

1-1-2015

Divided Schools and Divided Societies: Ethnic Saliency, Socialization, and Attitudes among Higs School Seniors in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Matthew Thomas Becker

Follow this and additional works at: <https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd>

 Part of the [Political Science Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Becker, Matthew Thomas, "Divided Schools and Divided Societies: Ethnic Saliency, Socialization, and Attitudes among High School Seniors in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (2015). *Electronic Theses and Dissertations*. 1513.

<https://egrove.olemiss.edu/etd/1513>

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

DIVIDED SCHOOLS AND DIVIDED SOCIETIES: ETHNIC SALIENCY, SOCIALIZATION,
AND ATTITUDES AMONG HIGH SCHOOL SENIORS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

A Dissertation
presented in partial fulfillment of requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Department of Political Science
The University of Mississippi

by

MATTHEW THOMAS BECKER

May 2015

ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores the role of schools, families, and other-group contact on ethnic saliency and student attitudes towards outside groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) via statistical analysis. It was found that families, via familial example, have a statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) effect on increasing tolerance towards outside groups, and schools tend to play a secondary role due to a high degree of ethnic homogeneity within secondary schools. Frequency of religious service attendance also plays a statistically significant role in increasing ethnic saliency. Another significant finding is that a majority of high school seniors are not opposed to socializing outside of their own respective ethno-national groups. This dissertation finds that a coupling and de-coupling of ethno-national identity and religion are currently taking place in BiH; among Bosniaks and Croats they are coupled, whereas among Serbs and self-identifying Bosnians they are de-coupled. Data was gathered via field surveys taken by high school seniors from 78 high schools in 53 cities and towns located across the country.

ON ETHNICITY, LANGUAGE, AND RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF THE PEOPLES OF FORMER SFR YUGOSLAVIA

BOSNIAK: The Bosniaks are followers of Sunni Islam, speak Bosnian (formerly Serbo-Croatian), and write using the Latin alphabet. Before the Bosnian War, Bosniaks used ‘Muslim’ (*Musliman*) as their ethnic group. The right to define themselves as ‘Muslim in the national sense’ was given to them under the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution.

CROAT: The Croats are Catholic, speak Croatian (formerly Serbo-Croatian), and write using the Latin alphabet.

MACEDONIAN: The Macedonians are Macedonian Orthodox, speak Macedonian, and write using the Cyrillic alphabet.

MONTENEGRIN: The Montenegrins are Montenegrin Orthodox, speak Montenegrin (formerly Serbo-Croatian), and write using the Latin alphabet.

SERB: The Serbs are Serbian Orthodox, speak Serbian, (formerly Serbo-Croatian), and write using the Cyrillic alphabet.

SLOVENE: The Slovenes are Catholic, speak Slovenian, and write using the Latin alphabet.

When the term “Muslim” (*Musliman* / *Muslimanka*) is used in this dissertation, it is used as an ethnic identifier, and it refers to Bosniaks. Citizens (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) may also self-identify as being “Bosnian” (*Bosanac* / *Bosanka*), and speaking Bosnian as their language.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	ii
ON ETHNICITY, LANGUAGE, AND RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION OF THE PEOPLES OF FORMER SFR YUGOSLAVIA.....	iii
FUNDING DISCLOSURE.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vi
LIST OF MAPS.....	vii
LIST OF TABLES.....	viii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
LITERATURE REVIEW.....	22
EDUCATION AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS.....	52
DATA AND METHODOLOGY.....	64
ETHNIC SALIENCY AND NATIONAL SELF-IDENTIFICATION OF STUDENTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA.....	78
FAMILIAL SOCIALIZATION.....	117
OTHER-GROUP ORIENTATION AND THE CONTACT HYPOTHESIS.....	130
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS.....	152
LIST OF REFERENCES.....	162
LIST OF APPENDICES.....	182
VITA.....	189

FUNDING DISCLOSURE

Research for this dissertation was funded in full by a National Security Education Program, David L. Boren Fellowship. The opinions expressed herein are the author's own and do not necessarily express the views of the National Security Education Program or the Institute of International Education. Research for this dissertation was also supported in part by a Title VIII Fellowship, which is funded by the U.S. State Department, Title VIII Program for Research and Training on Eastern Europe and Eurasia (Independent States of the Former Soviet Union). The opinions expressed herein are the author's own and do not necessarily express the views of the U.S. Department of State.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb – Center for Educational Research and Development for hosting me during my time abroad, especially Dr. Branislava Baranović, Iva Košutić, and Jelena Matić. In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Dinka Čorkalo-Biruški of the University of Zagreb for her help. I would like to thank my wonderful language professor, Dr. Ellen Elias-Bursać, for without her classes, I would not have been able to communicate in-field and would not have been able to secure the necessary permissions to conduct my fieldwork. Finally, and most importantly, I would also like to thank all of the students, for without their time and honest answers to sensitive questions, this dissertation would not be possible in its current form. This, in turn, would not have been possible without the help and permission of all the school principals for allowing me into their schools. The relevant ministries of education must also be recognized for granting me permission to carry out my research in their respective jurisdictions, for which I am grateful.

LIST OF MAPS

1. Post-Dayton Political Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina.....xi
2. Ethnic Composition at the Municipal Level in the Socialist Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991 Census).....xii

LIST OF TABLES

1. Cantonal Ethnic Saliency Scores.....	84
2a. Effects of Religious Service Attendance on Ethnic Saliency in Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	89
2b. Effects of Religious Service Attendance on Ethnic Saliency in the Federation of BiH.....	92
2c. Effects of Religious Service Attendance on Ethnic Saliency in Republika Srpska.....	93
2d. Effects of Religious Service Attendance on Ethnic Saliency in the Brčko District of BiH...	94
2e. Effects of Religious Service Attendance on Ethnic Saliency in Herzegovina.....	95
3a. Frequency of Religious Service Attendance.....	98
3b. Is Religion an Important Part of Your Life?.....	98
4. Effects of School Curricula (NPP) on Ethnic Saliency in Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	103
5. Cantonal Residence and Ethnic Saliency among Serbs.....	105
6a. National Self-Identification of Students in Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	110
6b. Effects of Civic Pride on Ethnic Saliency in Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	111
6c. Effects of Ethnic Saliency on Civic Pride in Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	112
7. Effects of Familial Socialization on Ethnic Saliency in Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	121
8. Familial Socialization vs. Ethnically Divided Towns in Three Cantons (Central Bosnia, Herzegovina-Neretva, and Zenica-Doboj).....	127
9. Effects of Religious Service Attendance and Urbanism on Other-Group Orientation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	135
10. Attending a Non-appropriate Ethnic School and its Effects on Tolerance in Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	137

LIST OF TABLES

11. Tolerance in Bosnia and Herzegovina – the Role of Families vs. Attending a Non-appropriate Ethnic School.....	140
12. Effects of Student Enjoyment of Being around other National Groups on Ethnic Saliency in Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	145
13. Effects of Spending Time with People from Other National Groups on Ethnic Saliency in Bosnia and Herzegovina.....	146
14. Meaningful Contact in Bosnia and Herzegovina	150


MAP 1: POST-DAYTON POLITICAL MAP OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA



Key (Federation of BiH):

- 1 – Una-Sana Canton.....Bosniak majority
- 2 – Posavina Canton.....Croat majority
- 3 – Tuzla Canton.....Bosniak majority
- 4 – Zenica-Doboj Canton.....Bosniak majority
- 5 – Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Goražde.....Bosniak majority
- 6 – Central Bosnia Canton.....ethnically mixed (Bosniak and Croat)
- 7 – Herzegovina-Neretva Canton.....ethnically mixed (Bosniak and Croat)
- 8 – West Herzegovina Canton.....Croat majority
- 9 – Canton Sarajevo.....Bosniak majority
- 10 – Hercegbosanska Canton.....Croat majority

MAP 2: ETHNIC COMPOSITION AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL (1991 CENSUS)



CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), as well as the Balkans as a whole, continue to be a critical region for American security interests and foreign policy. One of the most dynamic and potentially destabilizing forces is ethnic nationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country is currently experiencing two simultaneous and complicated transitions: post-war inter-ethnic reconciliation and post-communist democratization. According to the USAID “Strengthening Independent Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina Project” (2013, 1), the country is facing “...an increase in nationalistic rhetoric in political discourse and the media, which greatly influences public sentiment and attitudes.” It remains a society that is highly divided along ethnic lines, and overcoming these ethnic divisions is critical for democratic consolidation to occur. Sivac-Bryant (2008, 107) concurs, stating that “...nationalist parties and media continue to dominate public discourse, which has delayed the process of achieving justice and democratization.” The country's volatility was also stressed by the Director of U.S. National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, in his 2013 worldwide threat assessment report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the report stated that within the country, “...differences among Serb, Croat, and Bosniak elites are intensifying, threatening BiH's state institutions...[and that] secessionist rhetoric from the leadership of the political entity Republika Srpska has further challenged

Bosnia's internal cohesion” (Clapper 2013, 29-30). The 2014 report did not leave room for optimism, either, stating that ethnic leaders continue their efforts to “...maintain control over their political and ethnic fiefdoms...,” and thereby undermining state institutions (Clapper 2014, 27).

The purpose of this dissertation is to measure the causes and effects of ethnic saliency, socialization, and attitudes of high school seniors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Schools affect conceptualization of student identity because school education is a central form of political socialization for young people (Hello et al. 2004; Torsti 2007, 92), and schools in post-war societies serve as a particularly strong socialization agent (Ajduković and Biruški 2008, 340). Understanding this phenomenon is important for the academic and policy communities. This is due to the fact that ethnic nationalism is one of the “... most powerful political ideologies in the modern world, and it glorifies the state” (Mearsheimer 2001, 365). Indeed, the idea of “...nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (Anderson 2006, 3). After the fall of communism and socialism, which were forms of collective identity, another collective identity replaced it: ethnic nationalism. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, three competing ethno-nationalist ideologies emerged within the state.

This dissertation departs from previous scholarly work on Bosnia and Herzegovina in two ways. The current literature may be broken down into four broad categories, all reviewed in detail in the literature review chapter: analyses of history textbooks at various grade levels, a descriptive overview of the educational systems and situation, localized case studies which are usually focused on Mostar, and minority-returnee issues. In contrast, my work investigates student perceptions and attitudes, and hopes to contribute to a better understanding of the role

that schools and families play in shaping student identity and attitudes. I also contribute original data in the form of surveys of high school seniors throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, from 78 high schools in 53 cities and towns located across the country. The selection of these cities and towns was based on a non-probability sampling approach. A total of 5,749 surveys were conducted; 59.38% of all respondents were female (n=3,414), 38.25% of all respondents were male (n=2,199), and 2.37% of all respondents (n=136) did not provide their gender (either skipping the question or turning in a blank survey). The last official census¹ conducted in the country took place in 1991, before the outbreak of the war, while it was still a constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. My dissertation is also unusual in that it will focus on quantitative rather than qualitative analysis. The quantitative approach also differs from the majority of past research conducted on the general topic of ethnic identity as well (Phinney 1990, 499; 511).

Background: The Bosnian Kingdom, the Ottoman Empire, and Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Before the arrival of the Ottoman Empire, Bosnia and Herzegovina existed as a banate and independent kingdom ruled by the Kotromanić dynasty, with its territory comprising much of its modern state borders, and at its peak reaching to the Dalmatian coast, Montenegro, and parts of Serbia under the rule of King Tvrtko I. The Bosnian Kingdom had its own alphabet, known as *bosančica*, or Bosnian Cyrillic (Malcolm 2002, 26). During the time of the Bosnian Kingdom, an indigenous Christian church, known as the Bosnian Church (*Crvka bosanska*), competed with the Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches, and was declared to be heretical by

¹ The country held its first post-war census in October 2013 (Sanić-Hadžihasanović 2013, 1), but ethnic data has yet to be released. Information about this is covered in Chapter Five.

the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church. The followers of the Bosnian Church referred to themselves simply as *krstjanin* – ‘Christian’ (Malcolm 2002, 33). In some areas of the kingdom, however, most notably in Herzegovina and the eastern fringe of Bosnia, there were three competing Christian churches: the Bosnian Church, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Serbian Orthodox Church. In Bosnia-proper, there were two: the Bosnian Church and the Roman Catholic Church (Malcolm 2002, 57). Establishing a connection between Islamization and members² of the Bosnian Church, as well as the nature of the Bosnian Church in general, has been and continues to be one of the most argued over topic of the country’s history (Bringa 1995, 14-15; Malcolm 2002, 27). In the case of general church practices and especially specific beliefs, there exists very little written evidence (Bringa 1995, 17), thus making this a topic that can never be put fully to rest. The kingdom also had another unique cultural phenomenon: *stećci*. The *stećci* (singular: *stećak*) are unique tombstones erected by adherents of all three churches (Malcolm 2002, 30-31), with the epitaphs written in *bosančica*.

According to Malcolm (2002, 57), “[w]hat the story of the Bosnian Church shows is that Bosnia had a peculiarly weak and fractured ecclesiastical history during the period leading up to the Turkish conquest.” Tanner (2001, 29) concurs, stating that it was a kingdom “...divided against itself owing to the unresolved tripartite struggle for supremacy between...” the Bosnian Church, the Roman Catholic Church, and the Serbian Orthodox Church. The 1463 conquest of the kingdom by the Ottoman Empire brought a new faith: Islam. According Bieber (2000, 20), the indigenous South Slavic populations’ conversion to Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina was influenced by the Bektashi Order, which tolerated the consumption of alcohol and allowed

² Bosniaks link their ethno-national identity to the former adherents of the Bosnian Church, thus distinguishing themselves from the Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs.

marriage to non-Muslims. Unlike in Albania, the Ottomans did not bring a policy of forced religious conversion to Bosnia and Herzegovina. And yet, it is in this country where the local Christian population converted to Islam in very high numbers compared to other conquered lands and peoples (Bringa 1995, 15).

Another misconception that must be dispelled is the idea of a mass re-settlement of Muslims from other parts of the Ottoman Empire into the former Bosnian Kingdom. Indeed, historical Ottoman tax records, known as *defters*, show that this was not the case. According to Malcolm (2002, 54), the very "...idea that there was any sort of mass settlement during this period of Muslims from outside Bosnia must be dismissed: though the Ottomans did settle some Turkic peoples in other parts of the Balkans, the *defters* confirm that no such policy was ever applied to Bosnia." The Ottomans did, however, have an official settlement policy of Orthodox believers into Bosnia, especially in lands near the military border with the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Ottoman *defters* of the 1470s and 1480s identify these Orthodox believers as Vlachs (Malcolm 2002, 71-72), whose descendants would eventually identify themselves as Serbs due to their affiliation with the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The separation of the three religious communities into different ethno-national communities took place due to the spread of nationalism and influence from neighboring Croatia and Serbia. According to Dositej Obradović (1742-1811; cited by Bieber 2000, 20-21), who brought Enlightenment ideals to the Kingdom of Serbia and served as its first minister of education:

A Turk of Bosnia and Herzegovina is called a Turk according to his religion, but as for race and language, of whatever sort were his remote ancestors, of the same sort will be his latest descendants: Bosnians and Herzegovinians, so long as God's world endures. ... When the real Turks return to their own vilayet, whence they came, the Bosnians will remain Bosnians.

For Bieber (2000, 21), this means that the three religious communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina were not transformed into three different ethno-national communities until the nineteenth century.

Background: the Breakup of SFR Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (*Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavija*; hereinafter referred to as ‘SFR Yugoslavia’) was a one-party, socialist federal state which consisted of six constituent republics³ and two autonomous provinces.⁴ SFR Yugoslavia had three official languages,⁵ two official alphabets (Latin and Cyrillic), six peoples (Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Muslims, Serbs, and Slovenes; singular: *narod*), and ten *narodnosti* (‘nationalities’), of which the Albanians and Hungarians were the two largest ethnic groups. The official motto of SFR Yugoslavia was “Brotherhood and Unity” (*Bratstvo i jedinstvo*). Josip Broz Tito was president of SFR Yugoslavia until his death on May 4, 1980. After the death of Tito, the post of President of the Presidency of SFR Yugoslavia was re-established; this chairmanship rotated between each of the constituent republics and two autonomous provinces of SFR Yugoslavia on an annual basis until the collapse of the country in 1991 with the declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia (Ramet 2002; Lampe 2000).

³ Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Socialist Republic of Croatia, Socialist Republic of Macedonia, Socialist Republic of Montenegro, Socialist Republic of Serbia, and the Socialist Republic of Slovenia. The political structure of what would become SFR Yugoslavia was agreed upon during the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of the People’s Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), which took place November 21-29, 1943 in Jajce.

⁴ Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, both of which were located in the Socialist Republic of Serbia.

⁵ Serbo-Croatian, Macedonian, and Slovenian.

Bosnia and Herzegovina held its first democratic multi-party election in December 1990; the overwhelming majority of votes were cast for the main ethnic-nationalist parties: *Hrvatska demokratska zajednica Bosne i Hercegovine* ('Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina;' HDZ-BiH), *Srpska demokratska stranka* ('Serbian Democratic Party;' SDS), and *Stranka demokratske akcije* ('Party of Democratic Action;' SDA). Alija Izetbegović (SDA) was the first elected president of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; within the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Radovan Karadžić was the leader of the SDS and Miljenko Brkić was leader of the HDZ-BiH.

On 14 October 1991, Radovan Karadžić and the rest of the SDS deputies left the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina due to a plan to vote on Bosnian-Herzegovinian legislative sovereignty within Yugoslavia (but not independence). After the SDS departure, the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina voted in favor of legislative sovereignty. Several days later, the SDS proclaimed a Serb National Assembly, which was located in the Yugoslav People's Army (*Jugoslovenska narodna armija*; JNA) stronghold of Banja Luka (Malcolm 2002, 228).

The self-proclaimed Serb National Assembly declared the creation of the Republic of the Serb People of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Republika Srpskog naroda Bosne i Hercegovine*) on 09 January 1992, in which it was also declared to be an integral part of Yugoslavia. On 28 February 1992, the Serb National Assembly adopted a constitution, and changed the name of their republic to the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Srpska republika Bosne i Hercegovine*); Radovan Karadžić was elected president in April 1992 (Malcolm 2002; Lampe 2000). The Bosnian-Serb statelet would change its name one final time, to *Republika Srpska* ('Republic of the Serbs;' hereinafter referred to as 'Republika Srpska'). The day after the Serb National Assembly adopted its constitution, Bosnia and Herzegovina held a two-day vote (29 February

and 01 March 1992) on independence from Yugoslavia; 63.4% of eligible voters cast their ballot and it passed with 99.7% in favor of independence, although an overwhelming majority of Bosnian-Serbs boycotted the vote (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe report, 21); however, some Bosnian-Serbs did vote in favor of independence. Bosnia and Herzegovina declared independence from what was now a rump-Yugoslavia on 03 March 1992; the opening shots of the Bosnian War took place on 07 March 1992 by Serbian and Bosnian-Serb paramilitary forces. The Siege of Sarajevo by the *Vojske Republike Srpske* ('Army of Republika Srpska;' VRS), commanded by General Ratko Mladić, began on 06 April 1992. General Jovan Divjak (an ethnic-Serb who self-identified as being Bosnian) organized the defense of Sarajevo and was second-in-command of the Bosnian-government army, the *Armija Republike Bosne i Hercegovine* ('Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;' A-RBiH). On 25 August 1992, the VRS began shelling the National Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was one part of a systematic campaign of cultural destruction (Sells 1996, 1-5; 149-152) to erase any form of a "Bosnian" identity and history.

Republika Srpska was supported by the JNA and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević (*Socijalistička partija Srbije* - 'Socialist Party of Serbia;' SPS) in an effort to unite to create a Greater Serbia, with all Serbs in one nation-state (Ramet 2002; Malcolm 2002, Lampe 2000). A plan to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, took place much earlier; President Milošević and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman (*Hrvatska demokratska zajednica* – 'Croatian Democratic Union;' HDZ) met in March 1991 and drew up the Karadžević Agreement. This agreement divided Bosnia and Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia, thus also allowing for the creation of a Greater Croatia, which would have incorporated Herzegovina (Sells 1996, 95).

Similar to the nationalist Serbs, nationalist Croats set out to carve-up their own territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. The Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna (*Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bosna*) was proclaimed on 18 November 1991, which eventually declared independence on 02 July 1992 in the town of Grude as the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna (*Hrvatska republika Herceg-Bosna*); the eventual goal of which was political union with the Republic of Croatia.⁶ With the help of Croatian President Tuđman, Mate Boban (HDZ-BiH) wrested control of the party on 02 February 1992 from the more moderate (and pro-Bosnian) leadership of Stjepan Kljuić,⁷ who advocated that Croats should support the government of Alija Izetbegović (Ramet 2006, 343; Sells 1996, 96); Boban, a native of Herzegovina, then became leader of the HDZ-BiH and eventual president of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna. The *Hrvatsko vijeće obrane* ('Croatian Defense Council;' HVO) was one of two Croat militia forces, the other being the *Hrvatske obrambene snage* ('Croatian Defense Forces;' HOS). The HOS was commanded by Major General Blaž Kraljević, who, unlike Mate Boban and the HVO, advocated for a Croat-Bosniak alliance and opposed the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Divjak 2001, 175); Kraljević was also a member of the Chief of Staff of the A-RBiH. He was assassinated by HVO forces on 02 August 1992. The HOS was originally established as the armed-wing of the *Hrvatska stranka prava Bosne i Hercegovine* ('Croatian Party of Rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina;' HSP-BiH).

⁶ Up to December 1991, the HDZ-BiH was actually against the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, voting with the SDA and against the SDS. According to Thompson (1994, 204), the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna originally claimed to be a purely defensive arrangement and not hostile to the government in Sarajevo; this was viewed as credible by the government in Sarajevo given the recent JNA attack in Ravno. On 25 September 1991, over 5,000 JNA soldiers were sent to Ravno to destroy it and expel the Croats (Ramet 2002, 205). The area was to be incorporated into the Serb Autonomous Region of Herzegovina.

⁷ In an August 8, 1991 interview with *Bosanski pogledi*, Kljuić stated that "[w]e are for a sovereign and indivisible Bosnia-Herzegovina" (Thompson 1994, 204; footnote 8). He was a *Sarajlija* (native Sarajevan), and according to Tanner (2001, 286) "...was every inch a representative of Sarajevo's old middle class."

From 19 June 1992 to 23 February 1994, civil war broke out between the HVO and the A-RBiH, known as the Muslim-Croat War.⁸ The former allies competed in a land-grab for what may have constituted three ethnic mini-states (variations of which were put forth in different peace proposals to reflect the “reality on the ground,” most notably the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan). The fighting was fierce in Herzegovina and around central Bosnia. According to Sells (1996, 100), the authorities of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna used the map of one such peace plan, the 1993 Vance-Owen Peace Plan, as justification to attack Muslim communities in areas that the map labeled as being under Croat control.⁹ The purposeful shelling and destruction of the *Stari most* (‘Old Bridge’) in Mostar on 09 November 1993 by the HVO was a symbolic affirmation of their victory over the A-RBiH (Ramet 2006, 438); it was also a form of deliberate cultural destruction in an attempt to erase a symbol of a shared cultural heritage and peaceful coexistence (Coward 2009) between Bosniaks and Croats. In January 1994, President Tuđman replaced Boban with Krešimir Zubak, a lawyer from the Bosnian Posavina region. For Galbraith (2002, 140), the removal of Boban was a necessary pre-condition for ending the Muslim-Croat War, and Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granić (HDZ) helped this to occur.

⁸ The exceptions to this were in Sarajevo, Tuzla, the northwestern municipality of Bihać, and in the northern Posavina municipality of Orašje, where the two sides never went into armed conflict with each other and continued their cooperation on the battlefield.

⁹ The 1993 Vance-Owen Peace Plan also broke with the international concept of *Uti possidetis, ita possidetis* (Ramet 2002, 210).

An Alliance Betrayed: Civil War in Central Bosnia

In central Bosnia, Shrader (2003, 4) argues it was not the ethnic map of the 1993 Vance-Owen Peace Plan that caused the Muslim-Croat War, but rather the fall of Jajce in October 1992 to the VRS and the influx of Bosniak refugees from eastern Bosnia into central Bosnia.¹⁰ Shrader (2003, 4; 51) states it was not the Bosnian-Croats, but rather the “disruptive presence” of Bosniak refugees and around 4,000 foreign *mujahidin*, openly invited by President Izetbegović, that served as the catalyst for the conflict in central Bosnia. For unlike the Herzegovinian-Croats, the Croats of Bosnia-proper had tended to support an independent and unified Bosnian state (Tanner 2001, 285). With the influx of Bosniak military-aged men into central Bosnia, Shrader (2003, 4) states that the Bosniaks had “the means and the motive” to strike against the Bosnian-Croats, for they needed a new place of settlement. The A-RBiH was the clear aggressor in central Bosnia, and were even planning an offensive against the HVO and the Croats of Bosnia-proper before the fall of Jajce to the VRS (Shrader 2003, 72-73); the attack came as a shock to the HVO leadership in Operative Zone Central Bosnia, as they never suspected to be betrayed by the A-RBiH (Shrader 2003, 73). Ramet (2006, 435) also states that the arrival of *mujahidin* helped to spark the conflict between Bosniaks and Bosnian-Croats; she also blames (as a contributing factor) the arrival of Bosniak refugees fleeing the VRS for raising ethnic tensions: many of these Muslim Bosniaks came from mono-ethnic villages, and were not used to living with Croats. Ramet (2006, 435), Shrader (2003), and Tanner (2001, 287) concur; the strong animosity that now exists between the Bosniaks and Croats of central Bosnia came about due to the Muslim-Croat War, where Afghan *mujahidin* began to arrive, along with Bosniak refugees fleeing VRS

¹⁰ In central Bosnia, the conflict began on 14 January 1993, which was only two days after the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was unveiled.

advances, streaming into HVO-controlled towns, thus changing the ethnic balance of places such as Travnik and Bugojno. The A-RBiH offensive against the HVO began in the town of Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje (HVO Operative Zone Northwest Herzegovina), by the 305th and 317th Mountain Brigades, Third Corps, A-RBiH (Shrader 2003, 74).

The 1994 Washington Agreement brought an end to the Muslim-Croat War and created the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine*; hereinafter referred to as the ‘Federation of BiH’) from the territories controlled by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna on 02 March 1994 (Ramet 2002, 216-217), and divided the Federation of BiH into ten cantons; five are majority-Bosniak,¹¹ three are majority-Croat,¹² and two are ethnically mixed.¹³ The renewed alliance then focused on fighting the VRS and Serb-Montenegrin paramilitary forces (Malcolm 2002, 256). The 1994 Washington Agreement served as the basis for the creation of the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Federation of BiH became the foundation of American efforts to bring the Bosnian War to an end (Galbraith 2002, 141). The Federation of BiH is oftentimes mistakenly referred to as the “Muslim-Croat Federation.”

¹¹ Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Gorazde, Canton Sarajevo, Tuzla Canton, Una-Sana Canton, and Zenica-Doboj Canton.

¹² Hercegbosanska Canton, Posavina Canton, and West Herzegovina Canton. The Constitutional Court of the Federation of BiH ruled that the name “Hercegbosanska” is unconstitutional and must be changed (Ustavni sud Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine 1998; ruling U-11/97); the cantonal authorities have ignored the ruling and continue to use the name on all official documents, however. The canton is referred to by its official numerical designation (Canton 10) at the Entity and state levels. The ruling also banned the use of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna flag as the official cantonal flag, but cantonal authorities continue to use/fly it. West Herzegovina Canton uses the same flag, but has not had any rulings against its use by them.

¹³ Central Bosnia Canton and Herzegovina-Neretva Canton.

The Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia

In 1993, Fikret Abdić (*Demokratska narodna zajednica* - 'Democratic People's Union,' DNZ) declared the creation of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (*Autonomna pokrajina Zapadna Bosna*), with Velika Kladuša as its capital. In 1995, the name was changed to the Republic of Western Bosnia. Abdić, a Muslim, fought against the A-RBiH and was allies with the Bosnian-Serb authorities of Republika Srpska and the Croatian-Serb authorities of Republika Srpska Krajina.¹⁴ The joint Croatian Army (HV) and A-RBiH military operation known as *Oluja* ('Storm') was the surprise military offensive that re-took control of Slavonia (eastern Croatia) and the western Bosnian Krajina region in 1995, with Operation *Maestral* ('Mistral') linked to it, ending in a decisive victory for the Croatian Army and the A-RBiH (Galbraith 2002, 145). One important aspect of Operation *Oluja* within Bosnia and Herzegovina was that it lifted the joint Army of Republika Srpska Krajina and the People's Defense of Western Bosnia (*Narodna odbrana Zapadne Bosne*) siege of the city of Bihać; the city was one of six cities/towns given the dubious honor of being proclaimed a United Nations Safe Area¹⁵ during the war.

¹⁴ Republika Srpska Krajina was the Croatian-Serb statelet during the Croatian War of Independence, referred to in Croatia as the Homeland War. *Krajina* refers to the old military borderlands between the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, known as the *Vojna krajina* ('Military Frontier'; Tanner 2001, 37). Republika Srpska Krajina was originally proclaimed as the Autonomous Province of the Serbian Krajina, with its capital in Knin (Tanner 2001, 234).

¹⁵ Along with Bihać, the other cities/towns were: Goražde, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Žepa (UN Security Council Resolution 819). These UN Safe Areas were supposed to be protected by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

The End of the Armed Conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, better known as the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, brought the three and a half year Bosnian War to an end. It established the current consociational (Lijphart 1977) ethnic power-sharing arrangement¹⁶ as well as the de-facto partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Malcolm 2002, 270) between the Serbs and the Bosniaks/Croats through the creation of the two Entities:¹⁷ the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska. Although it institutionalized ethnic division, it also promoted the return of refugees and displaced persons to their pre-war homes, through Annex VII.¹⁸ The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords were unable to solve one issue, however – the contentious status of the municipality of Brčko, due to its strategic location for both Republika Srpska and the Federation of BiH (see: Map 1). Article V of Annex II established the creation of the Brčko International Arbitration Tribunal for the Dispute Over the Inter-Entity Boundary in Brčko Area Award to

¹⁶ The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is derived from Annex IV of the Dayton Peace Accords, specifically lists Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs as the three “constituent peoples” who have ethnic rights. Those who do not identify with one of the three are considered “Other citizens” and currently do not have the right to run for high office or be appointed to positions that are reserved for the three constituent peoples. According to the Law on the Protection of Rights of Members of National Minorities, adopted in 2003 by the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the country has 17 recognized ethnic-minority groups, of which the Roma are the largest. In 2009, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the country’s ethnic electoral laws violate minority rights (Protocol XII of the European Convention) after two non-constituent citizens – a Roma and a Jew – sued (case: Sejdić and Finci vs. Bosnia and Herzegovina). See: Milanović (2010) for the case note. On 15 July 2014, the European Court of Human Rights ruled in favor of Azra Zornić, who brought her own suit against her country since she does not identify with one of the three constituent peoples, but rather as a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina without ethnic affiliation (European Court of Human Rights 2014). Although the court ruled in her favor, as well as in Sejdić-Finci, they are still legally not allowed to run for high office until the country changes its constitution and electoral laws. The most visible example of the ethnic power-sharing may be seen through the fact that the country has three presidents: a Bosniak, a Croat, and a Serb. In addition, each Entity has its own president and prime minister.

¹⁷ The Federation of BiH consists of 51% of the country and Republika Srpska consists of 49% of the country.

¹⁸ The right of return has been obstructed at the local level, especially in eastern Republika Srpska and Herzegovina, where the ethno-nationalist parties wish to maintain their ethnic dominance, however (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail, June 2005). Galbraith (2002, 147) argues that the problems currently facing the country, particularly refugee-returnees, are not due to a failing of the peace agreement, but rather of the implementation.

decide on the final status of the municipality. In March 1999, it was ruled that the Brčko municipality would be held “in-condominium” between the two Entities and established the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Brčko Distrikt Bosne i Hercegovine / Distrikt Brčko Bosne i Hercegovine*; hereinafter: Brčko District of BiH)¹⁹ as a special political-administrative unit under direct control of the International Supervisor of Brčko District (through the Brčko Final Award Office²⁰), who also serves as the Principal Deputy High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. This position is reserved for an American, while the position of High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina is reserved for a European. The current High Representative for BiH is Valentin Inzko, an Austrian, who also serves as the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUSR). The current Principal Deputy High Representative for BiH is Tamir Waser.

The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords created a weak central state with two highly autonomous Entities. Within the Federation of BiH, the ten cantons are highly autonomous as well, and have full control over educational policy and affairs. This may be seen in the fact that the Federal Ministry of Education and Science of the Federation of BiH does not have any authority over the cantonal ministries of education due to the highly decentralized educational and political system within the Federation of BiH. Since authority for creating and implementing educational policy was given to the individual cantons under the Constitution of the Federation

¹⁹ The Brčko District of BiH is defined by Chapter I Article 1(1) of the Statute of the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Statut Brčko Distrikta Bosne i Hercegovine) as being a “single administrative unit of local self-government existing under the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

²⁰ The Brčko Final Award Office was officially closed by International Supervisor for Brčko District and Principal Deputy High Representative for BiH Roderick Moore on August 31, 2012. The position of International Supervisor for Brčko District was not closed, but “suspended,” and retains all powers if it is deemed necessary to intervene within the Brčko District of BiH.

of BiH (Section III Article 4.b), the cantons have “...organized their individual school systems according to national dividing lines” (Bartulović 2006, 54). The Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Department of Education, which is the nominal “state level” ministry, likewise has no authority over the Entity ministries of education or the Brčko District of BiH Department of Education. The municipality of Žepče has a “special status” within Zenica-Doboj Canton since it is a Croat-majority municipality within a Bosniak-majority canton; this means that the cantonal ministry has no authority within this municipality.²¹

Huntington (1996) argued that the wars in the former SFR Yugoslavia – and specifically in Bosnia and Herzegovina – were due to a “clash of civilizations.” Huntington (1996, 261) states that the three great European faiths of “...Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, and Islam, [are] the confessional detritus of the empires whose frontiers collided in Bosnia.” Thus, for Huntington (1996), it was Islamic, Orthodox, and Western civilizations that clashed. Kaplan (1993) argued the war came about due to “ancient ethnic hatreds;” in a similar line as the ancient hatreds argument, the “doctrine of moral equivalence” has also been put forth by various politicians as to why the war began as well as why there would never be peace (Hashemi 2002, 187-190).

For Ramet (2006; 2002), it was neither a “clash of civilizations” nor “ancient ethnic hatreds” that caused war to occur. Rather, she stresses that the ethnic hatred – which did fuel the war – was “...manufactured artificially, through skillful use of the media, propaganda, secret-police rumor-mongering, and the rehabilitation of nationalistically inclined agents, such as the

²¹ Educational affairs for Žepče Municipality used to fall under the Herzegovina-Neretva Canton Ministry of Education, but now falls under the Department of Administrative and Social Affairs of Žepče Municipality. Section V Article 2(2) of the Constitution of the Federation of BiH stipulates for the devolution of power to the municipal level when the majority-group of the municipality is different from that of the canton as a whole.

Serbian Orthodox Church²²...” (Ramet 2006, 481). Indeed, the Serbian Orthodox Church had numerous clergy²³ who took an active role in the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia (Iveković 2002, 524), whose declared aims were to unite all Serbs into one nation-state.²⁴ According to Bringa (2002, 28), the war was not a clear-cut religious conflict between Islam and Christianity, nor between what she terms “Christian- and Muslim-identified communities.” Rather, she argues that in order to understand the dynamics of the war, “...it is paramount to analyze the relationship between the three ethnic/national communities, each defined by a distinct religious system of beliefs, rituals, and symbols.” This is due to the fact that “...religion is the main cultural distinguishing factor...” among the three peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bringa 2002, 28). For Dahlman and Ó Tuathail (June 2005, 574), the Bosnian War came about due to “...competing visions of security and the meaning of the state.”

The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution decentralized much authority to the individual republics and the two autonomous provinces; due to this, the republic-level mass media made it surprisingly easy to spread divisive nationalistic messages in the years after Tito’s death. According to Lampe (2001, 342), it was due to the “...relative sophistication and reliability of

²² In 1989, the Serbian Orthodox Church disintombed the earthly remains of Serbian Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović and carried them across presumed “Serb lands” to mark “...the political space of ‘Greater Serbia’” The final destination of these remains was Kosovo Polje, to commemorate the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje.

²³ The militant stance of the Serbian Orthodox Church during and after the war has always been transparent (Sells 2003, 316). Although the Catholic Church took a markedly less militant stance in public, there was a strong division between the leadership in Herzegovina and Bosnia-proper (Sells 2003, 316-322). Within the Catholic Church, there is a notable divide between the Franciscans of Herzegovina (along with the clergy of the Diocese of Mostar-Duvno) and the Franciscans and clergy of Bosnia-proper. Those in Herzegovina have tended to be supporters of extreme Croatian nationalism, whereas those from Bosnia-proper tend to be supporters of a multi-ethnic Bosnian-Herzegovinian nation (Sells 2003, 321).

²⁴ According to Ó Tuathail and Dahlman (September 2006, 308), Republika Srpska was meant to be a “‘Serb homeland.’”

Yugoslavia's press, radio, and television [that] gave them a far greater influence²⁵ over public opinion than in any of the Soviet bloc countries." Friedman (2004, 77) argues that the mass medias in Yugoslavia were needed to prepare the population for war since it was the media that contributed to creating an exclusionary ethnic identity.

Since the end of the war, the country has three main broadsheet newspapers that cater to the three main ethnic communities: *Dnevni avaz* (Bosniak), *Dnevni list* (Croat), and *Glas Srpske* (Serb). *Oslobođenje* ('Liberation') is the main Sarajevo broadsheet newspaper. This segmented media market is conducive to the promotion and continuation of ethnic nationalism. According to Snyder and Ballentine (1996, 19), the main reason for this is that segmented media markets incentivize political elites "...to promote nationalist populism as a substitute for true democratization." Sivac-Bryant (2008, 107) concurs, arguing that nationalist political parties and the mass media continue their dominance of the public discourse, thus preventing true democratization and consolidation to occur. The challenge, according to the USAID "Strengthening Independent Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina Project" (2013, 1) is that journalists "...adhere to 'patriotism' rather than professionalism, and serve mostly special interests – not the public. The lack of professional and unbiased media prevents constructive public dialogue and further development of democracy" in the country. This biased and ethno-centric media is not fulfilling one of the key roles of the mass media for societies in transition: the "watchdog" role of the mass media (Vltmer 2006, 5), which is supposed to hold all political elites accountable to the citizenry. An exception to this is *Nezavisne novine*.

²⁵ See Zaller (1996) for mass media effects and the theory of "massive media impact" in shaping public opinion. Newton (2006) argues against the power of the mass media. During the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, according to Thompson (1994, 1), the mass media was a "strategic concern" for the warring sides, because they knew how important public opinion in America and Western Europe would be in shaping political opinion for the final outcome of the conflicts.

Post-war Political Situation

According to Kukić (2001), the slowest to return to their pre-war homes have been the Serbs to the Federation of BiH. Dahlman and Ó Tuathail (June 2005, 591) found this to be true as well, stating that the demographic legacy of ethnic cleansing has been reversed in only a small number of formerly Serb-majority municipalities²⁶ in the Federation of BiH. Phuong (2000) found that this was mainly due to political obstruction by local officials in the Federation of BiH. Dahlman and Ó Tuathail (September 2005, 656) state that the “frontline” of this obstructionism is at the local municipal housing office, which is controlled by the local ethno-national political parties. In contrast, the authors found that minority-returnees to Republika Srpska²⁷ more than doubled. Sivac-Bryant (2008, 108) cites several United Nations reports that claim the town of Kozarac (Prijeedor Municipality) has been “...one of the most successful returnee communities in the country.” In eastern Republika Srpska,²⁸ however, Dahlman and Ó Tuathail (June 2005) state

²⁶ According to the 1991 Census of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, there were seven Serb-majority municipalities that now comprise the post-war Federation of BiH: Drvar, Bosanski Petrovac, Bosansko Grahovo, Glamoč, Ključ, Kupres, and Ilijaš. I was able to visit schools in five of the seven municipalities, and found that ethnic cleansing has been reversed in only two (Bosanski Petrovac and Drvar) out of the five. The municipality of Bosansko Grahovo (Hercegbosanska Canton) does not have a high school, and I did not receive permission to visit the school in Ilijaš (Canton Sarajevo). The situation in Glamoč is more difficult to ascertain, although if we follow the assumption of who has their war memorial in the town center comprises the majority population, then Croats are the majority within the town of Glamoč. The municipality has one high school, with seven students comprising the entire senior class: three Serbs, two Croats, and two Bosniaks.

²⁷ According to the 1991 Census, there were two Croat-majority municipalities that now comprise the post-war Republika Srpska: Bosanski Brod and Bosanski Šamac. Ethnic cleansing has not been reversed in Bosanski Brod, and I did not receive permission to visit the high school in Bosanski Šamac. During the war, cities and towns that had ‘Bosanski’ or ‘Bosansko’ in their names were changed to ‘Srpski’ or ‘Srpsko’ to show ethnic ownership. The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has ruled such names to be illegal, and rather than restore the ‘Bosnian’ toponyms, they were dropped completely (such as with Brod and Šamac). Another example is the pre-war town of Bosanski Novi, now called Novi Grad (‘New City’).

²⁸ According to the 1991 Census, there were nine Muslim-majority municipalities that now comprise the post-war Republika Srpska: Bratunac, Doboj, Foča, Prijedor, Rogatica, Srebrenica, Višegrad, Vlasenica, and Zvornik. All are located in eastern Republika Srpska with the exceptions of Prijedor and Doboj.

that the right of minority returns has been obstructed at the local level, where the ethno-nationalist parties wish to maintain their ethnic dominance.

Throughout the country, ethno-national territorialization has been occurring, whereby Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs have built war memorials to their respective sides, as well as displaying wartime, politically-charged flags and the flags of neighboring Serbia and Croatia. Ethnic war memorials are ubiquitous in the country, and as Torsti (2004, 147) states, "...flags and other national symbols signal who controls the territory." The presence of war memorials serves this purpose in each city and town, publically showing who "owns it." These memorials glorify the majority ethno-national group and the sacrifices made to preserve "our freedom," or to remind the people who the enemy is. Religious symbols and quotes from either the Bible or Quran are sometimes inscribed in these stone monuments as well. This public display of ownership extends to schools and classrooms as well, where ethno-national symbols may be found. The exception to this are schools in the Brčko District of BiH, who are only allowed to display symbols of the state (Statute of the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chapter I Article 3). In the center of Brčko, all three sides have a memorial; this is also the only place where all three sides have equal display in the country.²⁹ The impact of such ethnic war memorials in post-conflict societies on the reconciliation and transitional justice process is an

²⁹ In Mostar, Croats and Bosniaks each have a memorial in front of Mostar City Hall to the HVO and A-RBiH, respectively. The memorial to the A-RBiH was blown up on 14 January 2013 (Behram 2013, 1), and the perpetrator(s) have yet to be apprehended as of this writing. The memorial to the HVO was untouched in this attack.

under-researched topic (Clark 2013, 117)³⁰ that deserves further academic study, especially as it relates to the socialization process of children.

³⁰ Clark (2013) attempts to shed some light on this topic, and uses the Croatian city of Vukovar as a case study. She found that “Vukovar’s war memorials are a major factor contributing to the problems of both selective memory and excess memory,” and these memorials “...represent a fundamental obstacle to reconciliation” (Clark 2013, 122). The memorials in Vukovar only focus on Croatian victimhood and Serb aggression, without acknowledging the 5% of Croatian-Serbs from Vukovar who fought to defend the city alongside the Croats against the JNA (Clark 2013, 128). The memorials to Croat victimhood are highly-selective and fuel a “memory surplus,” which does not allow the citizens of Vukovar to move forward (Clark 2013, 135) in inter-ethnic reconciliation. The reconciliation process in Vukovar has thus far been a failure, and Kosić and Tauber (2010, 91) believe that “... Vukovar is an example of how *not* to achieve reconciliation among youth.” Another topic deserving further study is the effects of memorials to the victim-group in towns where they currently comprise the minority population; see Sivac-Bryant (2015) for her case study on this topic in the Bosnian town of Omarska (Prijeedor Municipality).

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

The current literature on post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina may be broken down into four broad categories: a descriptive overview of the educational systems and situation, analyses of history textbooks at various grade levels, localized case studies, and minority-returnee issues. In this chapter, I review the previous research through incorporating them under the following overarching literature themes: ethnic identity and political socialization, education and the role of history textbooks, nationalism and the role of religion, and the contact hypothesis.

Ethnic Identity and Socialization

According to Phinney (1996, 143), the study of ethnic identity places its emphasis on how individual group members understand and interpret their own identity. In terms of research approach, the majority of researchers have taken a descriptive approach to the study of ethnic identity (Phinney 1990, 499; 511). “Ethnic identity” itself refers to the degree in which the individual has explored their ethnicity, is clear about what group membership means to them, and identifies with said ethnic group (Phinney 1996). From the perspective of social psychology, ethnic identity is a part of social identity, which Tajfel (1981, 255) defines as “...that *part* of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.”

Related to the idea of identity being a self-concept, Marcia (1980, 159) argues that identity is a “self-structure,” defined as being “...an internal, self-constructed, dynamic organization of drives, abilities, beliefs, and individual history.” The concept of “ethnic saliency” refers to how important their ethnic identity or background is to them (Roberts et al. 1999). According to identity formation theory, ethnic saliency is the outcome of ethnic identity search (Phinney 1993).

The concept and process of identity formation does not begin or end during adolescence, but adolescence is a time period that is much more critical than other periods of life for identity formation (Marcia 1980, 160). Identity formation in adolescence may be influenced by a number of socialization agents, such as schools (Hello et al. 2004; Torsti 2007), families (Erikson 1963), the mass media (Friedman 2004; Zaller 1996), and gender.³¹ Having an identity is an important aspect of being human, as well; Erikson (1968, 130) states that “...in the social jungle of human existence there is no feeling of being alive without a sense of identity.”

The process in which all of this occurs is known as “ethnic socialization,” which refers to the manner in which young people “...acquire the behaviors, perceptions, values, and attitudes of an ethnic group, and come to see themselves and others as members of such groups” (Rotheram and Phinney 1987, 11). Benedict Anderson (2006) refers to such a group, the nation, as an “imagined community.” Phinney and Rotheram (1987, 276) also note that ethnicity and ethnic socialization differ depending on the majority/minority status of children in schools; ethnic-minority children are more aware than the ethnic-majority children are. Ethnicity, or race, would thus be much more salient in heterogeneous schools, in comparison to homogenous schools (McGuire and McGuire 1982). Phinney and Rotheram (1987) as well as McGuire and McGuire

³¹ When it comes to the issue of how gender affects ethnic identity, some empirical evidence has found that women are less involved (or indifferent) compared to men, while other research suggests that ethnic identity is more important for women than men (Hjort and Frisé 2006, 147).

(1982) are set in the American context, where one's skin color easily shows group belonging; in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context, however, there are no physically distinguishing features or characteristics that set the three main ethnic groups apart: Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs are all South Slavs.

Next, I turn to the concept of political socialization, which can be part of the ethnic socialization process. Political socialization is "...the process by which the individual acquires attitudes, beliefs, and values relating to the political system of which he is a member and to his own role as a citizen within that political system'" (Gallatin 1980, 344; citing Greenberg 1970, 3). There are four major approaches in the study of political socialization: the Behavioral School, Generational School, Psychodynamic School, and Cognitive-Developmental School (Gallatin 1980, 345-348). Gallatin (1980) reviews the four approaches as well as research on political socialization agents and comes to the conclusion that although "...adolescence is a significant period for political socialization," it is also "...difficult to reach any definitive conclusions about political socialization during adolescence" due to the "...methodological limitations of the field and the mass of semidigested (sic) data..." (Gallatin 1980, 371). In order to overcome these limitations, in which the author believes is due to the use of statistical methodology (Gallatin 1980, 372), she advocates for the face-to-face interview (1980, 373). Aboud (1987, 55), however, believes that the use of advanced statistics pushes the study of ethnic socialization forward.

Schools are one possible socialization agent for young people, and I now turn to this specific literature. Schools affect conceptualization of student identity because school education

is a central form of political socialization³² for young people (Hello et al. 2004, 264-265; Torsti 2007, 92), and schools in post-war societies serve as a particularly strong socialization agent (Ajduković and Biruški 2008, 340). In post-war ethnically divided communities, such as in Vukovar, Croatia, the “...children grow up within a context loaded with social signs saying the community wants you to stay within your own ethnic group” (Ajduković and Biruški 2008, 340). When schools become divided along ethnic lines, children have limited opportunity to meet and have contact with others across the ethnic divide. In such circumstances, students are socialized to not interact with the “other.” Indeed, the central concept of socialization theory is that educational institutions transmit norms, values, and models of behavior which are considered appropriate in a given society. Gellner (1983, 34) goes so far as to argue that “...the monopoly of legitimate education is now more important, more central than is the monopoly of legitimate violence” for the state due to its role in the socialization of students. History textbooks serve as an instrument in this regard, for the power of history politics serves as the central factor in maintaining conflict and preventing reconciliation in a post-conflict, multicultural society. In the case of Vukovar, Reidy et al. (2015, 20) found in their qualitative study of 11, 13, and 15 year-old students (n=42) plus parents (n=24; not related to interviewed students), that schools were more important as an agent of socialization for Croatian students, in comparison to Croatian-Serbs.

Research on the segregated educational system in Northern Ireland provides support for the role of diverging history education in preventing reconciliation in a multicultural society.

³² According to Oder (2005, 80), early public schools were used to “fashion societies” in such a way so as to prevent conflict between Catholics and Protestants. Frederick the Great, the father of public schooling, claimed as much when he stated the purpose was to create *tolerance* amongst citizens of the state. Thus, public schools have served as socialization agents from their founding. Unfortunately, schools have also served as an agent for the promotion of intolerance amongst pupils.

Research on integrated schools in Northern Ireland also provides a window of what to expect in other societies which have experienced ethno-political conflict. In this line, McGlynn et al. (2004) explore the effects and legacy of integrated schools in Northern Ireland on its twenty-first anniversary.

A movement by parents for an integrated education system began in the late 1970s, with the first integrated school, Lagan College, opening its doors in 1981 (Donnelly 2004, 263; Smith 2001, 563).³³ In September 2003, there were a total of 50 integrated primary and secondary schools, the majority of which were organized by parents who wanted their children to be educated together (McGlynn et al. 2004, 152). 74% of parents wished to have more integrated schools³⁴ and stated they would opt for an integrated education if the opportunity was available for their children (McGlynn et al. 2004, 152). The establishment of such schools has come from cross-community parental initiatives at the local level, rather than from the government of Northern Ireland (Smith 2001, 564).

Research shows strong support that there is a positive effect of an integrated educational system on sectarian attitudes, and that cross-community contact between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland promotes positive out-group attitudes. The general assumption, then, is that integrated schools “...play a vital role in creating a cohesive and tolerant society” (Donnelly 2004, 264). In the context of Northern Ireland, research shows that “...awareness of the presence of outgroup members in an educational setting, rather than integrated education per

³³ The first integrated school may have opened in 1981, but it was not supported or financed by the government. Rather, these schools operated outside of the official education system and relied on parents and charities for funding. This changed in 1989 under the *1989 Education Reform (Northern Ireland) Order*, “...which placed a statutory duty on the Department of Education to ‘encourage and facilitate’ integrated schools...” (Donnelly 2004, 264).

³⁴ In September 2000, 4% of students attended integrated schools; 45 such schools existed at that time (Smith 2001, 564).

se, appears to affect attitudes towards the outgroup and the propensity towards forgiveness” (McGlynn et al. 2004, 157). In Northern Ireland, a fully integrated educational system allows for the promotion of forgiveness and reconciliation.

The first major study on the effects of high school civics curricula on political socialization was conducted by Langton and Jennings (1968). The authors found that high school civics courses had a positive effect on political knowledge for black students, but little to no effect for white students (1968, 859-860). The majority of political scientists have relied on this study to the present day, which for Niemi and Hepburn (1995) is why we have seen a lack of pre-collegiate studies within the political socialization literature to this day. The 1970s was the heyday of socialization work, but even then, political scientists paid little attention to pre-collegiate studies for the reason mentioned above. The paucity of theoretical and empirical research on political socialization related to American high school students means that there is little to offer by way of established conclusions or even methods of research. Yet this should not be the case; Niemi and Hepburn (1995, 6) argue that it is the high school years that should hold great interest for political scientists, for “...it is then that society makes the most explicit and concentrated effort to teach political knowledge and civic values.” Using data from the 1988 National Assessment of Educational Progress, Niemi and Junn (1993, 26) found that “...when it comes to high school seniors’ knowledge of American government and politics, the school and the civics curriculum do matter.” Moreover, in newly democratizing states, the “automatic” transmission of democratic ideals, which is taken for granted in the United States, cannot be taken for granted. Niemi and Hepburn (1995, 9) state that “...it cannot be readily assumed that education institutions or families will teach the appropriate knowledge and values” necessary to support a democratic polity. In the case of the emerging democracies of Southeastern Europe, an

understanding of the political socialization process can be done by examining the textbooks used in such classes as civics, history, and even geography – where the pedagogy used is part of the socialization process. Nationalist discourse may be found in the classrooms, where students are taught in an ethno-centric environment.

Hutton and Mehlinger (1987, 141) argue that civics, geography, and history textbooks are responsible for teaching students “...what adults believe they should know about their own culture as well as that of other societies.” The authors acknowledge that there are many sources of socialization in modern society; however, Hutton and Mehlinger (1987, 141) state that “...none compare to textbooks in their capacity to convey uniform, approved, even official version of what youth should believe.” Depending on the dominant “official” interpretation of history, a nation can perceive itself as a forceful, dominant and rising nation, as a cooperative and tolerant neighbor, or as a victim of aggressive foreign invasions (Stojanović 2009, 144-146; 155). A nation also can portray others as aggressive (e.g. all Croats are *Ustaše*³⁵), uncivilized, or treacherous (e.g. Bosnian-Muslims as “race traitors” who “forfeited” their Slavic identity; Sells 2002, 64; Sells 1996, 40-50) to justify its own policies and actions toward other nations (Stojanović 2009, 141); it also serves chauvinistic sentiments (i.e. reclaiming ‘our’ historic lands).³⁶ Murgescu (2002, 97) argues that geography, literature, religion, and civics classes – with their corresponding textbooks – often disseminate a higher level of hatred of the “other” than history textbooks do. Kostovicova (2004, 282) concurs with the important role of geography

³⁵ The *Ustaša* (plural: *Ustaše*) was the Nazi-allied Croatian fascist party during World War II, headed by Ante Pavelić (as *Poglavnik*), who ruled the Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Država Hrvatska*; NDH). *Ustaša* has come to be an ethnic slur for Croats. *Ustaša* symbols are still used by nationalist Croats.

³⁶ Vojislav Šešelj (*Srpska radikalna stranka*, ‘Serbian Radical Party;’ SRS) believed that Bosnia-Herzegovina and the majority of Croatia should belong to Serbia; he stated in an interview with *Der Spiegel* in August 1991 that the reason for this is because “... ‘Muslims of Bosnia are in fact Islamicized Serbs, and part of the population of so-called Croats consists in fact of Catholic Serbs’” (Malcolm 2002, 226).

classes and textbooks, stating that geographical imaginaries forge the symbolic and physical limits of a territory that is sought for the ethnic-nation. According to Baranović (2002, 9), the social science and humanities subjects are the key medium for transferring “desired” political and social values to the students, thus allowing for socialization to occur.

A common feature of teaching history and related courses in Southeastern Europe, according to Murgescu (2002, 96), is that there is an authoritarian pattern that is present whereby students are told to only learn what the teacher teaches them, while critical discussions and the teaching of analysis is almost non-existent. Due to the lack of analytical abilities, students uncritically accept what she terms “...the simplistic historical narratives...” of the mass media, which enforces a distorted view of the world upon the youth (Murgescu 2002, 96). Non-democratic socialization is thus occurring, coupled with ethno-nationalist discourse, which stresses the unity of the ethnic-nation and collective identity, rather than that of the democratic individual. The notion of stressing collective rights over that of the democratic individual is what Ramet (2005, 272) terms “nationalism-as-neurosis,” which is antagonistic toward the very idea of individual rights.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the educational system has been used by the ethno-nationalist political parties to socialize students in nationalist ideologies (OSCE Mission to BiH 2005). Hromadžić (2008, 560) states that the “reality on the ground” is that school education is “...at the heart of the ‘political’...” in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Stabback (2007, 453) agrees, stating that politicians use education as a means to support ethno-nationalist ideology and focus “...far more vigorously on differences than on similarities” between the three constituent peoples. On the other hand, Domović et al. (2001) argue that secondary schools in neighboring Croatia are not a major factor in the political socialization of Croatian students; rather the family

plays a more important role. Domović et al. (2001) conducted research on cultural predispositions of secondary school students in Croatia towards democratic values in 1993 and 1998; in their 1998 survey, parents and teachers were included. The authors found that students' attitudes were much closer to those of their parents than those of their teachers (the teachers acceptance of democratic values were highest, and the students were lowest).

Families are another possible agent of socialization. Erikson (1963), Berghahn and Schissler (1987, 1), and Reidy et al. (2015, 20) believe that the family acts as an important agent of socialization for young people. Umaña-Taylor et al. (2006, 407) find that familial ethnic socialization is strongly related to ethnic identity achievement and is critical for ethnic identity formation in adolescents. For Bringa (1995, 84), the primary domain of ethno-religious identity formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the household. On the other hand, Ajduković and Biruški (2008, 344) found from their study in the ethnically-divided town of Vukovar, Croatia that there is only a modest correlation between the inter-ethnic attitudes of children and their parents. That is, the children are not receiving high levels of ethnic socialization from their parents, which discredits the assumptions of the social learning approach that the parents are the most important transmitters of attitudes (Ajduković and Biruški 2008, 343). Instead, it seems that childhood experience has a bigger impact on children in terms of ethnic socialization than parental attitudes towards other ethnic groups.

When it came to the possibility of the re-integration of schools in Vukovar, Biruški and Ajduković (2007, 105) found that "...children are least supportive of joint education and social integration...and are most ready to discriminate against their peers from the other ethnic group." The children of Vukovar do not have the experience of living in a non-segregated town (unlike their parents), and "...have adopted the standard of community segregation on ethnic principles

since the earliest age.” That is, as far as the children are concerned, division is a natural state of affairs. Srđan Antić, president of the Nansen Dialogue Center in Osijek states that institutionalized segregation via the educational system “...‘predetermines both the life and the attitude of children in Vukovar,’” and the result of this is that “...‘young people are convinced that joint life is impossible’” (Matejčić 2012, 1). In the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context, Hjort and Frisén (2006, 142) state that “...ethnicity and ethnic identity may be considered a crucial aspect of being young.” In the American context, Ehman (1980, 112) finds that socialization via the family has less of an impact on high school students than the school does; he finds that as an agent of socialization, schools are very important “...for transmitting political information to youth and increases in importance from grade school to high school.”

H1a: Due to the institutionalization of ethnicity, students will choose the ethnic rather than civic identity.

H1b: Due to the institutionalization of ethnicity, non-Bosniak students will have lower levels of Bosnian-Herzegovinian civic pride.

H2a: Familial socialization will have a higher impact on ethnic saliency than school socialization.

H2b: Students will be more willing to interact and socialize with someone from a different national group if their parents also socialize with out-group members.

H3: Childhood experience of living in an ethnically segregated city/town has a bigger impact on children in terms of increased ethnic saliency than familial socialization.

Education and the Role of History Textbooks

Since the fall of communism, all post-communist states are facing the problem of defining their identity at two levels: the group level and individual level. In most of the post-communist states, changes have taken place in the history subject curriculum, which reflects the influence of political change (Baranović 2001, 16; Koren and Baranović 2009; Stojanović 2011; Stojanović 2009). In post-communist Eastern Europe, political change "...was also complicated by ethnic and nationalistic rivalries, as well as by intense conflicts over definitions of citizenship and national territory..." (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 371-372). This ideology of ethnic nationalism "...implies the ethnic definition of the new state, where ethnicity is used as a political instrument" (Koren and Baranović 2009, 92). Koren and Baranović (2009, 91) view school education as "...a powerful socializing medium..." in which schools serve as "...one of the most important tools..." in promoting this ideology via socially constructed knowledge. Among other subjects, students learn civics, geography, and history within the primary and secondary educational systems. In this context, history textbooks are used "...to create and maintain a suitable version of collective memory..." (Bartulović 2006, 52). With the fall of communism, history textbooks have been employed "...to establish continuity with a *suitable* historical past" (Koren and Baranović 2009, 97).

Education is supposed to serve as a unifying factor and socialization agent among citizens of a state; teaching them who they are (e.g. national identity; Bartulović 2006) and what their country expects of them (e.g. civic duties of the citizen; Baranović 2001, Oder 2005). The role of the educational system is important for the state in building civic identity and patriotism among students. According to Sivac-Bryant (2008, 115), post-war education "...is a vital part of the transition from conflict to peace." This is because schools "...are the crucible used by the

state to instil (sic) a national identity. As such, they [serve] in teaching the history that led up to the conflict.” The primary and secondary educational system after intrastate conflict thus becomes “...a site in which the politics of accountability and acknowledgement are played out” (Sivac-Bryant 2008, 107).

All of this leads to the situation in which history textbooks portray historical events in starkly different terms, depending on the ethnicity of the authors. For example, in Ukraine, history textbooks portray the “Ukrainian people” as eternal victims of Russia and the *Holodomor* (‘Hunger-plague’) as genocide of the Ukrainian people, whereas Russian textbooks portray the *Holodomor* in Ukraine as a Soviet-wide food shortage (Korostelina 2010). Under former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych (Party of Regions), the ministry of education under the leadership of Dmytro Tabachnyk revised fifth-grade history textbooks to remove references to the 2004 Orange Revolution (which previously removed Yanukovych from power) and downplayed the history of the *Holodomor* (Sindelar 2014, 1; Chopivsky 2011, 1), putting it in line with Russian views. In the Czech Republic, history textbooks represent the expulsion of the Sudetenland-Germans as “justified retaliation” for collaborating with the Nazis (Ingrao 2009, 186). In the Romanian history textbook *History of Romanians* (2000), students learn that the Romanian people are one of the most ancient peoples in Europe, are ““born Christians,”” and that they have defended Christianity “...‘against the invasion of the Islamised ‘pagans’” (Murgescu 2002, 92). In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, their time in the Soviet Union is viewed as an illegal occupation, whereas Russian textbooks claim the Baltic States joined voluntarily.

In Slovenia, history textbooks portray the World War II-era *Slovensko domobranstvo* (‘Slovene Home Guard’) as anti-communist freedom fighters, rather than the fascist Slovenian paramilitary force (Ingrao 2009, 186) that was under German military command. In Croatian

history textbooks, the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been covered only in chapters on Croatian history, as part of the history of the Croatian people, lands, and “Croatian national history” (Baranović 2002, 14). In post-independence Kosovo,³⁷ the Kosovo-Albanian history textbooks teach that Serbs settled in Kosovo whereas Albanians are its native inhabitants and decedents of the Illyrians (Ingrao 2009, 187; Karadaku 2011, 1). This obsession with the past, according to Zakošek (2008, 32), is typical for the ethnic nationalisms of Eastern Europe, and the discourse is primarily focused on uncovering and commemorating the suffering of one’s own ethnic group which was caused by members of a different ethno-national group.

In Serbia, the state publishing house maintains close ties to the Ministry of Education and Science, and holds a monopoly on textbook publication; each grade has a single, required civics and history textbook (Stojanović 2009, 155). In this instance, we are able to clearly see what the official interpretation of history is, and thus the values the state and society wish to pass along to the younger generation. As Heyneman (2002-2003, 81) notes, “...the public school experience is intended to mold desired behavior of future citizens.” Political socialization in this regard is important to understand, for it shapes how citizens view themselves and their neighboring countries. In the eighth grade Serbian history textbooks, unsparing language may be found that describes crimes against the Serbs, such as at the *Ustaša*-run Jasenovac concentration camp, which “...helps instill fear in young minds, and breeds future anxiety and aggressiveness” (Stojanović 2009, 146); these same textbooks have even placed Serbia on the defeated side of the

³⁷ Children in multi-ethnic areas of Kosovo (Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs) attend their own version of “two schools under one roof,” studying curricula of Kosovo (Albanians) and Serbia (Serbs). Unlike in Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, the authorities in Kosovo consider the use of the Serbian curriculum to be illegal. Interestingly, in the mountain village of Restelica, these two separate curricula are used between two South Slavic Muslim groups that speak the same South Slavic language, known as Našinski: Gorani (Serb curriculum) and Bosniaks (Kosovo curriculum) (Hajdari 2014, 1).

Second World War – *vis-à-vis* the *Četnik*³⁸ movement – and Tito’s *Partizans* as occupiers. Foster and Crawford (2006, 8) state that what appears in school textbooks within any state “...is legitimately sanctioned knowledge that has been allocated an official stamp of ‘truth’; but what textbooks offer are not truths but claims to truth.” After television and childhood religious instruction, it is the educational system, via history textbooks and classroom instruction that are “...the most influential forms of mass media because they provide the first imprint on our memory...” (Ingrao 2009, 181). As Korostelina (2010, 137) notes, it is these textbook “...history narratives [that] are considered vital for identity preservation and thus, are completely entrenched.”

History Textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosniak children are taught *historija* (‘history’), Croat children are taught *povijest* (‘history’), and Serb children are taught *istorija* (‘history’). Here, there are three truths and three official versions of history. In her case study on Vukovar, Clark (2013, 129) found that the “...problem of competing truths, moreover, is one that war memorials are helping to fuel and exacerbate.” Specific ethno-national curricula and textbooks are compulsory in the country, and as Kolouh-Westin (2004, 495) notes, the material that lies within indicates the “...intentions that society has in relation to the transmission of knowledge and attitudes to the younger generations.” In her analyses of how the 1992-1995 Bosnian War is represented in the primary and secondary school history textbooks used in Republika Srpska, Bartulović (2006, 64) finds that the message portrayed is that “...new conflicts will erupt sooner

³⁸ The *Četnik* (plural: *Četnici*) movement was a Serbian-monarchical militia during World War II, headed by General Draža Mihailović. It has come to be an ethnic slur for Serbs as well as a term of pride among nationalist Serbs.

or later, since Serbs are separated³⁹ from their fatherland and are being forced to sacrifice the unity of their nation....” This underscores the concept of nationalism as a political theory of legitimacy, where political state borders should not cut across ethnic ones (Gellner 1983, 1) and that all people of a certain nation should live in the same nation-state. Anzulović (1999) notes that sacrifice through suffering has also been a historically important aspect for the Serbs; this harkens back to the sacrifice of Serbian Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović at the 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje against the Ottoman Empire. The current president (and former prime minister) of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik (*Savez nezavisnih socijaldemokrata* – ‘Alliance of Independent Social Democrats;’ SNSD) has stated that Republika Srpska will become independent, and that this struggle will most likely last for several generations; President Dodik emphasized, however, that this independence would come about via the use of political tools and not weapons⁴⁰ (Jukić August 2013, 1).

In another analysis of history textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniak, Croat, and Serb), Baranović (2001, 24) found that these textbooks contribute “...to the creation of a closed, ethnocentric identity of children, rather than to an identity open to diversity....” This ethnocentric focus was most predominant in the Croat history textbooks, followed by the Serbian and Bosniak books (Baranović 2001, 24). Ramet (2006, 482) argues that the history textbooks used in primary and secondary schools have the potential to promote what she terms “inter-ethnic

³⁹ Pašalić-Kreso (2008, 366) however, found that a 9th grade geography textbook (from 2007) shows a map of Republika Srpska and neighboring states (Croatia, Macedonia, etc.) where the entity is represented as an independent nation-state that is united with Serbia. The name “Bosnia and Herzegovina,” however, is not mentioned on the map. The area that comprises the Federation of BiH is shown as an empty white space with no name.

⁴⁰ The Croatian member of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian tripartite presidency, Željko Komšić, has stated that there would be another war in the country if Republika Srpska attempted to gain independence (Jukić August 2013, 1). Komšić was elected to the presidency as a member of the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*Socijaldemokratska partija Bosne i Hercegovine*; SDP-BiH). He has since left the SDP-BiH and formed a new political party in April 2013: the Democratic Front (*Demokratska fronta*; DF).

bitterness” and contribute to a continuing distance between the three constituent peoples; this bitterness and resentment may also be found within the grammar books, where sentences are used to illustrate the proper use of grammatical cases.⁴¹ Such sentences have undertones that serve as a reminder of the recent war; Donia (2000, 43; 45) provides several examples from a grammar book used in the Bosniak curriculum: “She fled from Brčko; They will pay for their crime; We were banished from our home; Black clouds hung over our homeland; Free us, O God, from this evil...[and] The innocent dead people were floating down the Drina....” History narratives presented in textbooks do not cause or initiate conflict directly, but they can become a powerful tool of social mobilization (Korostelina 2010, 136).⁴²

H4: Divisive curricula serve to create a distinct ethnic separation of the three constituent peoples. The Croatian and Serbian curricula will promote higher levels of ethnic saliency compared to the Bosniak curricula.

⁴¹ The Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian languages have seven cases: nominative, genitive, accusative, dative, locative, instrumental, and vocative.

⁴² The presence of contentious history is not limited to post-communist Eastern Europe. Afghanistan is facing a similar problem. The solution the central government in Kabul decided to implement for this problem was to simply omit the last 40 years of history in its new high school textbooks. Afghan Deputy Minister of Education Mohammad Asef Nang stated that history “...‘should build and heal a generation, not destroy one. History should reflect the truth and the honor of the country. Those parts of history that provoke old rivalries and enmities and destroy national unity shouldn’t be included. Empty pages are better than pages that are full of animosities’” (Bezhan 2012, 1). The new high school history textbooks will end before the overthrow of the Afghan monarchy in 1973.

Nationalism and the Role of Religion

According to Gurr (1993, 3-4), religion is salient to ethnicity if it is used by the in-group to set itself apart from others, as well as if others use it as a defining trait to identify another group. Mitchell (2006, 1149) also believes that religion is only salient to ethnicity inasmuch as group members attach a specific meaning to it. In terms of understanding nationalism, Rieffer (2003) argues that religion is more important than economics in understanding the origins of nationalism, whereas Gellner (1983) and Anderson (2006) argue economics – specifically, the rise of print-capitalism and spread of print-languages – gave birth to nationalism. In the development of a religious-national identity through the marriage of religion and nationalism, an alien “Other” is created; this exclusionary element “breeds intolerance and hatred” of the Other, thus making compromise and peaceful relations more difficult (Rieffer 2003, 234-235). Voicu (2012, 338) found in her study of 30 Christian European countries (using data from the 2000 European Values Survey) that a strong correlation exists between nationalism and religiosity; specifically, she found that a high “[r]eligious concentration increases the level of religiosity...[and that] [n]ationalist ideology only affects religious beliefs where there exists a dominant religion” (Voicu 339; 341, 2012). Voicu (341, 2012) also found that being a post-communist state had the opposite effect; she argues this is due to the ““forced secularization”” under communism. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, religion is the main cultural distinguishing factor among the three constituent peoples, and each religious community “...needs the presence of the other in order to construct an ethnoreligious (and village) identity, since it is mainly through this presence that a person is taught to be aware (by way of contrast) of his or her own identity” (Bringa 1995, 79). In neighboring Croatia, Kunovich and Hodson (1999, 645) found that church

attendance and religiosity act as “...a carrier of group identity...,” but they do not have a statistical, direct impact on increasing ethnic intolerance (1999, 661).

According to Cohen (1997, 482), one aspect of the ethno-nationalist mobilization by ethno-nationalist leaders that occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina involved the “...direct appeal to religious themes...[by leaders] who were well aware of the deep historically-shaped divisions and latent antagonisms that existed...” among the three different confessional communities of the country. In the breakup of SFR Yugoslavia, religion served as the framework for which the new ethno-national state would be based, thus defining new identities. According to Bringa (2002, 29-30), “...religion was also the one feature that stressed the distinctiveness of the three ethno-religious communities...[and that]...religion provided nationalists with a rich source of symbols and rituals with which to inspire national identification, separateness, and internal cohesion of the ethnic group.” In Bosnia and Herzegovina, religion “...is part of a person’s cultural identity, whether or not one is a believer” (Bringa 1993, 81). Indeed, your name tells people what, and thus who, you are (Bringa 1995, 19).⁴³ This point is made clear by Sells (2003, 310); he states that it was this “religion identity,” and not “religious identity,” which served to differentiate the three sides in the war. Iveković (2002, 534) states that religion also “...has apparently filled the vacuum created by the delegitimization of the communist project” and serves as a continuity with the pre-communist past. Due to the fact that nationality is defined by religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina, “...a religious revival will be at the core of any development of an aggressive nationalism among either of the three Bosnian nationalities” (Bringa 2002, 28).

⁴³ This is also the case in Northern Ireland, where one’s religious affiliation is ascertained by asking their name (Donnelly 2004, 268).

In SFR Yugoslavia, the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia were very much compliant with the state. For the Orthodox Church, this follows historically back to Byzantium and the link between church, state, and nation (Anzulović 1999, 112),⁴⁴ as well as its compliance under the Ottoman Empire. Within the Islamic Community of Yugoslavia, the *reis-ul-ulema* and other Islamic leaders encouraged the faithful "...to put their obligations to the state before their obligations as practicing Muslims" (Bringa 1995, 199). At the broadest level, this meant non-observance of Ramadan and even the consumption of pork in military mess halls. The hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia and Slovenia, however, were much less compliant. Although the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina used a religious term to describe their ethnic identity, the Muslims were the most secularized of the three peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina; according to Iveković (2002, 530), the two main reasons for this was that the Muslims were a predominantly urban population living in ethnically-mixed areas (thus benefitting the most from communist modernization) and that they were culturally and geographically separated from the rest of the Islamic world for over 100 years. For the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina, communism had the least impact on their traditional Catholic religiosity; this stood out in strong contrast compared to the other peoples throughout the entirety of SFR Yugoslavia.

Cohen (1997, 489) notes that for the Bosnian-Croats, Catholicism and Croat nationalism were inextricably linked together. This claim by Cohen (1997) is supported by research done by Skrbiš (2005). Skrbiš (2005, 449) states that there is "...a strong and well-established connection between Croatian identity and Catholicism. Croatian devotion to Mary, and the belief that God

⁴⁴ Known as Saint Savaism (*Svetosavlje*), the close link between the Serb nation (*nacija*) / state and Serbian Orthodox Church harkens back to the very founding of the Church in 1219 by St. Sava. He was the brother of Stefan Nemanja, the first Serbian king (Anzulović 1999, 23).

has chosen Croats for a special mission, has deep roots in Croatian Catholicism....” In their longitudinal study (1985-2004), Sekulić and Šporer (2006, 7; graph 1) found that as Catholic religiosity increased, so did ethnic nationalism in Croatia. Sekulić et al. (2006) find that Catholic religiosity decreased in Croatia as its relevance for the nationalist movement decreased. The fervent religiosity of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina was made even stronger after six Herzegovinian-Croat teenagers saw an apparition of the Virgin Mary on 24 June 1981 in Međugorje, a village located in southern Herzegovina, near Mostar. The emotional conviction surrounding these events, according to Cohen (1997, 489), has reinforced “...‘a militant Marian ideology united with conservative political forces.’” This link between Catholicism and Croatian identity harkens back through history, and has been acknowledged by Pope John X and Pope Leo X. According to Pope John X (914-928), Croats “...‘received the spiritual food of the apostolic Church with their mother’s milk whilst still in their cribs’” (Skrbiš 2005, 449). In 1519, Pope Leo X described Croatia as “...*Antemurale Christianitatis* – the ramparts, or bulwark, of Christendom” (Tanner 2001, 32). Regarding the apparitions in Međugorje, they have yet to be confirmed by the Vatican, and have even been dismissed by the Bishop of Mostar-Duvno, Ratko Perić. This has not stopped the local parish church, St. James Catholic Church, from supporting the apparition claims as true.

The role of Bosnian-Croat religiosity on the willingness to accept co-existence and possibilities for reconciliation was explored by Dragun (2006). In a sample of 1,002 Croat adults from the Federation of BiH, Dragun (2006, 178) found that a distinct ethnic distance existed among the surveyed Croats towards the other two constituent peoples, but is more expressed towards the Bosniaks than the Serbs. This strong ethnic distance (and non-acceptance of co-existence) expressed by Croats in the Federation of BiH is strongly correlated with religiosity,

ethno-centricity, lower education, and place of residence. Willingness for reconciliation is positively correlated with how the respondents assessed the importance of democracy and higher levels of personal education.

According to Bringa (2002, 33), the “...particularistic and nationalist characteristic of the Serbian Orthodox Church (which is inward looking⁴⁵ and concerned with the interests of the Serbs) stands in contrast to the universalistic (i.e., not nationally defined) character of the Catholic (Croat) Church and the Islamic (Bosniak) association.” The 1389 Battle of Kosovo Polje figures significantly in the Serbian collective religious memory.⁴⁶ On the eve of the battle, Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović is said to have been visited by Saint Elias, who gave the prince a choice: a military victory and expanded earthly empire, or defeat – and death – with the promise of securing a place for his people in Heaven. Prince Lazar chose the Heavenly Kingdom, thus granting to the Serbs the mantle of being the *Nebeski narod* (‘Heavenly People’) and heirs to the Heavenly Kingdom. The Kosovo Myth is full of religious imagery; the two most prominent figures are Prince Lazar as the sacrificial Christ-figure and Vuk Branković as Judah (Anzulović 1999). According to Anzulović (1999), the core of the Kosovo Myth is the linking of war with Serbia’s salvation, and Prince Lazar as its martyr. The Kosovo Myth also serves to portray the Serbs as a people who “...at every decisive turn in their history opt for the heavenly kingdom by taking the moral high ground” (Anzulović 1999, 12), and the domination by the Ottoman Empire

⁴⁵ The inward-looking nature of the Orthodox Church also gave it privileged status under the Ottoman Empire, since its members looked within the Empire for their source of religious authority rather than outside of it (Malcolm 2002, 71). Under the Ottoman millet system, the Serbian Orthodox Church was a “...cultural and quasi-political institution, which embodied and expressed the ethos of the Serbian people to such a degree that nationality and religion fused into a distinctive ‘Serbian faith’” (Anzulović 1999, 25). It became the main carrier of Serbian national identity.

⁴⁶ What is not remembered, however, is that the Serbs were not alone in this fight; a substantial number of Croats, Bosnians, Albanians, Bulgars, and Wallachians were in their ranks as well (Tanner 2001, 29).

contributed to the development of the Serbs' "...self-image of a holy people whose moral superiority makes them victims of the immorality of others" (Anzulović 1999, 33). Ramet and Adamović (1995, 119) refer to this as the eternal "victim complex" of the Serbian people.

Bringa (2002, 28) states that "...the role that Islam played in the construction of a Muslim (or Bosniak) identity was similar to that played by Catholic and Orthodox Christianity in the construction of Croat and Serb collective identities..." Islam is thus "...closely linked to the process of Muslim *nacija*⁴⁷ formation" (Bringa 1995, 229). Bringa (1995, 231) ends her ethnographic study by stating that although Islam plays this important role in Bosnian-Muslim *nacija* and identity formation, their identity "...cannot be fully understood with reference to Islam only, but has to be considered in terms of a specific Bosnian dimension which for Bosnian Muslims has implied sharing a history and locality with Bosnians..." who are of other religious faiths. Beyond her work, the role of Islam in Bosnian-Muslim / Bosniak nationalism or identity formation before and after the 1992-1995 Bosnian War has received little academic study, and thus offers no established quantitative conclusions or theoretical framework to review. An exception to this is a February 2013 policy report published by The International Crises Group (ICG), in which they found an increasing role of Islam in Bosniak nationalism. The ICG report states that "Bosniak national ideology stands on two legs: allegiance to the Bosnian state and affiliation with Islam, the latter a cultural identity shared by practising and secular alike" (International Crisis Group 2013, 19). However, a large division exists between religious and secular Bosniaks when it comes to religious (Islamic) education in public schools. According to

⁴⁷ The term *nacija* translates to 'nation,' but in the context of former Yugoslavia it could best be described as 'ethnicity' in English-language understandings. Nationality (*nacionalnost*) is also tied to *nacija*. In addition, *nacija* is tied to the idea of *narod* ('people'), which does not have the same meaning as one understands "people" in English. In order to be a *narod*, one must be a *nacija*.

the ICG report, schools “...are a key battleground between secularists and the more religiously orientated. The politicalisation of religious education has [also] contributed heavily to dividing ethnically mixed communities” (International Crises Group 2013, 10). The former *reis-ul-ulema* of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina (IZ-BiH), Mustafa Cerić, has advocated that the country should be a nation-state only of Bosniaks, since Croats and Serbs already have their own homeland; Cerić was also a champion of Islam being a “strong element” of Bosniak nationalism (International Crisis Group 2013, 1). It is this linking of Islam, Bosniak nationalism, and the state that will increase tensions with the country’s other two constituent peoples (International Crisis Group 2013, 2). As Brinda (2002, 28) has noted, “...a religious revival will be at the core of any development of an aggressive nationalism among either of the three Bosnian nationalities.” The ICG report confirms this, stating that “[r]eal instability and violence are more likely to come from clashing nationalisms” (International Crisis Group 2013, 1).

The ICG report also explores the rise of Wahhabism in the country, which was brought by foreign *mujahidin* during the Bosnian War. The report downplays the influence of the Wahhabi movement on Bosniak nationalism, claiming the movement is small and fragmented; Morrison (2008, 11) however, states that the “...growing influence of the Wahhabi movement over the last ten years cannot and should not be ignored.” The village of Gornja Maoča, located in Tuzla Canton (Srebrenik Municipality), is a Wahhabi stronghold that is home to foreign *mujahadin* as well as Bosniaks who have adopted this puritanical interpretation of Sunni Islam, and the state has had no effective control.

On the night of February 1-2, 2010, Operation *Svijetlost* ('Light') took place against Gornja Maoča, which was the largest post-war police operation, and saw cooperation between police forces of Republika Srpska and the Federation of BiH (Halimović 2010, 1). According to

Dževad Galijašević, a member of the Southeastern Europe Expert Team on Terrorism and Organized Crime, the state must not only focus on Gornja Maoča, but also Sarajevo, which is overlooked. Galijašević states that while everyone is focused on Gornja Maoča, "...the Wahhabis and members of terrorist organisations have been allowed to smoothly conduct their business in Sarajevo.'" For him, Gornja Maoča "...is only one tentacle of the huge octopus, with its head in Sarajevo...at the King Fahd Mosque'" (Ramadanović 2010, 1). The King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud Mosque, built and financed by Saudi Arabia, is located in the Dobrinja neighborhood of Sarajevo (visited during my fieldwork). On 03 September 2014, another police raid took place (Operation *Damask*; 'Damascus'), this time in Bužim, Kiseljak, Maglaj, Sarajevo, Srebrenik, Teslić, Zenica, and Zvornik; 16 people were arrested by the State Investigative and Protection Agency (SIPA) on charges of recruiting Bosniaks to fight *jihad* in Iraq and Syria (Jukić September 2014, 1). On 13 November 2014, a follow-up of Operation *Damask* took place in Kakanj, Maglaj, Sarajevo, Zenica, and Živinice, which led to the arrest of an additional 11 individuals by SIPA (Jukić November 2014, 1). Muhamed Velić, an imam at a Sarajevo mosque, stated that the Islamic Community of BiH must "...address the issue of radical Islamism, which in the past had been 'swept under the rug'" (Jukić January 2015, 1).

H5a: Students who regularly attend religious services will experience ethnic socialization and increased ethnic saliency.

H5b: Students who report that they consider religion to be an important part of their life will show a higher level of ethnic saliency than those who do not.

H5c: Students who attend Catholic schools⁴⁸ will experience lower levels of ethnic socialization compared to students who do not.

H5d: Croats will have higher levels of religious service attendance compared to Bosniaks and Serbs.

The Contact Hypothesis

The contact hypothesis was first put forth by Gordon W. Allport in *The Nature of Prejudice* (1958). The basic premise of the contact hypothesis is that reconciliation between different groups can occur when they have contact with one another. Simple contact is not enough, however; it must also include four prerequisite features as well. Allport (1958, 454) hypothesized that to be maximally effective,

...contact and acquaintance programs should lead to a sense of equality in social status, should occur in ordinary purposeful pursuits, avoid artificially, and if possible enjoy the sanction of the community in which they occur. The deeper and more genuine the association, the greater the effect. While it may help somewhat to place members of different ethnic groups side by side on a job, the gain is greater if these members regard themselves as part of a *team*.

The contact hypothesis was developed within the American context, and within this context, on white and black race relations. It has since been expanded outside of the United States, and has shown to be effective in Northern Ireland as well.

Oliver and Wong (2003) explore racial attitudes in multi-ethnic settings among Asian-Americans, blacks, Latinos, and whites in Atlanta, Boston, and Los Angeles using data from the 1992-1994 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality and the 1990 U.S. Census. At the neighborhood level, the authors find a consistent pattern: those who live among more members of an out-group

⁴⁸ There are seven Catholic schools (*Katolički školski Centar*; KŠC) in the country, located in: Banja Luka, Bihać, Sarajevo, Travnik, Tuzla, Zenica, and Žepče. The school in Travnik only allows Croatian students to enroll and is considered a *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* school system.

have a more positive opinion toward members of said group; those who live in more homogeneous neighborhoods hold more negative views of members of the out-group. The exception to this is Asian-Americans in Los Angeles: those who live in more homogeneous neighborhoods hold a less negative opinion of out-group members than Asian-Americans who live in more racially mixed neighborhoods of Los Angeles (Oliver and Wong 2003, 573). In support of the contact hypothesis, the authors find that residents of integrated neighborhoods are more likely to participate in integrated civic organizations, which "...provide the ideal circumstances for interracial contact..." and status equality (2003, 580). Participation in these integrated civic organizations would also fulfill Allport's (1958) prerequisite that members consider themselves as part of a team.⁴⁹

Jackman and Crane (1986, 480) find that white racial attitudes towards blacks are more positive when their black friends have a higher socio-economic status compared to themselves. However, they also find that although high levels of white contact with blacks renders a substantial positive change in whites' social predispositions towards blacks, it did not remove discriminatory policy orientations. Jackman and Crane (1986, 482) argue this is due to an "enduring force" that personal contact and friendship cannot change: "...the material and cultural interests of white racial privilege." In the United States, research on the contact hypothesis has mainly focused on the role of white contact with blacks and its effects on white racial attitudes towards blacks. Ellison and Powers (1994) take a different research approach in regards to the contact hypothesis; they explore black racial attitudes towards whites using data from the

⁴⁹ How then, can joining civic organizations be encouraged or predicted? Youniss et al. (1997, 620) found that American students who participated in school government (SGA) while in high school were more likely to become members of civic organizations compared to those who were not involved in high school governance; Hanks and Eckland (1978) also found that participation in high school government (or some other extra-curricular activity in high school) was the strongest predictor of adult membership in civic associations.

1979-1980 National Survey of Black Americans (n=2,107). Ellison and Powers (1994, 395) find that blacks who have strong, close friendships with whites express a more favorable attitude of whites and race relations compared to those blacks who do not have white friends. This finding conforms to the predictions of the contact hypothesis. Ford (1973) tested the contact hypothesis in racially segregated and de-segregated public housing projects in Lexington, Kentucky by interviewing white and black housewives (n=168) in 1967. This environment allowed for equal-status and same-sex measurements to occur. Ford (1973) found that for the low-income white housewives, the contact hypothesis had strong support. When it came to attitudes of black housewives, the contact hypothesis was “partially and inconclusively” (Ford 1973, 1440) confirmed.

Looking outside of the United States, Janmaat (2012) tested the contact hypothesis using data from the April 1999 International Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) Civic Education Study amongst 14 year-olds in England, Germany, and Sweden. Janmaat (2012) found that ethnically diverse classrooms increased tolerance in Germany and Sweden, but had the opposite effect in England. Bekhuis et al. (2013) explored the contact hypothesis among secondary school students in Nijmegen, the Netherlands (n=1,444); the authors found that quality of contact, rather than quantity, lowers xenophobic attitudes (Bekhuis et al. 2013, 238). Hooghe et al. (2013) explore the effects of inter-ethnic contact and education on ethno-centrism in Belgium using data from the Belgian Political Panel Survey (2006-2011; n=2,428); respondents were questioned at three age-points in their lives: 16, 18, and 21. The authors found that inter-ethnic friendships did not have a significant effect on changes in ethno-centrism (Hooghe et al. 2013, 1118); rather, students who attended the “general education” secondary schools (equivalent to U.S. high schools) had the lowest levels of ethno-centrism, whereas technical and

vocational secondary school students had high levels of ethno-centrism (Hooghe et al. 2013, 1117). In the case of Belgium, the secondary school track one attends is "...the most important determinant..." for ethnocentric attitudes (Hooghe et al. 2013, 1117).

In Northern Ireland, cross-community contact between Catholics and Protestants promotes positive out-group attitudes via an integrated educational system. Research also shows that "...awareness of the presence of outgroup members in an educational setting, rather than integrated education per se, appears to affect attitudes towards the outgroup and the propensity towards forgiveness" (McGlynn et al. 2004, 157). In a similar vein, Čehajić et al. (2008) explore the contact hypothesis and its effects on the possibility for inter-group forgiveness in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In their study, Čehajić et al. (2008) specifically look at the possibility (willingness) of Bosniaks to forgive Bosnian-Serbs. Survey respondents (n=180) were students at the University of Sarajevo as well as students at one high school; all survey respondents identified as being Bosniaks. The authors found that frequent and high-quality contact promoted intergroup forgiveness and a decreased social distance between Bosniaks and Bosnian-Serbs. The authors also found that an increase in "...willingness to understand how the other party might feel (empathy), the development of trust, and an increase in perceived outgroup variability all played crucial roles in linking contact to forgiveness" (Čehajić et al. 2008, 362).

Although this research shows that contact allows for a positive effect on sectarian attitudes and forgiveness (that is, the effect of contact on prejudice), there has been no research that has examined the relationship between contact and acknowledgement of in-group responsibility for wartime atrocities. In this line, Čehajić and Brown (2010) set out to examine the link between contact and acknowledgement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In their study, survey respondents were high school students (n=284) from two different high schools in the

towns of Pale and Lukavica (both located in Republika Srpska). All survey respondents identified as being Serb. Čehajić and Brown (2010, 194) found that it was contact quality rather than quantity that seemed to correlate with in-group acknowledgement. Frequent and quality contact with members of the victim-group (Bosniaks) increased perspective-taking ability and also decreased the belief of perceived in-group victimhood (that is, that the in-group suffered more than the out-group).

Contact creates positive out-group perceptions, but it also has the effect of re-enforcing our own identity. Through these encounters with “otherness,” our own identity becomes “...relational so that contact with otherness is both positive and negative....” (Schöpflin 2003, 479-480). Oliver and Wong (2003, 573) provide an example of the negative effect of contact; the authors found that Asian-Americans who live in racially mixed neighborhoods of Los Angeles hold a negative opinion of out-group members, whereas Asian-Americans who reside in more homogeneous neighborhoods hold a less negative opinion of out-group members. According to Bakke et al. (2009, 231; fn. 4), the contact hypothesis has also been dismissed by many social psychologists.

In the case of the former SFR Yugoslavia, the contact hypothesis found strong support. In late 1989 and early 1990, the Consortium of Social Research Institutes of Yugoslavia conducted survey interviews on tolerance towards other nationalities in all Yugoslav republics and the two autonomous provinces. Tolerance was highest in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. Tolerance of others was lowest in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, with the Socialist Republic of Macedonia ranked second-to-last (Hodson et al. 1994, 1548; Table 1). The Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the most ethnically mixed, and the Socialist Autonomous Province

of Kosovo was the most ethnically homogenous. Although Hodson et al. (1994) found that contact increased tolerance, the authors also found that religiosity was the strongest predictor of national intolerance. Although the contact hypothesis is seemingly confirmed, history also shows us that it did not prevent the spread of exclusive, ethnic nationalism and war. Using data from the 1991 Yugoslav Census, Kunovich and Hodson (2002, 204) found that ethnic diversity at the county level, along with an ethnically segregated workplace, lowered ethnic prejudice levels in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

H6a: The less often a student attends religious services, the more willing they will be to interact with someone from a different ethno-national group.

H6b: Students who attend schools in an urban area will be more willing to interact with someone from a different ethno-national group.

H7a: Students attending school on a non-ethnic appropriate curriculum will be more willing to interact with someone from a different ethno-national group.

H7b: Students attending school in the Brčko District of BiH will be more willing to interact with someone from a different ethno-national group.

H8a: Students who enjoy being around people from other national groups will have decreased levels of ethnic saliency.

H8b: Contact with other ethno-national groups via familial example will increase student willingness for out-group contact.

CHAPTER III

EDUCATION AND SCHOOL SYSTEMS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

The current educational system in the country came about as consequences of the various constitutions, via the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords and the 1994 Washington Agreement. Torsti (2009, 67) puts the blame squarely where it belongs, stating that: “[t]he Dayton Peace Agreement institutionalized the war-time educational division.” The purpose of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords was to stop the war. It was, and has been, successful in this regard; however, it failed to address primary and secondary education issues – that is, the educational system played a secondary role in the peace treaty (Pingel 2009, 258). The consequences of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords and the decentralized educational systems is that educational policy is left in the hands of ethno-nationalist parties who wish to cement the ethnic cleansing that took place during the war. Primary and secondary school education is truly “...at the heart of the ‘political’...” in the country today (Hromadžić 2008, 560). In her study on education policies in the former SFR Yugoslavia and three of its successor states (Serbia, Kosovo, and Macedonia), Bačević (2014, 5) mentions that the post-Dayton education system in Bosnia and Herzegovina “...borders on impossible to analyze, given the complexity of administrative layers...,” and is “...riddled by political struggles...” between the three constituent peoples. Swimelar (2013) argues that the current educational systems and practices in the country have given rise to what she terms a “societal security dilemma.”

According to the “44th Report of the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” which covers the time period of 20 April 2013 to 21 October 2013, High Representative Valentin Inzko (November 2013, 1) writes that:

Education is central to efforts to embed the values of tolerance and coexistence in future generations so that the tragic mistakes of the past are never repeated. During the reporting period, education issues came to the fore again. In September [2013] the start of the new school year brought with it disputes over the curricula being used at a number of schools in the Republika Srpska where there have been significant Bosniak returns. Parents and pupils staged boycotts of classes at a number of schools and at the time of writing, the boycott of classes in some schools continues. The problem underlying the protests is not unique to Republika Srpska. It reveals the failure of the competent authorities in BiH in the past eleven years to find a permanent, countrywide solution which would guarantee children’s equal rights to education.

The boycott that Inzko refers to in his report was held by Bosniak parents from the villages of Konjević Polje (Bratunac Municipality) and Vrbanjci (Kotor-Varoš Municipality) who camped out in front of the Office of the High Representative from September 2013 to January 2014 to protest against what they feel is “discrimination” and for the right to teach their children using the Bosniak curriculum, rather than the Serbian curriculum (Jukić September 2013, 1). During this time period, the parents pulled their children out of elementary school as part of the protest. The protest ended when the parents agreed to a temporary solution: their children would be taught by teachers from Sarajevo at an improvised school in the village of Nova Kasaba (Milići Municipality), around 1.5 miles away from Konjević Polje (Jukić January 2014, 1), thus segregating themselves from the Serbian children.

Education

Education is mandatory until the eighth grade. If students/their parents decide to continue to secondary school, they have four options to choose from: gymnasium (*gimnazija*; this is closest to the American high school system), technical school (*teknička škola*), vocational school (*strukovna škola*), or traffic school (*saobraćajna škola*). Gymnasium and technical schools are for four years, while the majority of vocational schools are for three years. The national group of subjects are: history, geography, religion, mother tongue and literature, and society/nature. The country has three ethno-national curricula, based on language: the Bosnian National Plan and Program (B-NPP), Croatian National Plan and Program (H-NPP), and the Serbian National Plan and Program (S-NPP). In Bosniak schools the B-NPP is sometimes referred to as the “Federal” curriculum, although it is only used in their schools. The B-NPP is also referred to as the “Bosniak” curriculum in schools that operate on one of the other two ethno-linguistic curricula. In this dissertation, I refer to the B-NPP as the Bosniak curriculum for clarity purposes. Schools display specific symbols of the majority group within classrooms as well: for Bosniaks it is the state coat-of-arms and fleur-de-lis, for Croats it is the Croatian chequy (*šahovnica*), and in Serbian schools, portraits of St. Sava (as well as other Orthodox saints), the Serb cross,⁵⁰ and the coat-of-arms of Republika Srpska. The exception to such displays are schools located in the Brčko District of BiH, who are only allowed to display symbols of the state (Chapter I Article 3 of the Statute of the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina). Along with the three ethno-national schools, the country has seven Catholic high schools and six madrassas.

⁵⁰ The Serb cross is a stylized cross with the letter “S” (in Cyrillic: ‘С’) in each of the four quadrants. The four letters in turn represent the Serbian motto: *Samo sloga Srbina spasava* (‘Only Unity Saves the Serbs’).

Two Schools Under One Roof

Within the Federation of BiH, a policy known as *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* (‘two schools under one roof’) exists in schools within three of the ten cantons, in which students of two different ethnic groups (Bosniaks and Croats) have classes within the same school building, but only with students and teachers of their nationality. This occurs by either having morning/afternoon shifts (such as in Busovača or Stolac) or separate wings/floors (such as in Bugojno or Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje). There are two principles, two sets of teachers, two different school names – all delineated based on ethnicity. Both schools are considered two separate legal entities existing at the same address. These schools are located in Central Bosnia Canton, Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, and Zenica-Doboj Canton. They are especially located in cities/towns that have an ethnically-mixed population. In regards to the existence of the “two schools under one roof” system in Central Bosnia Canton, the then-Minister of Education of Central Bosnia Canton Greta Kuna (HDZ-BiH) stated in 2007 that “... ‘apples and pears should not be mixed and neither should Bosniak and Croat children’” (Kaletović 2011, 1).⁵¹ In the ethnically divided town of Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje (Central Bosnia Canton), the local high school building has two entrances: one for Croat students and the other for Bosniak students; the former use the classrooms located on the first floor (Secondary School Uskoplje) and the latter use the second floor (Mixed Secondary School Gornji Vakuf). On the Croat side of the school building that faces the road in Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje, there is a small plaque that states: “*Neka ova škola bude simbol mira, razumjevanja i tolerancije*” (‘Let this school be a symbol of peace, understanding, and tolerance;’ seen during my fieldwork). In the town of Usora (Zenica-Doboj

⁵¹ The High Representative for BiH did not use the Bonn Powers to remove Minister Kuna from office for this statement, and she served in her post until 2011.

Canton), Croat teachers set up a “tent school” in the local schoolyard where they held their lessons for ethnic-Croat students in order to separate them from Bosniak students (Pašalić-Kreso 2008, 363). In Vitez (Central Bosnia Canton), Bosniak students attend high school in the morning shift, and Croat students attend in the afternoon shift. In Stolac (Herzegovina-Neretva Canton), Croat students attend high school in the morning shift, and Bosniaks in the afternoon shift. This segregation of students in multi-ethnic towns at the primary and secondary educational levels serves to further divide society along ethnic lines, creating an “us versus them” mentality.

Initially launched in 2000 in the town of Stolac to encourage refugees to return to their homes of origin (Božić 2006, 331-333; Hromadžić 2008, 554), this policy has allowed for an environment where “...a hostile image of the ‘others’ is disseminated...” via diverging historical narratives (Juhász 2007, 180) among the three constituent peoples. Education is supposed to serve as a unifying factor and socialization agent among citizens of a state; teaching them who they are and what their country expects of them (that is, a civic identity; Baranović 2001). According to Gellner (1983, 34) the university professor is the base of the modern social order; within Bosnia and Herzegovina, I argue that teachers at the primary and secondary educational levels hold this position as well. Within Republika Srpska, education is handled within a single ministry, but a separate (Serb) curriculum is used.⁵² The policy of *dvije škole pod jednim krovom*

⁵² The exception to this is Kozarac Elementary School, in Kozarac (Prijedor Municipality), which uses the Bosniak curriculum (Sivac-Bryant 2008).

does not exist in Republika Srpska due to its high degree of ethnic homogeneity and centralized⁵³ education system.

Bosniak and Croat children whose parents reside in Republika Srpska have the option of either attending the local Serb school or cross the Inter-Entity Boundary Line and attend a school in the Federation of BiH if they wish to study from “their” respective ethno-national curricula. According to Clark (July 2010, 347), many Bosniak students who reside in the towns Čelopek, Osmaci, and Zvornik do just that by going to school in Kalesija, located in Tuzla Canton. Similarly, rather than attend local schools in the Federation of BiH, many Serb parents who reside in Stolac send their children to schools in nearby Berkovići or Ljubinje, in Republika Srpska (Clark July 2010, 347). Busing children to mono-ethnic schools is an instrument of segregation that further divides society along ethnic lines, thus preventing students from interacting and having contact with the proverbial “other.”

Different textbooks are used that promote a separate, exclusive identity among the three constituent peoples. The current system in Bosnia and Herzegovina is producing three separate sets of citizens who view the country and each other in vastly different ways, creating a closed ethno-centric identity that is not conducive to reconciliation or democratic consolidation. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (OSCE Mission to BiH), the existence of these three separate curricula and history textbooks, which often have mutually-opposed versions of history, poses “...a considerable threat to social cohesion and a shared sense of citizenship and future in BiH” (OSCE Mission to BiH - Curricular Reform 2012, 1). Without a genuine reform in the education sector at these

⁵³ For intra-entity administrative purposes, Republika Srpska has seven non-autonomous administrative regions: Banja Luka Region, Doboj Region, Bijeljina Region, Vlasenica Region, Sarajevo-Romanija Region, Foča Region, and Trebinje Region. The regions do not have separate curricula.

levels, it will be harder for democratic consolidation as well as ethnic reconciliation to occur (Baranović 2001; Kolouh-Westin 2004; Sivac-Bryant 2008).

Adnan Omerbašić believes that the goals of those individuals who wish to perpetuate the educational status quo relate to a desire by the ethno-nationalist parties to maintain power (Kaletović 2011, 1). He states that students will be voters in a few years, and “[t]o manipulate someone in their teenage years is not hard; in the long run you have created voters who will subconsciously support your political position that all who are different are enemies and should be avoided” (Kaletović 2011, 1). Schüler Helfen Leben Foundation Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina Aida Bećirović argues that the net result of this policy is that students are raised to be nationalists and chauvinists (Kaletović 2011, 1).

Although originally launched to encourage returns, the ethno-centric history lessons and divided schooling policies, according to Torsti (2007, 91), are factors that greatly inhibit refugee return to their pre-war homes; parents do not want to return “...to areas where [their] children would be subject to history teaching suggesting that their own national group is evil or inferior.” The European Commission’s “Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 Progress Report” also found that the ethnically-based and divided educational system “...remains an obstacle to sustainable returns” (2011, 18) of refugees to their pre-war homes. According to Kukić (2001), the slowest to return to their pre-war homes have been the Serbs to the Federation of BiH. Dahlman and Ó Tuathail (June 2005, 591) found this to be true as well, stating that the demographic legacy of ethnic cleansing has been reversed in only a small number of formerly Serb-majority municipalities in the Federation of BiH. Phuong (2000) found that this was mainly due to political obstruction by local officials in the Federation of BiH. At the same time, the authors found that minority-returnees to Republika Srpska more than doubled. Sivac-Bryant (2008, 108)

cites several United Nations reports that claim the town of Kozarac (Priedor Municipality) has been “...one of the most successful returnee communities in the country.” Dahlman and Ó Tuathail (September 2005, 650; 653) find that the most difficult area for minority-returnees is the city of Zvornik (Zvornik Municipality), which was due to official political obstructionism by local Serb officials. In general, the right of return has been obstructed at the local level, especially in eastern Republika Srpska and Herzegovina, where the ethno-nationalist parties wish to maintain their ethnic dominance (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail, June 2005). Dahlman and Ó Tuathail (September 2005, 656) state that the “frontline” of this obstructionism is at the local municipal housing office, which is controlled by the local ethno-national political parties.

On 27 April 2012, the Municipal Court of Mostar ruled the existence of *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* as unconstitutional and must be abolished. Judge Rabija Tanović ordered the Ministry of Education, Science, Culture, and Sport of Herzegovina-Neretva Canton to establish completely integrated schools by 01 September 2012 (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2012, 1). This was the first such ruling in all of Bosnia and Herzegovina; however, the court order has not been followed by the cantonal ministry, and students are still segregated along ethnic lines (Inzko 2012, 1). The Minister of Education of Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, Zlatko Hadžiomerović (SDA), stated that the cantonal ministry has no authority to enforce such a ruling (Dnevnik 2012, 1). In October 2012, the Municipal Court of Travnik (Central Bosnia Canton) ruled that the policy of *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* is not unconstitutional and does not violate any anti-discrimination laws (Karabegović 2012, 1). For several years there has been an attempt to unify these schools (Boračić 2010, 1), but thus far only four schools have become administratively and legally unified: three in Zenica-Doboj Canton and one in Herzegovina-Neretva Canton.

The primary and secondary school system in Novi Travnik (Central Bosnia Canton) used to operate on the principle of *dvije škole pod jednim krovom*, but this is no longer the case. The schools did not unify, however; the Croatian-language secondary school moved out of the common pre-war high school building and into a wing of the elementary school. Likewise, the Bosnian-language elementary school moved out of the common pre-war elementary school building and into a newly built annex on the grounds of the Bosnian-language secondary school. In Bugojno, the two elementary schools (First Elementary School, H-NPP; and Third Elementary School, B-NPP) operate on the *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* principle, but the high school (Bugojno Gymnasium, B-NPP) does not. Rather, it has a “department” of *Gimnazija Uskoplje* (H-NPP; located in Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje) within it. In Travnik, the Bosnian-language secondary school is in the process of having its own school building constructed, as it currently occupies a wing of the pre-war Catholic School Center. In Vareš, the two elementary schools operate as *dvije škole pod jednim krovom*, but the high school is integrated. In Čapljina, there is no high school that operates on the B-NPP (only the H-NPP), although the two elementary schools are *dvije škole pod jednim krovom*. If Bosniak students from Čapljina wish to go to high school, they must travel to Mostar in order to study on the B-NPP. In the town of Stolac, where this phenomenon began, the two elementary schools (First Elementary School Stolac, B-NPP; Stolac Elementary School, H-NPP) and the two high schools (both of which are called *Srednja škola Stolac*; ‘Secondary School Stolac’) continue to operate in this manner.

H9: Students who study on the *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* system will have higher levels of ethnic saliency compared to those who do not.

Mono-ethnic Schools

Within the Federation of BiH, mono-ethnic schools are schools designated, officially or unofficially, as for either Bosniaks or Croats. This designation comes in the form of which language-program curriculum (NPP) the school operates on. If there are less than 18 minority students, they are expected to study on the majority groups' NPP. Schools in Republika Srpska are considered mono-ethnic due to the high degree of ethnic homogeneity within Republika Srpska, and all high schools operate on the Serbian curriculum.

Administratively Unified Schools

A smaller, third school system exists within the Federation of BiH as well, known as “administratively unified schools,” or *jednu školu, dva nastavna plana i programa* (‘one school, two national plans and programs’). In these schools, students attend school at the same time, but do not share the same classes; rather, they attend classes with other students of their ethnic group, with teachers of their respective ethnicity, using either the Bosniak or Croatian curricula. The most well-known of these schools is Mostar Gymnasium, located in Mostar. It was the first administratively re-unified school in the country. The symbolic aspect for the re-unification of Mostar Gymnasium, also known as the *Stara gimnazija* (‘Old Gymnasium’), is immense; in practice, the re-unification has maintained the use of separate Bosniak and Croatian curricula; Hromadžić (2008, 549) terms this as “...preserving ethnic segregation through unification.”

Another such high school is located in Žepče (Zenica-Doboj Canton), which “administratively unified” from being *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* on 18 May 2005 (SMŠ Žepče 2012, 1). Unlike at Mostar Gymnasium, however, the administratively unified school in Žepče maintains two separate wings; Bosniak students use the left wing and Croat students use

the right wing, having no contact between classes. The school has a common entrance, but only a small corridor connects the two wings of the school, thus not allowing for a “common area” for interaction. The other administratively unified high school in Zenica-Doboj Canton is located in the town of Maglaj; in the town of Vareš, the school became completely unified, following one curriculum.

Schools in the Brčko District of BiH

All schools in the Brčko District of BiH are integrated, with students and teachers of the three constituent peoples sharing and attending classes together.⁵⁴ However, students have the right to use textbooks (Bosniak, Croat, or Serb) of their choice within the same classroom. Integrated schools/classrooms were not always the case, however. The District used to have ethnically-segregated schools, following one of the three ethno-national curricula used in either the Federation of BiH or Republika Srpska. The integration of schools was forced upon the people by the International Supervisor of Brčko on 05 July 2001 through the *Single Law on Education and Harmonized Curriculum* (Perry 2003, 78). The law stipulated that integration would take an incremental approach, but that by 2005 all schools would be integrated (Perry 2003, 78; citing Gienger, July 2002).

⁵⁴ Students are segregated in one subject, however: that of ‘mother-tongue’ language classes. Outside of ‘mother-tongue’ language classes, students often refer to the spoken language as *naša jezik* (‘our language’) while in school in all other classes. Teachers are required to give “equal treatment” to all three languages; otherwise, they could be viewed as giving preferential treatment to one over the other two. The equal treatment requirement is derived from Chapter I Article 6(1) of the Statute of the Brčko District of BiH, which states that the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian languages – along with the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets – will be used “on equal terms.”

H10a: Students attending school in the Brčko District of BiH will have lower levels of ethnic saliency.

H10b: Students attending a non-ethnic appropriate curriculum will have lower levels of ethnic saliency compared to those who study on the “appropriate” curriculum.

CHAPTER IV

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

I gathered data via field surveys in Bosnia and Herzegovina using the Revised Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (Roberts et al. 1999), the Other-Group Orientation Scale (Phinney 1992), the Revised Familial Ethnic Socialization Measure (Umaña-Taylor et al. 2004), the Quality of Other-Group Contact Measurement (Čehajić and Brown 2010), and general demographic questions during the 2012-2013 academic year – 18 years since the end of the war. Students were given the survey and answered the questions in class. The surveys were written in the three official languages of the country: Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian.⁵⁵ To secure permission to enter schools, I had to gain permission from the Republika Srpska Ministry of Education and Culture, the Brčko District of BiH Department of Education, each of the ten cantonal ministries of education within the Federation of BiH, the Žepče Municipality Department of Administrative and Social Affairs, and the principle (B-NPP) / vice principle (H-NPP) of Mostar Gymnasium. The Federal Ministry of Education and Science of the Federation of BiH does not have any authority to grant permission due to the highly decentralized educational system within the Federation of BiH. The Ministry of Civil Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina – Department of Education, which is the nominal state-level ministry, likewise has

⁵⁵ Students were given the survey in the curriculum (NPP) that their school uses. The exception to this were students who attend schools in the Brčko District of BiH (see footnote 57). Secondary School Drvar (Hercegbosanska Canton) is a Serb-majority school that operates on the H-NPP with the exception of the national group of subjects, in which they follow the curriculum of Republika Srpska (S-NPP); this is also the only high school in the Federation of BiH that fully operates on a separate NPP for the full national group of subjects. All schools in Republika Srpska were given the Serbian-language version. Catholic high schools were given the Croatian-language version since Croatian is the language of instruction.

no authority over the Entity ministries of education, the Brčko District of BiH Department of Education, or the cantonal ministries of education. Each school principle also had to grant me permission to visit their respective schools.

Stata 12.1 was used to conduct a principal component analysis (PCA) on the data, which is a descriptive statistical technique (Jackson 2003, 4) that allows us to learn more about the underlying structure of the data (Anderson 1963, 137). After running the PCA, I tested for Cronbach's α , which has a range between 0 and 1; a high Cronbach's α would tell us that there is a high association between different items on a scale. If Cronbach's α was above 0.70, an additive scale test was conducted. I then used Stata 12.1 to run linear regression analyses, which are explained in detail within each of the subsequent chapters. The regressions focus on students who self-identified as being Bosniak, Croat, Serb, or Bosnian.

The Revised Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM-R), first developed by Roberts et al. (1999), consists of twelve statements, plus three self-identification items. The twelve statements are designed to measure two sub-factors: (1) ethnic identity search and (2) affirmation, belonging, and commitment. The original Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM-O) was developed by Phinney (1992) and consisted of twenty statements. Roberts et al. (1999) revised the original MEIM in two ways: by dropping two statements from the measure and separating an additional six statements as a unique measure known as the Other-Group Orientation Scale. Minor re-wording of some statements was done by Roberts et al. (1999) as well for clarification purposes.

Respondents must answer MEIM-R along a four-point Likert Scale, using the following options: (4) Strongly Agree, (3) Agree, (2) Disagree, or (1) Strongly Disagree. MEIM-R has frequently been used in multicultural research elsewhere, such as Australia (e.g. Dandy et al.

2008), the United States (i.e. Roberts et al. 1999; Umaña-Taylor et al. 2006), and Zimbabwe (e.g. Worrell et al. 2006), where it has shown to be consistently reliable. MEIM-O was used by Hjort and Frisén (2006) in their case study on Mostar (n=89).⁵⁶ A total score for MEIM-R is determined by obtaining the mean of the items, with a range of scores from 1 to 4. Ethnic identity search is measured using items 1, 2, 4, 8, and 10. Affirmation, belonging, and commitment (ethnic saliency) is measured using items 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 12. In addition to the twelve statements, MEIM-R asks respondents to choose a national self-identification for themselves and their parents; the three self-identification statements are measured using items 13, 14, and 15, in which the respondents have the following options: (1) Bosniak, (2) Croat, (3) Serb, (4) Bosnian, (5) Roma, and (6) Other. If respondents choose “Other,” they have the option to write-in a national/ethnic group of their choice. For schools in the Brčko District of BiH, I was required to modify possible responses to items 13, 14, and 15 by the Brčko District of BiH Department of Education in order to carry out the survey in their schools.⁵⁷ When I began coding the data, I noticed that some Bosniak students also circled 'Bosnian,' and so I coded these responses separately from those who only identified as Bosniak; if students circled both, I coded it as (7). If students circled two or more ethnic/national groups (Options 1-5) with the exception of Bosniak/Bosnian, these were coded as (8). If students circled one or more ethnic/national groups (options 1-5), along with Other (option 6), these were coded as (9).

⁵⁶ Hjort and Frisén (2006, 156-157) found that in their sample (n=89), ethnic saliency received a higher score compared to ethnic identity search, and they attribute this to individuals having a high emotional attachment to their ethno-national group – which my findings also support (Chapter 5).

⁵⁷ I was only allowed to offer the following options: (1) Bosniak, (2) Croat, (3) Serb, and (4) Other. The reason given for this is that possible responses had to be in accordance with the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Constitution, which states that the country is comprised of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, as well as Other citizens. For schools in the Brčko District of BiH, students were given the Bosnian-language version of the survey. The reason for this is because the Brčko District of BiH Department of Education asked for a copy of the survey “in one of the official languages used in Bosnia and Herzegovina” for them to review, and I submitted the Bosnian-language version.

Upon running a PCA on the set of variables measuring ethnic saliency in the country, I found that the first principle component (Comp1) accounts for 62.17% of the variance in the variables ($\alpha=0.8937$). After conducting an additive scale, Item 3⁵⁸ of MEIM-R must be dropped from the analysis. A survey was dropped if a student did not respond to three or more of the sub-factor battery statements. The countrywide mean ethnic saliency score is 3.3493 (n=5,611; $\alpha=0.9019$). For the set of variables measuring ethnic identity search in the country, the first principle component accounts for 47.76% of the variance in the variables ($\alpha=0.7198$). After conducting the additive scale test, I found that no variables needed to be dropped from the analysis. A survey was dropped if a student did not respond to three or more of the sub-factor battery statements. The countrywide mean ethnic identity search score is 2.7770 (n=5,622; $\alpha=0.7198$). I also ran a PCA within the two entities and the Brčko District of BiH because I am interested in possible differences between them, especially in regards to school socialization, which is explored in Chapter Five. The traditional region of Herzegovina is explored for these reasons as well.

For the set of variables measuring ethnic saliency in the Federation of BiH, the first principle component accounts for 61.85% of the variance in the variables ($\alpha=0.8921$) upon running a PCA. For the set of variables measuring ethnic identity search in the Federation of BiH, the first principle component accounts for 47.37% of the variance in the variables ($\alpha=0.7164$). For the set of variables measuring ethnic saliency in Republika Srpska, the first principle component accounts for 63.86% of the variance in the variables ($\alpha=0.9009$); for the set of variables measuring ethnic identity search in Republika Srpska, the first principle component

⁵⁸ Item 3 of MEIM-R states: “I have a clear sense of my national background and what it means for me.”

accounts for 48.85% of the variance in the variables ($\alpha=0.7278$). For the set of variables measuring ethnic saliency in the Brčko District of BiH, the first principle component accounts for 60.68% of the variance in the variables ($\alpha=0.8888$); for the set of variables measuring ethnic identity search in the Brčko District of BiH, the first principle component accounts for 51.54% of the variance in the variables ($\alpha=0.7569$). Finally, I present my PCA results for Herzegovina. For the set of variables measuring ethnic saliency in Herzegovina, the first principle component accounts for 65.08% of the variance in the variables ($\alpha=0.9066$). For the set of variables measuring ethnic identity search in Herzegovina, the first principle component accounts for 50.86% of the variance in the variables ($\alpha=0.7525$). Upon conducting the additive scale tests on the ethnic saliency PCA's, it was found that Item 3 had to be dropped from the analyses within the Federation of BiH, Republika Srpska, and Herzegovina; no variables had to be dropped for the Brčko District of BiH. For ethnic identity search, no variables needed to be dropped from the analysis.

In Chapter Six, I explore the role of familial socialization on ethnic saliency. To do so, I used the Revised Familial Ethnic Socialization Measure (Umaña-Taylor et al. 2004; R-FESM), which consists of 12 statements based on a five-point Likert Scale. It is designed to measure two factors: Covert Familial Ethnic Socialization (Covert FES) and Overt Familial Ethnic Socialization (Overt FES). The respondents rate how much they agree/disagree with each statement, using the following options: (5) Strongly Agree, (4) Agree, (3) Neither agree nor disagree, (2) Disagree, or (1) Strongly Disagree. The original Familial Ethnic Socialization Measure (FESM) consisted of nine statements and was developed by Umaña-Taylor (2001) for her doctoral dissertation. The R-FESM is used to assess the degree to which respondents perceive that their families socialize them with respect to their nationality. Items 3, 4, 5, 8, 10,

11, and 12 tap Covert FES; items 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9 tap Overt FES. Covert FES assesses instances of daily life in which socialization regarding nationality occurs, although perhaps not through planned activities or events. Overt FES assesses socialization experiences that serve an intentional or planned nature. Higher scores indicate higher levels of familial ethnic socialization, and low scores indicate low levels of familial ethnic socialization. After running a PCA on these 12 variables, I found that the first principle component accounts for 50.72% of the variance in the variables ($\alpha=0.9055$). No variables were dropped after conducting an additive scale test. For my analysis of familial socialization, I only use the total R-FESM score in my regressions. The country-wide mean R-FESM score is: 3.9046 ($n=5,608$; $\alpha= 0.9055$).

The next measurement scale I used in my survey is the Other-Group Orientation Scale (OGO Scale), which was included in MEIM-O as part of the original twenty statements developed by Phinney (1992). Other-group orientation is the focus of Chapter Seven. The purpose of the OGO Scale is to measure the respondent's willingness to interact and socialize with someone from a different national group than his or her own. The OGO Scale consists of six statements based on a four-point Likert Scale, in which respondents must indicate how much they agree or disagree with each statement, using the following options: (4) Strongly Agree, (3) Agree, (2) Disagree, or (1) Strongly Disagree. Items 1, 3, 5, and 6 measure active/positive orientation; items 2 and 4 measure passive/negative orientation. The OGO score is calculated by obtaining the mean of the six items. A high OGO score indicates a willingness to interact and socialize with those from a different national group. Items 2 and 4 were re-coded so that a single OGO score could be used in the regression analyses. My research is also the first to use the OGO Scale and MEIM-R in a countrywide analysis; the only previous research using MEIM in Bosnia and Herzegovina was by Hjort and Friséen (2006) in their case study on Mostar. Upon running a

PCA on these six variables, I found that the first principle component accounts for 53.27% of the variance in the variables ($\alpha=0.8145$). After conducting an additive scale test, Item 2⁵⁹ has to be dropped from the mean score computation. The countrywide mean OGO score is 3.0290 ($n=5,613$; $\alpha=0.8183$).

In order to test the contact hypothesis, I also used the Quality of Other-Group Contact Measurement, which consists of three statements that are designed to assess the quality of contact, and are based on a four-point Likert Scale. This measurement scale is adapted from Čehajić and Brown (2010), who derived it from Zagefka and Brown (2002). A high score indicates a high level of quality contact. Upon running a PCA on the three variables, it was found that the first principle component accounts for 70.87% of the variance in the variables ($\alpha=0.7841$). No variables were dropped after running an additive scale test. The countrywide mean score is 2.9210 ($n=4,880$ $\alpha=0.7842$). The Quality of Other-Group Contact Measurement is included in Chapter Seven with Other-group orientation (OGO Scale).

The final section of my survey asked general demographic questions, such as student gender (female respondents are coded as 0, male respondents are coded as 1), how often the student attends religious services (1=never to 4=every week),⁶⁰ and if they planned on attending college or not.⁶¹ The last question of the survey asked the students to rate how proud they are to be citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on a four-point scale (1=not proud at all to 4=very

⁵⁹ Item 2 of the OGO Scale: “I sometimes feel that it would be better if the different national groups did not try to mix together.”

⁶⁰ This reflects the recoded frequency of religious service attendance scale. In the original survey, the scale was 1=once a week to 4=never.

⁶¹ Responses to this question are not used in any of the regressions due to the fact that 92.79% of surveyed students planned on attending college.

proud). The English version of the survey is included in the appendix; the official Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian versions are available upon request.

Cronbach's α across measures are consistently strong, and this shows the reliability of the various batteries within the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context. The country currently has an extremely high degree of social division between the three constituent peoples into three distinct societies, brought about by extreme violence during the war. These batteries were developed outside of the unique Bosnian-Herzegovinian system, and its reliability shows the good transferability of the different measures. I also ran correlation tests between the scales generated from the social measurement batteries. The first pairwise correlation test between ethnic saliency (derived from MEIM-R) and other-group orientation (OGO Scale) has a correlation coefficient score of -0.1104 ($p < 0.001$), which demonstrates a significant, if not overwhelming, negative relationship between mean scores of the two scales. As expected, tolerance of out-group nationalities decreases as ethnic saliency increases. The second pairwise correlation is between ethnic saliency and familial ethnic socialization (R-FESM) which are highly positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of 0.5997 , demonstrating a strong and positive relationship ($p < 0.001$).

Research Design

Surveys were administered to high school seniors⁶² during the 2012-2013 academic calendar year. These students would have no memorable personal experiences with the Bosnian War; rather, their knowledge mainly comes from older family members and what they learn in school. When designing field surveys to be conducted in a foreign state with a highly charged political environment, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, one must be mindful of language (Greenburg 2008; Pašalić-Kreso 2008, 367) and the political-historical memories from the Bosnian War, depending on which city/town one may visit. A total of 5,749 surveys were conducted at 78 high schools in 53 cities and towns across the country; 59.38% of all respondents were female (n=3,414), 38.25% of all respondents were male (n=2,199), and 2.37% of all respondents did not provide their gender (either skipping the question or turning in a blank survey; n=136).

Within the Federation of BiH, a total of 4,288 surveys were gathered; in Republika Srpska, a total of 1,149 surveys were gathered; and in the Brčko District of BiH, a total of 312 surveys were gathered. 60.19% of surveyed students in the Federation of BiH went to schools that operated on the Bosniak curriculum, 36.33% went to schools that operated on the Croatian curriculum, and 3.47% of students went to Catholic schools. In Republika Srpska, 96.17% of surveyed students went to schools on the Serbian curriculum and 3.83% went to the Catholic school in Banja Luka. In all three political-administrative areas, females constituted the majority of surveyed students.

⁶² The exception to this is data gathered from two schools in Stolac and one school in Vareš, which I visited in November and December 2013. I also re-visited the school in Čitluk during this time, because when I visited in May 2013 it was the last day of the school year, and I was only able to survey one senior class (n=28) out of a total of 207 seniors that normally would have been there. The school in Čitluk was kind enough to allow me to return the following academic year. Similar to what happened in Čitluk, I visited the school in Ključ in May 2013 on their last day, but was unable to visit any seniors. The principle allowed me to return the following academic year as well.

The selection of cities and towns was based on a non-probability sampling approach. In the Federation of BiH, I attempted to conduct the surveys in public high schools located in all ten cantons in the following cities and towns: Bihać (Una-Sana Canton), Bosanska Krupa (Una-Sana Canton), Bosanski Petrovac (Una-Sana Canton), Breza (Zenica-Doboj Canton), Bugojno (Central Bosnia Canton), Busovača (Central Bosnia Canton), Bužim (Una-Sana Canton), Cazin (Una-Sana Canton), Čapljina (Herzegovina-Neretva Canton), Čitluk (Herzegovina-Neretva Canton), Donji Vakuf (Central Bosnia Canton) Drvar (Hercegbosanska Canton), Glamoč (Hercegbosanska Canton), Goražde (Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Goražde), Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje (Central Bosnia Canton), Grude (West Herzegovina Canton), Hadžići (Canton Sarajevo), Jablanica (Herzegovina-Neretva Canton), Jajce (Central Bosnia Canton), Kakanj (Zenica-Doboj Canton), Kalesija (Tuzla Canton), Kiseljak (Central Bosnia Canton), Ključ (Una-Sana Canton), Konjic (Herzegovina-Neretva Canton), Kreševo (Central Bosnia Canton), Kupres (Hercegbosanska Canton), Livno (Hercegbosanska Canton), Lukavac (Tuzla Canton), Ljubuški (West Herzegovina Canton), Maglaj (Zenica-Doboj Canton), Mostar (Herzegovina-Neretva Canton), Novi Travnik (Central Bosnia Canton), Odžak (Posavina Canton), Olovo (Zenica-Doboj Canton), Orašje (Posavina Canton), Posušje (West Herzegovina Canton), Rama-Prozor (Herzegovina-Neretva Canton), Sarajevo (Canton Sarajevo), Sanski Most (Una-Sana Canton), Stolac (Herzegovina-Neretva Canton), Široki Brijeg (West Herzegovina Canton), Tešanj (Zenica-Doboj Canton), Tomislavgrad (Hercegbosanska Canton), Travnik (Central Bosnia Canton), Tuzla (Tuzla Canton), Usora (Zenica-Doboj Canton), Vareš (Zenica-Doboj Canton), Velika Kladuša (Una-Sana Canton), Visoko (Zenica-Doboj Canton), Vitez (Central Bosnia Canton), Zavidovići (Zenica-Doboj Canton), Zenica (Zenica-Doboj Canton), Žepče (Zenica-Doboj Canton), and Živinice (Tuzla Canton). In Republika Srpska, I attempted to conduct the

surveys in public high schools located in all seven administrative regions, in the following cities and towns: Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Bileća, Brod, Derventa, Doboj, Foča, Gacko, Istočno Sarajevo, Gradiška, Kneževo, Kotor-Varoš, Ljubinje, Mrkonjić Grad, Novi Grad, Pale, Prijedor, Prnjavor, Rogatica, Srbac, Srebrenica, Šamac, Trebinje, Višegrad, and Zvornik. In the Brčko District of BiH, the survey was administered in the city of Brčko. I also attempted to conduct the surveys in Catholic high schools (KŠC), which are considered public schools in the country; there are seven such schools, located in: Banja Luka, Bihać, Sarajevo, Travnik, Tuzla, Zenica, and Žepče.

Within the Federation of BiH, I was unable to visit 14 of my proposed towns: Jablanica, Kalesija, Kiseljak, Konjic, Maglaj, Odžak, Olovo, Orašje, Rama-Prozor, Tešanj,⁶³ Usora, Visoko, Zavidovići, and Živinice. Posavina Canton was the only canton I was unable to visit any towns/schools (Odžak and Orašje / two schools total) since I was not successful in obtaining permission from the cantonal ministry of education. I never received a response from the ministry in Tuzla Canton, but I was able to visit two (Tuzla and Lukavac) of the four proposed towns (the other two being Kalesija and Živinice). Within the Federation of BiH, I was able to visit 74.07% of my proposed cities/towns (40 out of 54).

Within Republika Srpska, I was unable to visit 13 of my proposed towns: Bijeljina, Bileća, Doboj, Gacko, Gradiška, Kneževo, Kotor-Varoš, Novi Grad, Ljubinje, Pale, Rogatica, Šamac, and Zvornik. I was able to visit six of the seven administrative regions in Republika Srpska. I was unable to visit schools in Bijeljina Region, which is the smallest of the seven administrative regions. Within Republika Srpska, I was able to visit 48% of my proposed cities/towns (12 out of 25).

⁶³ I was originally granted permission to visit the school (Mixed Secondary School Tešanj; B-NPP), but it was later revoked by the principle.

In regards to the Catholic high schools, I was able to visit four of the seven schools. I was unable to visit the Catholic high schools in Sarajevo, Travnik,⁶⁴ and Zenica. In regards to the three national curricula used in the country, I was able to visit 36 schools on the Bosniak curriculum, 24 on the Croatian curriculum, 13 on the Serbian curriculum, three schools on the unified Brčko District of BiH curriculum (all located in the city of Brčko), and four Catholic schools. One school in the Federation of BiH (Secondary School Drvar) uses the Serbian curriculum for the national group of subjects, but operates on the Croatian curriculum for all other matters (thus, it was included under the Croatian school count). In sum, I was able to visit 53 of my originally proposed 80 cities/towns throughout the country, or 66.25%. Of the 53 visited cities/towns, 39.87% of students went to high school in an urban/large city and 60.13% went to high school in a rural/small town. There was no gender difference between urban or rural high schools; females constituted the majority in both: 61.92% of the student population in urban areas and 60.10% in rural areas. As for the surveyed students at the national level, 44.89% attended schools on the Bosniak curriculum, 27.10% on the Croatian curriculum, 19.22% on the Serbian curriculum, 5.43% on the unified Brčko District of BiH curriculum, and 3.36% on the Catholic high school curriculum.

The previously mentioned cities and towns in the Federation of BiH were chosen since they have at least one high school, and I attempted to visit all school-types whenever and wherever possible. The public high school system in Mostar, the capital of Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, represents a unique situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The city has three public

⁶⁴ As noted previously, this specific Catholic school does not allow Bosniaks as it operates on the *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* principle. Before the war, the school building consisted of only the Catholic school, but post-war, the Bosniaks occupy a wing of the building for their own school. All other Catholic schools in the country do not discriminate and allow all national groups to enroll.

(gymnasium) high schools: two are mono-ethnic and the third is administratively unified. The Croat school is Friar Grga Martić Gymnasium (*Gimnazija fra Grge Martića*), the Bosniak school is the Second Gymnasium of Mostar (*Druga gimnazija Mostar*), and the administratively unified school is Mostar Gymnasium (*Gimnazija Mostar*). Mostar Gymnasium is located in the western, Croat part of the city, just across from the former frontline of the war. The first fully administratively-unified (9th-12th grade) school year was during the 2005-2006 academic year. Although Mostar Gymnasium is “administratively unified,” the Bosniak and Croat students do not attend the same classes together. The unification comes in the form of attending (separate) classes at the same time, having shared facilities (library, computer lab, and a sports/recreation area), a single principle,⁶⁵ a joint school board, a joint student government association, and one school bank account. The symbolic aspect for the re-unification of Mostar Gymnasium is immense; in practice, the re-unification has maintained the use of the two separate curricula. Hromadžić (2008, 549) terms this as “...preserving ethnic segregation through unification.” This was the first administratively re-unified school in the country (Hromadžić 2008). I administered the survey at all three of the previously mentioned high schools in Mostar. At the university level, Mostar is also unique in that it has two universities: one for Bosniaks (*Univerzitet “Džemal Bijedić” u Mostaru*; ‘Džemal Bijedić University of Mostar’) and one for Croats (*Sveučilište u Mostaru*; ‘University of Mostar’). Before the war, the city only had one university, the University of Mostar.

In the case of Republika Srpska, Banja Luka was chosen because it is the capital of Republika Srpska, whereas Pale was the wartime capital. Prijedor Municipality has the highest

⁶⁵ The positions of principle and vice principle rotate between a Croat and a Bosniak. Although legally one school, I had to get permission from the principle (Bosniak) to survey students on the B-NPP, and the vice principle (Croat) in order to survey students on the H-NPP.

level of Bosniak returnees. The town of Foča is unique in Republika Srpska due to the policies of Mayor Zdravko Krsmanović (*Nova Socijalistička Partija* – ‘New Socialist Party,’ NSP) regarding Bosniak returnees. Unlike other ethnic-Serb politicians in Republika Srpska, Mayor Krsmanović has traveled to Sarajevo and Goražde to invite the towns’ former Bosniak residents back (of whom around 4,500 have returned as of 2010), has rebuilt 14 mosques that had been blown up during the war, returned the town to its original name of Foča, and supports abolishing the entities (Pavić 2010, 1; Freeman 2010, 1). For the town of Foča, these policies represent a 180 degree shift of what took place during and immediately following the Bosnian War. During the war, the town was ethnically-cleansed of all non-Serb inhabitants, was renamed to Srbinje (‘Place of Serbs’), and was the location of a notorious rape-camp. Until the election of Mayor Krsmanović in 2004, the town was known as a “black hole in the Balkans” (Freeman 2010, 1), where Radovan Karadžić and other Bosnian-Serb war criminals were welcomed; the United States even imposed sanctions on the town due to its recidivism. Krsmanović served as mayor until 2012, when he was defeated in local elections by Radislav Mašić (SNSD-SDS Coalition). The other towns were chosen based on if they had a high school. Croats do not form a majority within any cities or towns in Republika Srpska; the majority-Bosniak town of Kozarac only has an elementary school. The towns that Inzko (November 2013, 1) refers to in his report to the UN Secretary-General – Konjević Polje (Bratunac Municipality) and Vrbanjci (Kotor-Varoš Municipality) – only have elementary schools.

CHAPTER V

ETHNIC SALIENCY AND NATIONAL SELF-IDENTIFICATION OF STUDENTS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

In this chapter, I explore ethnic saliency and national self-identification of high school seniors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In order to do this, I use the Revised Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM-R), developed by Roberts et al. (1999), which consists of twelve statements based on a four-point Likert Scale, plus three items regarding national self-identification of the student and their parents. I use it to measure two sub-factors: (1) ethnic identity search and (2) affirmation, belonging, and commitment. For each of the twelve statements, respondents have the following options: (4) Strongly Agree, (3) Agree, (2) Disagree, or (1) Strongly Disagree. Ethnic identity search is measured using items 1, 2, 4, 8, and 10. Affirmation, belonging, and commitment (ethnic saliency) is measured using items 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 11, and 12. I first present data from the country as a whole, and then break it down into the post-war political constructs of the Federation of BiH, Republika Srpska, and the Brčko District of BiH. I also present data from the region of Herzegovina.⁶⁶

According to Phinney (1996, 143), the study of ethnic identity places its emphasis on how individual group members understand and interpret their own identity. “Ethnic identity”

⁶⁶ I visited the following cities/towns in Herzegovina: Trebinje (Republika Srpska); Grude, Ljubuški, Posušje, and Široki Brijeg (West Herzegovina Canton); Čapljina, Čitluk, Mostar, and Stolac (Herzegovina-Neretva Canton); Kupres, Livno, and Tomislavgrad (Hercegbosanska Canton). In Herzegovina, 145 surveys were filled out by students on the Bosniak curriculum, 1,201 by students on the Croatian curriculum, and 95 by students on the Serbian curriculum.

itself refers to the degree in which the individual has explored their ethnicity, is clear about what group membership means to them, and identifies with said ethnic group (Phinney 1996). From the perspective of social psychology, ethnic identity is a part of social identity, which Tajfel (1981, 255) defines as “...that *part* of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.” The notion of “ethnic saliency” refers to how important their ethnic identity/background is to them (Roberts et al. 1999). The concept and process of identity formation does not begin or end during adolescence, but adolescence is a time period that is much more critical than other periods of life for identity formation (Marcia 1980, 160).

The countrywide mean ethnic saliency score is 3.3493 ($n=5,611$; $\alpha=0.9019$). The countrywide mean ethnic identity search score is: 2.7770 ($n=5,622$; $\alpha=0.7198$). The Federation of BiH has a mean ethnic saliency score of 3.3494 ($n=4,192$; $\alpha=0.9010$) and a mean ethnic identity search score of 2.7773 ($n=4,200$; $\alpha=0.7164$). Republika Srpska’s mean ethnic saliency score is 3.3548 ($n=1,116$; $\alpha=0.9095$), with a mean ethnic identity search score of 2.7987 ($n=1,118$; $\alpha=0.7278$). In the Brčko District of BiH, the mean ethnic saliency score is 3.3140 ($n=303$; $\alpha=0.8897$), with a mean ethnic identity search score of 2.6921 ($n=304$; $\alpha=0.7569$). The traditional region of Herzegovina has an ethnic saliency score of 3.4194 ($n=1,417$; $\alpha=0.9112$) and a mean ethnic identity search score of 2.8326 ($n=1,419$; $\alpha=0.7524$). Although identity formation theory posits that ethnic saliency is the outcome of ethnic identity search (Phinney 1993), ethnic saliency has a higher average score compared to that of ethnic identity search across all areas in the country. The lower ethnic identity search scores compared to those of

ethnic saliency have a negative meaning; that is, students are not sure what group membership means for their lives.

In this chapter, I explore ethnic saliency and national self-identification of students. In regards to ethnic saliency, I first explore the role (frequency) of religious service attendance on levels of ethnic saliency (Hypothesis 5a). The second component of this chapter, national self-identification, is presented at the countrywide level. In regards to national self-identification, I focus on the three constituent peoples and those who self-identify as Bosnian, but also provide additional data within certain tables for the other respondents as well. The second component of this chapter also explores the role of civic pride (Hypothesis 1b).

According to the 1991 Census of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it had a population of 4,377,033 people. 43.47% identified as Muslim by nationality, 31.21% as Serb, 17.38% as Croat, 5.54% as Yugoslav, 0.23% as Montenegrin, 0.05% as Slovenian, 0.03% as Macedonian, and 2.09% as Other⁶⁷ (Zavod za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine 1991). Post-war, the term “Bosniak” has come to replace the “Muslim by nationality” ethno-national group. In my fieldwork, I found that 38.43% of students identified as Bosniak, 28.73% as Croat, 22.14% as Serb, 8.05% as Bosnian, 1.53% as Other, and 0.26% as Roma. Forty-seven students (0.83%) identify with more than one ethno-national group. See Table 6a (page 110) for percentages and number of students who identified with each ethno-national category.

⁶⁷ The term “Other” in this context referred to all other minority groups in SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the Roma. If I include the Roma with ‘Others’ from my fieldwork, I get 1.80% (n=102). Post-war, the Roma people are the largest recognized national minority group in the country, yet they were conspicuously absent from the high schools I visited. A total of 15 students identified as being Roma in the entire country. The cities of Sarajevo and Mostar have the largest visible Roma populations; yet only six students out of a total of 532 respondents from five high schools in Sarajevo were Roma, and no students identified as being Roma in Mostar, out of a total of 333 respondents from three high schools.

Two Schools Under One Roof

Within the Federation of BiH, a policy known as *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* ('two schools under one roof') exists in schools within three of the ten cantons, in which students of two different ethno-national groups (Bosniaks or Croats) have classes within the same school building, but only with students and teachers of their nationality. This occurs by either having morning/afternoon shifts (such as in Busovača or Stolac) or separate wings/floors (such as in Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje or Bugojno). Both schools are considered two separate legal entities existing at the same address and building. This policy was initially launched in 2000 in the Herzegovinian town of Stolac to encourage refugees to return to their pre-war homes of origin (Božić 2006, 331-333; Hromadžić 2008, 554). This school type is located in multi-ethnic towns, yet students are officially segregated along ethno-national lines.

H9: Students who study on the *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* system will have higher levels of ethnic saliency compared to those who do not.

For this school type, I visited six towns (nine schools) in two cantons: six on the Bosniak curriculum and three on the Croatian curriculum. I was able to visit schools on both curriculums in the towns of Bugojno, Stolac, and Vitez. I was only allowed to visit schools on the Bosniak curriculum in the towns of Busovača, Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje, and Travnik. The mean ethnic saliency score for this school type is: 3.4176 (n=566; α =0.8727). When broken down between the two national curricula, I found that mean ethnic saliency score was slightly higher among students studying on the Croatian curriculum (3.4680; n=188) compared to students studying on the Bosniak curriculum (3.3926; n=378). The mean civic pride score amongst students on the Croatian curriculum was significantly lower (2.0904; n=188) compared to students on the Bosniak curriculum (3.4331; n=374).

Before the war, the Croats of Bosnia-proper had tended to support a unified and independent Bosnian-Herzegovinian state (Tanner 2001, 285); if we separate the Croatian-program towns and calculate between Herzegovina and Bosnia-proper, we do in fact see a difference for place of residence for levels of civic pride and ethnic saliency (for students who attend the *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* school type). In Herzegovina (Stolac), the mean civic pride score is 1.6829; in Bosnia-proper (Bugojno and Vitez), the mean civic pride score is 2.2040. In the case of ethnic saliency, I found that ethnic saliency is, on average, lower for students who attend Croatian schools in Bosnia-proper compared to Herzegovina:⁶⁸ 3.3289 ($\alpha=0.8211$) and 3.5853 ($\alpha=0.9362$), respectively. A similar pattern can be seen when looking at Bosniak-curricula schools: students on the Bosniak program in Herzegovina⁶⁹ (Stolac) also displayed a higher level of ethnic saliency compared to students on the Bosniak program in Bosnia-proper (Bugojno, Busovača, Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje, Travnik, and Vitez),⁷⁰ with the respective scores of 3.4385 ($\alpha=0.7334$) and 3.3888 ($\alpha=0.8784$), however there is no statistical difference between Bosniak schools in Bosnia-proper and Herzegovina for this particular school type.

When comparing ethnic saliency scores among students on the two national curricula in the three towns I was able to visit both sides on (Bugojno, Stolac, and Vitez), I found, as Hypothesis 8 predicted, ethnic saliency levels were high. In Bugojno, they were 3.3679 (B-NPP; $\alpha=0.8904$) and 3.3854 (H-NPP; $\alpha=0.8753$); in Stolac, they were 3.4385 (B-NPP; $\alpha=0.7334$) and

⁶⁸ Item 3 of MEIM-R was dropped from the analysis.

⁶⁹ Item 6 of MEIM-R: “I have a strong sense of belonging to my own national group.” This was dropped from the analysis.

⁷⁰ Item 3 of MEIM-R was dropped from the analysis.

3.5853 (H-NPP; $\alpha=0.9362$); in Vitez, they were 3.3857 (B-NPP; $\alpha=0.8402$) and 3.4312 (H-NPP; $\alpha=0.8449$). The Bosniak *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* program had an average saliency score of 3.3831 ($\alpha=0.8746$; $n=174$) and the Croatian *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* program had an average saliency score of 3.4680 ($\alpha=0.8709$; $n=188$). There was no statistical difference between the Bosniak and Croatian sides. When it comes to ethnic saliency scores between this school type compared to schools that do not operate under this particular system within other cantons of the Federation of BiH, it was found that mean ethnic saliency scores were lower, with the exception of Hercegbosanska Canton (H-NPP), which had the highest saliency score. Schools in Čapljina, Mostar, and Novi Travnik were excluded from this analysis since although students are segregated based on nationality, the schools are not considered *dvije škole pod jednim krovom*. There is only one non-segregated school I can use for comparison in Herzegovina-Neretva Canton (Čitluk; H-NPP), compared to three in Central Bosnia Canton: Donji Vakuf (B-NPP) Jajce (H-NPP), and Kreševo (H-NPP). See Table 1 for the non-*dvije škole pod jednim krovom* cantonal ethnic saliency scores. What this analysis has found is that institutionalized segregation and overt emphasis of the nationality of students leads to higher average levels of ethnic saliency, with the exception of Hercegbosanska Canton. Hypothesis 9 can be accepted.

Table 1: Cantonal Ethnic Saliency Scores

Cantons	Ethnic Saliency
Una-Sana	3.2810 (n=680)
Tuzla Canton	3.2161 (n=133)
Zenica-Doboj	3.3681 (n=622)
Bosnian-Podrinje	3.3719 (n=108)
Central Bosnia	3.3514 (n=101)
Herzegovina-Neretva	3.3763 (n=184)
West Herzegovina	3.4469 (n=609)
Canton Sarajevo	3.2211 (n=575)
Hercegbosanska	3.5177 (n=122)

The Role of Religious Service Attendance on Ethnic Saliency

According to Gurr (1993, 3-4), religion is salient to ethnicity if it is used by the in-group to set itself apart from others, as well as if others use it as a defining trait to identify another group. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, religion is the main cultural distinguishing factor among the three constituent ethno-national groups. In this section, I explore the role of religious service attendance on ethnic saliency (Hypothesis 5a), which states:

H5a: Students who regularly attend religious services will experience ethnic socialization and increased ethnic saliency.

My first model (Model 1a) explores the effects of religious service attendance on ethnic saliency in the country. For this regression, my independent variables are: amount of religious service attendance, parental education levels (*Mom Education* and *Dad Education*), student gender (*Gender*),⁷¹ urban or rural school location (*Urban*),⁷² and dummy variables representing the student national self-identifications (*nat_dummy_*). The dependent variable is mean ethnic saliency (*Saliency*), derived from MEIM-R (Roberts et al. 1999). The reference national self-identification group is Croat. My model is:

$$\text{Model 1a: Saliency} = \text{Amount of Religious Service Attendance} + \text{Mom Education} + \text{Dad Education} + \text{Gender} + \text{Urban} + \text{Bosniak_dummy} + \text{Serb_dummy} + \text{Bosnian_dummy} + \text{Roma_dummy} + \text{Other_dummy} + \text{Bosniak/Bosnian_dummy} + \text{Mix1_dummy} + \text{Mix2_dummy}$$

After running Model 1a, I find that amount of religious service attendance is statistically significant, where $p < 0.001$, in increasing saliency levels. An urban or rural school location has no statistical effect on saliency levels. The level of parental education is statistically significant,

⁷¹ *Gender*: 0=female; 1=male.

⁷² *Urban*: 0=rural; 1=urban.

but only for that of the mother; the educational attainment of the father has no statistical significance. Gender also has no statistical significance on ethnic saliency. In a study on the causes of ethnic prejudice prior to the wars of national separation in the former Yugoslavia, Kunovich and Hodson (2002, 204) found that increased educational attainment in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia had a non-linear effect on ethnic tolerance. The role of parental education on ethnic saliency would be an interesting topic to explore in future research. Next, I run four regressions (Models 1b to 1e) exploring the role of religious service attendance on ethnic saliency levels among the three constituent peoples and those who self-identified as being Bosnian. See Table 2a for the results of Models 1b to 1e.

Model 1b (Bosniak): Saliency = Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Mom Education + Dad Education + Gender + Urban

Model 1c (Croat): Saliency = Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Mom Education + Dad Education + Gender + Urban

Model 1d (Serb): Saliency = Amount of Religious Service + Mom Education + Dad Education + Gender + Urban

Model 1e (Bosnian): Saliency = Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Mom Education + Dad Education + Gender + Urban

At the state level, religious service attendance has a statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) effect on ethnic saliency among the three constituent peoples, as well as those who self-identified as being Bosnian. This means the act of going to church or mosque, on average, increases ethnic saliency levels. Hypothesis 5a, which states that “Students who regularly attend religious services will experience ethnic socialization and increased saliency” can be accepted. What makes the Bosnian-Herzegovinian case more interesting in this analysis, however, is that 57.61%

of Croats reported they attend weekly Mass, 21.23% of Bosniaks⁷³ reported they attended mosque once a week, and 5.75% of Serbs reported they attend weekly services. The three constituent peoples have, on average, high levels of ethnic socialization with no statistical difference between them: 3.3932 (Bosniaks), 3.4365 (Croats), and 3.3518 (Serbs). 11.16% of self-identifying Bosnians reported they attend weekly religious services, with a mean ethnic saliency score of 3.0214. See Table 3 for the complete breakdown of frequency of religious service attendance.

With no statistically significant difference between Bosniak, Croat, and Serb ethnic saliency scores, but radically different percentages of weekly religious service attendance between the two Christian ethno-national groups, why do we not see a difference in ethnic saliency scores? Even if we were to include the percentage of students who attend religious services every other week with those who attend weekly, the strong contrast remains the same between all four groups: Croats still attend the most and Serbs the least (see Table 3a). Hypothesis 5d, which states that “Croats will have higher levels of religious service attendance compared to Bosniaks and Serbs,” can be accepted.

In regards to if religious importance in everyday life has an effect, Hypothesis 5b states:

H5b: Students who report that they consider religion to be an important part of their life will show a higher level of ethnic saliency than those who do not.

In response to the question “is religion an important part of your life,” Croats and Bosniaks profess an almost equal level of importance (94.21% and 91.86%, respectively), with Serbs somewhat behind, at 82.47%. Amongst self-identifying Bosnians, 71.85% reported that religion is an important part of their life. One Bosniak student from Žepče, who stated that religion is an

⁷³ 23.53% of students who chose the joint ethnic and civic identity of Bosniak/Bosnian reported they attend mosque once a week.

important part of his life, added the following comment for why this is so: “*Apsolutno jer nas i ona potiče da poštujemo pripadnike drugih nacionalnosti i konfesije*” (‘Absolutely, because it encourages us to respect members of other nationalities and confessions’). Among the three constituent peoples, there is not enough variance to test Hypothesis 5b; see Table 3b for the importance of religion in everyday life. When asked if they believe in God or not, 97.06% of Bosniaks, 98.11% of Croats, 92.14% of Serbs, and 87.27% of Bosnians stated that they do. 1.36% of Bosnians were unsure; one such student from Sarajevo wrote in English that she is “...on a spiritual journey at this time, so I don’t know yet.”

One possibility that may explain high levels of saliency even with lower weekly religious service attendance amongst Bosniaks and Serbs (compared to Croats) is the fact that these students are still exposed to religion through their schools. Students on all three national curricula have specific religion classes, where priests or imams teach / preach the appropriate ethnic faith in school. Gender was also statistically significant, but gender type was not uniform across the four groups. Among Croats, being male is statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) for increasing saliency, whereas being female is statistically significant among Bosnians ($p < 0.01$) and Bosniaks ($p < 0.05$). There is no statistical effect on Serbs. The effects of gender on ethnic saliency would be an interesting topic to explore in future research. See Table 2a for the results of the regressions of Models 1b to 1e.

Table 2a: Effects of Religious Service Attendance on Ethnic Saliency in Bosnia and Herzegovina

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Religious Service Attendance	0.106*** (0.0102)	0.155*** (0.0146)	0.166*** (0.0198)	0.127*** (0.0307)
Urban	- 0.0316 (0.0271)	- 0.0806* (0.0406)	0.0577 (0.0388)	- 0.00300 (0.0839)
Male	- 0.072** (0.0278)	0.104** (0.0318)	0.00570 (0.0396)	- 0.239** (0.0780)
Mom Education	0.00121 (0.0128)	- 0.0179 (0.0153)	- 0.0396 + (0.0205)	- 0.0928* (0.0373)
Dad Education	0.00479 (0.0128)	- 0.000650 (0.0146)	0.0143 (0.0200)	0.0217 (0.0377)
_cons	3.126*** (0.0544)	2.827*** (0.0881)	3.009*** (0.0865)	3.079*** (0.153)
R-square	0.054	0.076	0.058	0.083
N	2,027	1,572	1,206	436
(Standard errors in parentheses)				
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001				

I am also interested to see if living in the Federation of BiH, Republika Srpska, and/or the Brčko District of BiH has an impact on saliency levels due to ethno-national composition structures. When a regression of Model 1a is conducted individually in the two entities, an interesting result comes about. Religious service attendance maintains its statistical significance in both entities ($p < 0.001$) for increasing ethnic saliency, but the effects of an urban or rural location becomes statistically significant, albeit in two different manners. In Republika Srpska, an urban area is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) for *increasing* saliency, whereas in the Federation of BiH, it is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) for *decreasing* saliency. Within the Brčko District of BiH, I cannot test for possible urban/rural effects since all three high schools are located in the city of Brčko (coded as urban). See Tables 2b, 2c, and 2d.

Within the Federation of BiH, an urban area is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) for decreasing saliency levels among Croats; there is no statistical effect on Serbs, Bosniaks, or Bosnians. Gender becomes statistically significant for increasing saliency among Croat males ($p < 0.01$). The opposite holds true for Bosnians ($p < 0.01$) and Bosniaks ($p < 0.05$); being female statistically increases saliency. Gender has no statistical effect on Serbs in the Federation of BiH. In Republika Srpska, there is not a large enough sample size of Croats ($n=7$) or Bosnians ($n=13$) to conduct proper analyses. I was able to do so for Bosniaks, however ($n=43$); the variable *Urban* has no statistical effect on Bosniaks who reside in Republika Srpska. The statistically significant effect on saliency in Republika Srpska ($p < 0.05$) mentioned previously thus only applies to Serbs. Gender is statistically significant for Bosniak females ($p < 0.01$), but not for Serbs of either gender in Republika Srpska. When running Model 1a in Herzegovina, I found that living in an urban area becomes statistically significant for increasing ethnic saliency among Serbs ($p < 0.01$), but

there is no statistical effect for Bosniaks or Croats; there was not a large enough sample size of self-identifying Bosnians for a comparison (n=8) in Herzegovina.⁷⁴ See Table 2e for results from Herzegovina.

⁷⁴ Gender is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) only for Croats in Herzegovina. Religious service attendance is statistically significant for increasing saliency among Bosniaks ($p < 0.05$) and Croats ($p < 0.001$), but there is no effect for Serbs in Herzegovina. In Herzegovina, two areas were coded as urban: Mostar and Trebinje.

Table 2b: Effects of Religious Service Attendance on Ethnic Saliency in the Federation of BiH

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Religious Service Attendance	0.0994*** (0.0107)	0.156*** (0.0149)	0.0575 (0.0991)	0.121*** (0.0306)
Urban	- 0.0447 (0.0288)	- 0.0889* (0.0425)	0.189 (0.266)	0.0109 (0.0841)
Male	- 0.0613* (0.0293)	0.107** (0.0323)	- 0.0998 (0.216)	- 0.234** (0.0787)
Mom Education	0.00731 (0.0134)	- 0.0190 (0.0156)	- 0.308** (0.114)	- 0.0978** (0.0370)
Dad Education	0.00178 (0.0135)	- 0.000121 (0.0149)	- 0.027 (0.108)	0.0216 (0.0376)
_cons	3.135*** (0.0576)	2.822*** (0.0896)	4.186*** (0.430)	3.106*** (0.154)
R-square	0.047	0.074	0.155	0.082
N	1,880	1,542	66	423
(Standard errors in parentheses)				
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001				

Table 2c: Effects of Religious Service Attendance on Ethnic Saliency in Republika Srpska

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Religious Service Attendance	0.192** (0.0573)	0.617 + (0.0553)	0.202*** (0.0220)	1.158 (1.071)
Urban	0.165 (0.223)	0.325 (0.182)	0.0917* (0.0437)	- 0.530 (1.140)
Male	- 0.380** (0.0293)	1.533 + (0.221)	0.0468 (0.0425)	0.178 (0.751)
Mom Education	0.0850 (0.0799)	0.508 + (0.0520)	- 0.0243 (0.0216)	0.409 (0.553)
Dad Education	- 0.0415 (0.0725)	- 0.675 + (0.0909)	0.00549 (0.0212)	- 0.192 (0.507)
_cons	2.912*** (0.268)	2.433 + (0.193)	2.903*** (0.0944)	0.243 (2.853)
R-square	0.387	0.996	0.083	0.322
N	43	7	978	13
(Standard errors in parentheses)				
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001				

Table 2d: Effects of Religious Service Attendance on Ethnic Saliency in the Brčko District of BiH

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Religious Service Attendance	- 0.0335 (0.0353)	0.104 (0.125)	0.0946* (0.0395)	x (x)
Male	0.0627 (0.117)	- 0.0978 (0.250)	- 0.138 (0.105)	x (x)
Mom Education	- 0.132* (0.0586)	0.00122 (0.111)	0.0107 (0.0688)	x (x)
Dad Education	0.0881 (0.0546)	- 0.0322 (0.124)	0.0185 (0.0622)	x (x)
_cons	3.561*** (0.207)	3.276*** (0.666)	3.068*** (0.195)	x (x)
R-square	0.068	0.054	0.048	x
N	104	23	162	x
(Standard errors in parentheses)				
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001				

Table 2e: Effects of Religious Service Attendance on Ethnic Saliency in Herzegovina

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Religious Service Attendance	0.111* (0.0425)	0.198**** (0.0204)	0.109 (0.0808)	0.0626 (0.155)
Urban	0.107 (0.140)	- 0.0462 (0.0502)	1.009** (0.356)	1.618 (1.423)
Male	- 0.0773 (0.113)	0.136**** (0.0395)	- 0.0459 (0.160)	1.432 (1.267)
Mom Education	- 0.0231 (0.0553)	- 0.00700 (0.0195)	- 0.144 (0.0689)	1.673 + (0.566)
Dad Education	0.0136 (0.0535)	- 0.00234 (0.0183)	- 0.00171 (0.0654)	- 1.391 (0.573)
_cons	3.136**** (0.234)	2.557**** (0.122)	2.674**** (0.552)	0.625 (1.720)
R-square	0.053	0.088	0.142	0.934
N	137	1,095	98	8
(Standard errors in parentheses)				
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001				

The high levels of church service attendance (Hypothesis 5d) and religiosity levels amongst Croats were expected due to their pre-war high levels in SFR Yugoslavia (Cohen 1997). Skrbiš (2005, 449) states that there is "...a strong and well-established connection between Croatian identity and Catholicism." This could explain such high levels of church attendance amongst Croats; however, the Orthodox Church is also tied to Serbian identity, yet we find a drastically different weekly attendance rates. Amongst Bosniaks and Serbs, the results were not expected. During the Yugoslav period, Bosniaks were considered the most secularized of the three Bosnian ethno-national groups (Iveković 2002, 530); indeed, leading Islamic scholars within the former Islamic Community of SFR Yugoslavia encouraged their followers to put their duty to the state before their obligations as observant Muslims (Bringa 1995, 199). In the case of Bosniaks, the increased levels of religiosity and mosque attendance may come from parental wartime experiences and growing up in a post-war society. In the post-war Bosnian-Herzegovinian context, religion has been used by all three ethno-national group leaders as unifying agent for each of the respective ethno-national groups in the country.

Post-war, Islam has been used as a tool and infused into Bosniak nationalism, in competition with Croat and Serb ethnic nationalisms. The former *reis-ul-ulema* of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mustafa Cerić, has advocated that the country should be a nation-state only of Bosniaks, since Croats and Serbs already have their own homeland; Cerić was also a champion of Islam being a "strong element" of Bosniak nationalism (International Crisis Group 2013, 1). It is this linking of Islam, Bosniak nationalism, and the state that will increase tensions with the country's other two constituent peoples (International Crisis Group 2013, 2). It is this type of religious revival that will be the seed of an aggressive nationalism (Bringa 2002, 28), and violence (via clashing nationalisms) towards the other two constituent

peoples will be the likely outcome (International Crisis Group 2013, 1). See Table 3a for the complete breakdown of religious service attendance. See Table 3b for the importance of religion in everyday life.

Due to the statistically significant effects ($p < 0.001$) that religious service attendance has on ethnic saliency (Table 2a) across all four groups, it would be prudent to incorporate local religious leaders in the peace and reconciliation process. This important role of religious actors in the peace and reconciliation process has, unfortunately, been an understudied area within as well as outside of the former Yugoslavia (Clark June 2010, 671-672). Although the Franciscans have undertaken some valuable cross-ethnic work in the country (e.g. Bread of St. Anthony; *Kruh svetog Ante*), Clark (June 2010, 690) found that "...religious actors overall are doing little in practice to encourage reconciliation in BiH, and in some cases are actually hindering it."⁷⁵ Within the three main faiths, there has been a struggle between moderates and extremists; however, the "...split between moderates and extremists is particularly manifest within the Islamic Community, due to the influence of Wahhabism" (Clark June 2010, 684). The struggle between the two camps in each of the faiths will determine which role the dominant religious actors will steer their faith *vis-à-vis* the other two constituent peoples. This struggle should be of special concern within the Islamic Community of BiH due to the rise of the Islamic State and its recruitment efforts in the country; indeed, the role of radical Islam in general has been an issue that religious and Bosniak political elites have tried to ignore in the past.

⁷⁵ According to Clark (June 2010, 683), religious leaders from the three faiths continue to fuel the fires of ethnic distrust "...by focusing on ethnic issues...and on the suffering of their own communities..." rather than attempting peace building and dialogue.

Table 3a: Frequency of Religious Service Attendance

Frequency	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Once a week	21.23%	57.61%	5.75%	11.16%
Every other week	10.49%	21.89%	8.38%	5.69%
Once/twice a month	16.18%	10.94%	26.54%	11.39%
A few times a year	42.35%	6.98%	51.93%	43.05%
Never	9.75%	2.58%	7.40%	28.70%

Table 3b: Is Religion an Important Part of Your Life?

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Yes	91.73%	94.13%	82.54%	71.95%
No	8.08%	5.74%	17.29%	27.83%
Maybe / Unsure	0.19%	0.12%	0.16%	0.23%

The Effect of Schools on Ethnic Saliency

Next, I test the effects that the three ethno-national curricula, the unified Brčko District of BiH curriculum, and Catholic school curriculum have on ethnic saliency. Models 2a through 2d below are designed to measure the effects of the curricula on Bosniak, Croat, Serb, and Bosnian ethnic saliency levels. These models are specifically designed to test Hypotheses 4, 5c, 10a, and 10b. The individual hypotheses are listed, followed by their respective findings from the regressions. See Table 4 for the results of Models 2a to 2d.

Model 2a (Bosniak): Saliency = Croat Curriculum + Serb Curriculum + Brčko District Curriculum + Catholic School + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 2b (Croat): Saliency = Bosniak Curriculum + Serb Curriculum + Brčko District Curriculum + Catholic School + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 2c (Serb): Saliency = Bosniak Curriculum + Croat Curriculum + Brčko District Curriculum + Catholic School + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 2d (Bosnian): Saliency = Croat Curriculum + Serb Curriculum + Brčko District Curriculum + Catholic School + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

H5c: Students who attend Catholic schools will have lower ethnic saliency.

Attending a Catholic high school had no statistical effect on lowering (or raising) ethnic saliency levels for any of the national groups. I was unable to visit KŠC Travnik, which is only for Croats. See Table 4 for the full regression results.

H10a: Students attending school in the Brčko District of BiH will have lower levels of ethnic saliency.

Studying on the unified Brčko District of BiH curriculum only had a statistically significant effect on lowering ethnic saliency among self-identifying Serbs, where $p < 0.05$. There was no effect on Croats or Bosniaks. I was unable to test the effects on (possible) self-identifying Bosnians, as I was not allowed to offer “Bosnian” as a possible option for nationality by the Department of Education of the Brčko District of BiH. The reason given for this was that all possible responses had to be in accordance with the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Constitution, which states that the country is comprised of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, as well as Other citizens. No students wrote-in “Bosnian” if they chose Other for their nationality in the three schools visited in the city of Brčko. Hypothesis 10a can only be partially and inconclusively confirmed in the case of Serbs (see Table 4).

H4: Divisive curricula serve to create a distinct ethnic separation of the three constituent peoples. The Croatian and Serbian curricula will promote higher levels of ethnic saliency compared to the Bosniak curricula.

H10b: Students studying on a non-ethnic appropriate curriculum will have lower levels of ethnic saliency compared to those who study on the “appropriate” ethnic curriculum.

Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 10b could not truly be tested between all three of the constituent peoples, or those who self-identify as being Bosnian. The reason for this is that nationality and curricula are too closely matched,⁷⁶ and 91.56% of self-identifying Bosnians studied on the Bosniak curriculum. There is one exception, however; for self-identifying Serbs who do not study on the Serbian curriculum, there is a statistically significant effect on lowering ethnic saliency, at the 0.05 level, when studying on the Brčko District of BiH curriculum. Serbs were the only ethno-national group that had a high enough amount of students studying on a

⁷⁶ In this analysis, for example, only one self-identifying Croat studied on the Serbian curriculum.

“non-appropriate” ethnic curriculum as well. For Serbs, studying on the Bosniak curriculum was statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) for lowering saliency levels; studying on the Croatian curriculum was less so, giving a significance level where $p < 0.10$. Although I am unable to determine which of the three ethno-national curricula espouses a higher level of ethno-centrism in comparison to the other two, we are able to see, in the case of the Serbs, if students do not study on the “appropriate” Serbian curriculum, their ethnic saliency scores are lowered in a statistically significant manner. Although 91.56% of self-identifying Bosnians studied on the Bosniak curriculum in this analysis, I did find that for those who studied on the Croat curriculum (3.33%), saliency was lowered in a statistically significant manner ($p < 0.001$). Hypothesis 10b can be partially confirmed in the case of Serbs and Bosnians within the Federation of BiH. It seems that this contact with “otherness” creates positive out-group perceptions by the minority group (Serbs or Bosnians) towards the majority group (Bosniaks or Croats). These findings go against arguments made by Phinney and Rotheram (1987, 276) as well as McGuire and McGuire (1982), who argue that minority students would be more cognizant of their ethnicity (with a corresponding high saliency level). I have no doubt that the minority Serb students are “aware” of their status as a minority, and yet, studying on a non-ethnic “appropriate” curriculum lowers ethnic saliency levels in a statistically significant manner. Building on these initial quantitative results, a qualitative approach – such as semi-structured interviews – would perhaps be the best way to analyze the specific impact of curricula on students. See Table 4 for the full regression results.

The variable *Urban* had no statistical effect on ethnic saliency among Bosniaks or Bosnians, but it did for Serbs and Croats. For Serbs, living in a rural / small town increased ethnic saliency ($p < 0.05$), whereas for Croats, living in a rural / small town decreased ethnic saliency ($p < 0.05$). Gender had no effect on ethnic saliency for Serbs, but it was statistically significant for Croats, Bosniaks, and Bosnians, all at the 0.01 level. The effect of gender on ethnic saliency for the three previously mentioned groups, but its non-effect among Serbs, is an interesting finding to be pursued in future research. See Table 4 for the full regression results.

Table 4: Effects of School Curricula (NPP) on Ethnic Saliency in Bosnia and Herzegovina

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Bosniak Curriculum		0.0483 (0.113)	- 0.397*** (0.113)	
Croat Curriculum	- 0.225 (0.140)		- 0.205 + (0.117)	- 0.872*** (0.201)
Serb Curriculum	0.0168 (0.0923)	0.0998 (0.605)		- 0.350 (0.230)
Brčko District	0.0638 (0.0603)	0.125 (0.133)	- 0.148* (0.0625)	x (x)
Catholic School	0.0448 (0.149)	0.0733 (0.0564)	0.00797 (0.132)	- 0.126 (0.224)
Religious Service Attendance	0.106*** (0.0102)	0.157*** (0.0147)	0.168*** (0.0197)	0.135*** (0.0304)
Urban	- 0.0436 (0.0286)	- 0.0956* (0.0424)	0.0891* (0.0446)	- 0.0802 (0.0853)
Male	- 0.0720** (0.0278)	0.104** (0.0319)	0.00904 (0.0394)	- 0.216** (0.0782)
Mom Education	0.00335 (0.0129)	- 0.0144 (0.0155)	- 0.0383 + (0.0206)	- 0.0858* (0.0367)
Dad Education	0.00458 (0.0129)	- 0.000832 (0.0147)	0.00888 (0.0200)	0.0256 (0.0372)
_cons	3.122*** (0.0553)	2.799*** (0.0902)	3.040*** (0.0865)	3.100*** (0.153)
R-square	0.055	0.077	0.074	0.125
N	2,027	1,572	1,206	436
(Standard errors in parentheses) +p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001				

Due to the findings regarding the Serbs who are not studying on the Serbian curriculum (and thus not residing in Republika Srpska), I ran another regression analysis (Model 3) looking to see if a cantonal place of residence had an effect on Serb ethnic saliency scores within the Federation of BiH, compared to that of Republika Srpska. The Brčko District of BiH is not included in this model. The measurement is Serbs who live outside of Republika Srpska compared to Serbs who do live in Republika Srpska, and its effects on Serb ethnic saliency. My model is:

Model 3 (Serb): Saliency = Una-Sana Canton + Tuzla Canton + Zenica-Doboj Canton + Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Goražde⁷⁷ + Central Bosnia Canton + Herzegovina-Neretva Canton + West Herzegovina Canton + Canton Sarajevo + Hercegbosanska Canton + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

After running Model 3, I found that Serbs residing in Una-Sana Canton (B-NPP), Zenica-Doboj Canton (B-NPP and H-NPP), Central Bosnia Canton (B-NPP and H-NPP), and West Herzegovina Canton (H-NPP) have a statistically significant, lowered ethnic saliency score. For Serbs residing in Central Bosnia Canton and West Herzegovina Canton, saliency was statistically lowered at the 0.001 level; for Serbs in Una-Sana Canton it was at the 0.01 level, and in Zenica-Doboj Canton it was at the 0.05 level. No students identified as Serb in Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Goražde. Religious service attendance is statistically significant at the 0.001 level for increasing saliency. See Table 5 for the results of Model 3.

⁷⁷ No students identified as being Serb (or Croat) in Bosnian-Podrine Canton Goražde.

Table 5: Cantonal Residence and Ethnic Saliency among Serbs

Canton	Serbs	
Una-Sana Canton	- 0.387** (0.130)	
Tuzla Canton	- 0.266 (0.371)	
Zenica-Doboj Canton	- 0.706** (0.261)	
Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Goražde	x (x)	
Central Bosnia Canton	- 2.678*** (0.640)	
Herzegovina-Neretva Canton	- 0.227 (0.262)	
West Herzegovina Canton	- 1.512*** (0.371)	
Canton Sarajevo	0.0653 (0.451)	
Hercegbosanska Canton	0.158 (0.145)	
Religious Service Attendance	0.195*** (0.0215)	
Urban	0.105* (0.0441)	
Gender	0.0411 (0.0419)	
Mom Education	- 0.0390 + (0.0213)	
Dad Education	0.00636 (0.0209)	
_cons	2.968*** (0.0928)	
R-square	0.112	(Standard errors in parentheses)
N	1,044	+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

National Self-Identification in Bosnia and Herzegovina

According to the 1991 Census of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it had a population of 4,377,033 people. 43.47% identified as Muslim by nationality, 31.21% as Serb, 17.38% as Croat, 5.54% as Yugoslav, 0.23% as Montenegrin, 0.05% as Slovenian, 0.03% as Macedonian, and 2.09% as Other⁷⁸ (Zavod za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine 1991). Post-war, the term “Bosniak” has come to replace the “Muslim by nationality” ethno-national group. In my fieldwork, I found that 38.43% of students identified as Bosniak,⁷⁹ 28.74% as Croat, 22.15% as Serb, 8.05% as Bosnian, 1.54% as Other, and 0.26% as Roma; forty-seven students (0.83%) identify with more than one ethno-national group. Hypothesis 1a, which states that “Due to the institutionalization of ethnicity, students will choose the ethnic rather than civic identity,” can be confirmed due to the fact that 88.37% of students chose one of the three constituent ethnic identities, whereas only 8.05% chose the Bosnian civic identity.

Along with asking students to declare their own national identification, I asked them to provide the national identifications of their parents as well. Of the 456 students who identified as being Bosnian in the country, 328 students identified both of their parents as being Bosnian. 44 students reported that both parents were Bosniaks, five reported that both parents were Croats, seven reported both parents were Serbs, two reported both parents as Bosniak/Bosnian, and four

⁷⁸ The term 'Other' in this context referred to all other minority groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the Roma. If I include the Roma with 'Others' from my fieldwork, I get 1.80% (n=102). Post-war, the Roma people are the largest recognized national minority group in the country, yet they were conspicuously absent from the high schools I visited. A total of 15 students identified as being Roma in the entire country. The cities of Sarajevo and Mostar have the largest visible Roma populations; yet only six students out of a total of 532 respondents from five high schools in Sarajevo were Roma, and no students identified as being Roma in Mostar, out of a total of 333 respondents from three high schools.

⁷⁹ 0.95% (n=54) of students chose Bosniak and Bosnian as their nationality, viewing them as being linked together. This view is confirmed by an unsolicited message written to me in English by one such student (male) from Zenica (Zenica-Doboj Canton): “Bosniak and Bosnian are the same.”

reported both parents as Other. For 13.59% of the surveyed students (n=62), this seems to be the case. An additional 14.47% of students (n=66) who identified as being Bosnian reported that they came from a mixed marriage; the Bosnian civic identity thus allows them to not have to pick one ethno-national group over another.

Table 6a lists percentages and number of students who identified with each ethno-national category. The country-wide mean civic pride score, on a range of one (not proud at all) to four (very proud), is 2.6705 (n=5,563). In the case of individual schools, the highest civic pride score comes from the Bosniak school in Busovača (3.7162; n=74), and the lowest civic pride score comes from a Serbian school in Prijedor (1.6535; n=127). Hypothesis 1a, which states “Due to the institutionalization of ethnicity, students will choose the ethnic rather than civic identity” was confirmed on the basis that only 8.05% (n=456) of high school seniors chose the civic identity over the ethno-national choices. The contentious issue of the Bosnian civic identity may be seen from the following comment by a male Bosniak from the Bosniak mono-ethnic school in Mostar; he wrote, in English: “What is this? It doesn’t exist. You are uninformed.” This message was written on the page of my survey asking students the nationality of themselves and their parents. Taking all of the above into account, it is interesting to see the regression results testing Hypothesis 1b, which states that “Due to the institutionalization of ethnicity, non-Bosniak students will have lower levels of Bosnian-Herzegovinian civic pride.” My models are:

Model 4a (Bosniak): Saliency = Civic Pride + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 4b (Croat): Saliency = Civic Pride + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 4c (Serb): Saliency = Civic Pride + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 4d (Bosnian): Saliency = Civic Pride + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Table 6a presents mean civic pride scores, along with national self-identification of all respondents. As Hypothesis 1b predicts, self-identifying Bosniaks have the highest average civic pride score (3.3666), with Croat and Serb scores coming in much lower, at 2.2439 and 1.8891, respectively. Upon running Models 4a to 4d to test Hypothesis 1b, I found, as predicted, that Bosnian-Herzegovinian civic pride was statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) for increasing ethnic saliency among Bosniaks. A surprising finding, however, comes from the Serb regression (Model 4c), in which it was found that civic pride is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) for *increasing* saliency among Serbs. Hypothesis 1b can only be partially (and inconclusively) confirmed. See Table 6b for the regression results from Models 4a and 4b. The lowest individual school-level civic pride score in the country comes from Prijedor (1.6535), located in Republika Srpska.

Given the interesting results from Model 4b, what variables could lead to a higher level of civic pride among Serbs, which is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) towards their ethnic saliency score? I use Model 5 to attempt to figure this out.

Model 5 (Serb): Civic Pride = Saliency + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Using Model 5, which has Bosnian-Herzegovinian civic pride (*Civic Pride*) as my dependent variable and ethnic saliency as an independent variable, I found that female Serbs tend to have higher levels of Bosnian-Herzegovinian civic pride compared to male Serbs ($p < 0.001$); this finding is also interesting because gender plays no statistically significant role in increasing or

decreasing ethnic saliency levels among Serbs. Ethnic saliency is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) for increasing civic pride. Religious service attendance is statistically significant at the 0.05 level for civic pride, whereas it was significant at the 0.001 level for saliency. See Table 6c for the regression results.

Table 6a: National Self-Identification of Students in Bosnia and Herzegovina, plus Civic Pride

Nationality	Percentage	N = 5,662	Civic Pride
Bosniak	37.48%	2,122	3.3666 (n=2,069)
Croat	28.74%	1,627	2.2439 (n=1,605)
Serb	22.15%	1,254	1.8891 (n=1,227)
Bosnian	8.05%	456	3.1272 (n=448)
Roma	0.26%	15	2.5333 (n=15)
Other	1.54%	87	2.2804 (n=82)
Bosniak/Bosnian	0.95%	54	3.5185 (n=54)
Mixed	0.83%	47	2.3404 (n=47)

Table 6b: Effects of Civic Pride on Ethnic Saliency in Bosnia and Herzegovina

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Civic Pride	0.294*** (0.0139)	0.0435** (0.0155)	0.0523* (0.0216)	0.378*** (0.0342)
Religious Service Attendance	0.0698*** (0.00937)	0.157*** (0.0145)	0.159*** (0.0198)	0.0892** (0.0270)
Male	- 0.0930*** (0.0252)	0.120*** (0.0321)	0.0191 (0.0403)	- 0.215** (0.0686)
Mom Education	- 0.00159 (0.0114)	- 0.0196 (0.0152)	- 0.0354 + (0.0204)	- 0.0872** (0.313)
Dad Education	0.0109 (0.0115)	- 0.00105 (0.146)	0.0229 (0.0200)	0.0246 (0.0331)
_cons	2.221*** (0.0653)	2.704*** (0.0958)	2.904*** (0.0980)	1.935*** (0.170)
R-square	0.225	0.079	0.061	0.286
N	2,022	1,571	1,201	436
(Standard errors in parentheses)				
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001				

Table 6c: Effects of Ethnic Saliency on Civic Pride in Bosnia and Herzegovina

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Saliency	0.620*** (0.0293)	0.111** (0.0411)	0.0969* (0.0385)	0.587*** (0.0503)
Religious Service Attendance	0.0575*** (0.0138)	0.00993 (0.0246)	0.0562* (0.0271)	0.0251 (0.0344)
Urban	0.00999 (0.0357)	- 0.152* (0.0662)	- 0.111* (0.0519)	- 0.0185 (0.0923)
Male	0.117** (0.0366)	- 0.310*** (0.0520)	- 0.346*** (0.0528)	0.0755 (0.0867)
Mom Education	0.00152 (0.0169)	- 0.0171 (0.0249)	- 0.0173 (0.0274)	0.0412 (0.0413)
Dad Education	- 0.0317 + (0.0169)	- 0.0410 + (0.0238)	- 0.0558* (0.0268)	- 0.0199 (0.0415)
_cons	1.150*** (0.116)	2.183*** (0.185)	1.862*** (0.163)	1.216*** (0.235)
R-square	0.219	0.040	0.065	0.238
N	2,022	1,571	1,201	436
(Standard errors in parentheses)				
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001				

General Conclusions

The ethnic salience scores⁸⁰ across schools and groups show that identity is important to responding students. This is to be expected, as identity politics continues to dominate political discourse, in particular among Croats, who perceive that they are particularly aggrieved. This may be seen through a message written to me by a female Croatian student from Posušje (West Herzegovina Canton), next to the survey question asking about Bosnian-Herzegovinian civic pride. She wrote, in Croatian:

Uopće nisam ponosna, al' niti malo. Jer je položaj Hrvata nebitan, nemamo nikakva prava. Ima nas samo 17%, te smo manjina. To bi se trebalo promijeniti da imamo neka prava i da donosimo bitne odluke u državi – HERCEGOVINA.

‘I am not proud at all, not even a little. This is because the position of Croats [in this country] is irrelevant; we do not have any rights. At only 17% of the population, we are a minority. This needs to be changed so that we can have some rights and bring about essential decisions in the state – HERZEGOVINA.’

However, a second finding, that students are not sure what group membership means for their lives (ethnic identity search⁸¹), suggests that their stated strong identity is possibly weakly rooted, and represents less their personal experience and more the broader environment and messaging in their communities; this is especially interesting since identity formation theory posits that ethnic saliency is the outcome of ethnic identity search (Phinney 1993). A number of factors could explain such responses: family life, church/mosque socialization, the country’s divided media, and/or divisive elite political discourse. Indeed, the data shows that frequency of religious service attendance is positively statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) for increasing ethnic saliency across all four groups. When it comes to the vastly different levels of weekly religious

⁸⁰ Mean ethnic saliency scores: Bosniak (3.3932), Croat (3.4365), Serb (3.3518), and Bosnian (3.0214).

⁸¹ Mean ethnic identity search scores: Bosniak (2.7967), Croat (2.8732), Serb (2.7590), and Bosnian (2.5097).

service attendance yet no statistical difference between mean ethnic saliency scores, the general role of families must be considered via familial socialization of their children, in comparison to frequency of religious service attendance. The high levels of Croat religiosity compared to the others cannot simply be explained through their ethno-national curricula, as all three ethno-national curricula have religious classes of their respective ethno-national faith included in their schools. According to Bringa (2002, 29-30), "...religion was also the one feature that stressed the distinctiveness of the three ethno-religious communities...[and that]...religion provided nationalists with a rich source of symbols and rituals with which to inspire national identification, separateness, and internal cohesion of the ethnic group."

The role of elite political discourse was stressed by the Director of U.S. National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, in his 2013 worldwide threat assessment report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the report stated that within the country, "...differences among Serb, Croat, and Bosniak elites are intensifying, threatening BiH's state institutions...[and that] secessionist rhetoric from the leadership of the political entity Republika Srpska has further challenged Bosnia's internal cohesion" (Clapper 2013, 29-30). The divisive role of the media is a serious issue that the USAID's "Strengthening Independent Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina Project" is working on, stating that BiH is facing "...an increase in nationalistic rhetoric in political discourse and the media, which greatly influences public sentiment and attitudes" (2013, 1). If we accept identity formation theory (Phinney 1993), this provides support to my previous claim that the surveyed students' stated strong identity is possibly weakly rooted, and represents less their personal experience and more the broader environment and messaging in their communities. The role of families in the socialization process is the focus of the next chapter.

The country conducted its first post-war census in October 2013 (Sanić-Hadžihasanović 2013, 1), eleven months after the conduction of this field research. Ethnic data from the official census has yet to be released. As part of a civic monitoring program, Cvjetićanin et al. (2014, 21) found that 14.9% of surveyed respondents (n=1,015) did not trust that the census will actually reflect the true composition of the country. In addition, 24.19% of citizens reported that census-takers attempted to influence their national declarations (derived from reports of irregularities self-reported by citizens to *Popis Monitor* during the census period).⁸²

According to *Popis Monitor* ('Census Monitor;' 2014, 1), there is a high probability that an organized census scam took place. They cite two cases in particular – Dobretići (Central Bosnia Canton) and Ravno (Herzegovina-Neretva Canton) – where 214% and 130% more people, respectively, were recorded as living there compared to local demographic data from 2012. In other cases, drastically fewer residents (69.13%) were officially recorded compared to local data from 2012 in the municipality of Istočni Mostar (Republika Srpska). Inflated numbers mainly came from the Croat-majority cantons of Hercegbosanska, Posavina, and West Herzegovina (Cvjetićanin et al. 2014, 1). No official release date has been set for the ethnic information, although general population numbers have been released. According to the preliminary results of the 2013 Census, 3,791,622 people currently live in the country; of this, 2,371,603 reside in the Federation of BiH, 1,326,991 reside in Republika Srpska, and 93,028 reside in the Brčko District of BiH (Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine 2013, 3). These preliminary population figures show 62.55% of citizens live in the Federation of BiH, 35% live

⁸² An example provided in the *Popis Monitor* report (Cvjetićanin et al. 2014, 21) states that: “‘When he began asking questions he didn’t read all the offered answers but just the one he believed to be correct; for example, when he came to the ethnic/national declaration the enumerator just read ‘Bosniak’ and without waiting my answer he wrote in ‘Bosniak’. When I stopped him and told him I don’t want to declare as Bosniak, he told me: ‘Well, I assumed judging by your name you would want to.’” This was reported by a citizen from Tuzla (Tuzla Canton).

in Republika Srpska, and 2.45% live in the Brčko District of BiH (Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine 2013, 5).

Another development occurred two years after the start of my field research (November 2012) that is tied to several schools that I visited. On 04 November 2014, the Supreme Court of the Federation of BiH ruled that the policy of *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* was discriminatory, and that “... 'organising school systems based on ethnic background and implementing curriculums on ethnic principles, which divide children'...” must end and ruled that these schools must establish “... 'common integrated multicultural education facilities’” (Džidić 2014, 1). This was the first such ruling regarding this policy at the Entity level, and the Minister of Education of the Federation of BiH, Damir Mašić (SDP-BiH), welcomed the ruling. Leading up to the start of my fieldwork, two rulings regarding the legality of this policy took place at the cantonal level as well. The Municipal Court of Mostar ruled in April 2012 that the existence of *dvije škole pod jednim krovom* is unconstitutional and discriminatory (Radio Slobodna Evropa 2012, 1), whereas the Municipal Court of Travnik ruled in October 2012 that it is not unconstitutional and does not violate any anti-discrimination laws (Karabegović 2012, 1). The Supreme Court of the Federation of BiH lacks enforcement mechanisms at the cantonal level, however, as power over primary and secondary education was given to the individual cantons under the Constitution of the Federation of BiH (Section III Article 4.b) as part of the 1994 Washington Agreement, which ended the Muslim-Croat War. In addition, Section IV(5) Article 17(a) of the Constitution of the Federation of BiH stipulates for the protection of “vital national interests,” which includes education, religion, and language being part of the “identity of one constitutive people.” It remains to be seen how the three relevant cantons and their ministries of education will respond to this, other than ignoring the ruling.

CHAPTER VI

FAMILIAL SOCIALIZATION

For Bringa (1995, 84), the primary domain of ethno-religious identity formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the household. Erikson (1963), Berghahn and Schissler (1987, 1), and Reidy et al. (2015, 20) also believe that the family acts as an important agent of socialization for young people. Domović et al. (2001) argue that the family plays a more important role in the political socialization of high school students and that schools are not a major factor in the socialization process in Croatia. Umaña-Taylor et al. (2006, 407) find that familial ethnic socialization is strongly related to ethnic identity achievement and is critical for ethnic identity formation in adolescents.

On the other hand, Ajduković and Biruški (2008, 344) found from their study in the ethnically-divided town of Vukovar, Croatia that there is only a modest correlation between the inter-ethnic attitudes of children and their parents. That is, the children are not receiving high levels of ethnic socialization from their parents, which discredits the assumptions of the social learning approach that the parents are the most important transmitters of attitudes (Ajduković and Biruški 2008, 343). For Ajduković and Biruški (2008), it seems that childhood experience has a bigger impact on children in terms of ethnic socialization than parental attitudes to other

ethno-national groups.⁸³ When it came to the possibility of the re-integration of schools in Vukovar, Biruški and Ajduković (2007, 105) found that “...children are least supportive of joint education and social integration...and are most ready to discriminate against their peers from the other ethnic group.” The children of Vukovar do not have the experience of living in a non-segregated town (unlike their parents), and “...have adopted the standard of community segregation on ethnic principles since the earliest age.” That is, as far as the children are concerned, division is a natural state of affairs. In the American context, Ehman (1980, 112) also finds that socialization via the family has less of an impact on high school students than the school does; he finds that as an agent of socialization, schools are very important “...for transmitting political information to youth and increases in importance from grade school to high school.”

H2a: Familial socialization will have a higher impact on ethnic saliency than school socialization.

H3: Childhood experience of living in an ethnically segregated city/town has a bigger impact on children in terms of increased ethnic saliency than familial socialization.

⁸³ Ajduković and Biruški (2008, 345) note however, there has been a lack of familial ethnic socialization studies conducted in settings where the ethnic groups are not visibly or physically distinctive from one another; this, according to the authors, is research that is of “...crucial importance in multi-cultural settings and could have a key role” in creating peaceful or conflicting inter-group relations. Bosnia and Herzegovina fits this, since the three constituent peoples are all South Slavs; here, it is your name which tells people who you are (Bringa 1995, 19).

In order to test the role that families/parents may play in ethnic socialization, I used the Revised Familial Ethnic Socialization Measure (Umaña-Taylor et al. 2004; R-FESM), which consists of twelve statements, based on a five-point Likert Scale designed to measure two factors: Covert Familial Ethnic Socialization (Covert FES) and Overt Familial Ethnic Socialization (Overt FES). The respondents rate how much they agree or disagree with each statement, using the following options: (5) Strongly Agree, (4) Agree, (3) Neither Agree nor Disagree, (2) Disagree, or (1) Strongly Disagree. The R-FESM is used to assess the degree to which respondents perceive that their families socialize them with respect to their nationality. Items 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, and 12 tap Covert FES; items 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9 tap Overt FES. The R-FESM score is derived from the mean responses to the twelve items. Hypothesis 3 is tested within the Federation of BiH only, using Model 11. The country-wide mean R-FESM score is: 3.9046 (n=5,608; $\alpha = 0.9055$).⁸⁴

Next, I present my models to test for Hypothesis 2a, which states that “Familial socialization will have a higher impact on ethnic saliency than school socialization.” The impact of school socialization on ethnic saliency is tested via school curricula (NPP). My dependent variable for Models 6a to 6d is ethnic saliency (*Saliency*). My independent variables are: familial ethnic socialization (*Familial Socialization*), parental education (*Mom Education* and *Dad Education*), student gender (*Gender*), amount of religious service attendance, and dummy variables for the school curricula (NPP). *Familial Socialization* is derived from R-FESM. See Table 7 for the regression results. My models are:

⁸⁴ When broken down between the four groups, Croats have the highest mean R-FESM score and Bosnians have the lowest mean score. Bosniak: 3.8955; Croat: 4.093; Serb: 3.9126; Bosnian: 3.4809.

Model 6a (Bosniak): Saliency = Familial Socialization + Croatian Curriculum + Serbian Curriculum + Brčko District Curriculum + Catholic School + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 6b (Croat): Saliency = Familial Socialization + Bosniak Curriculum + Serbian Curriculum + Brčko District Curriculum + Catholic School + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 6c (Serb): Saliency = Familial Socialization + Bosniak Curriculum + Croatian Curriculum + Brčko District Curriculum + Catholic School + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 6d (Bosnian): Saliency = Familial Socialization + Croatian Curriculum + Serbian Curriculum + Brčko District Curriculum + Catholic School + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

The variable *Familial Socialization* has a statistically significant effect on ethnic saliency among Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians, all at the 0.001 level. Two interesting results were discovered upon running the above models in test of Hypothesis 2a as well. First, the role of religious service attendance among Bosniaks and Croats retains its statistical significance ($p < 0.001$), whereas among Serbs and Bosnians, religious service attendance loses statistical significance on ethnic saliency. Second, the effects of attending a Catholic school become significant for saliency among Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Catholic school attendance still has no effect on self-identifying Bosnians. See Table 7 for the full regression results of Models 6a to 6d.

Table 7: Effects of Familial Socialization on Ethnic Saliency in Bosnia and Herzegovina

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Familial Socialization	0.465*** (0.0172)	0.476*** (0.0212)	0.565*** (0.0202)	0.508*** (0.0427)
Bosniak Curriculum		0.0984 (0.0972)	0.0631 (0.0922)	
Croatian Curriculum	- 0.0809 (0.119)		- 0.0379 (0.0908)	- 0.551** (0.172)
Serbian Curriculum	0.0337 (0.0795)	0.303 (0.524)		- 0.411* (0.199)
Brčko District Curriculum	0.0484 (0.0493)	0.161 (0.111)	0.0416 (0.0430)	x (x)
Catholic School	0.225 + (0.127)	0.140** (0.0488)	0.185 + (0.101)	0.310 (0.196)
Religious Service Attendance	0.0338*** (0.00912)	0.0522*** (0.0137)	0.00571 (0.0163)	0.0186 (0.0282)
Male	0.00283 (0.0239)	0.120*** (0.0277)	0.0297 (0.0307)	- 0.107 (0.680)
Mom Education	0.0115 (0.0108)	- 0.00470 (0.0133)	- 0.00576 (0.0158)	- 0.0335 (0.0308)
Dad Education	- 0.00487 (0.0109)	- 0.00524 (0.0127)	0.00914 (0.0155)	0.00215 (0.0322)
_cons	1.471*** (0.0771)	1.242*** (0.104)	1.102*** (0.0972)	1.383*** (0.196)
R-square	0.308	0.303	0.438	0.344
N	2,021	1,566	1,200	435
(Standard errors in parentheses) +p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001				

Previously, it was found that ethnic identity and school curricula were too closely correlated to test possible effects on saliency (Chapter 5), with the exception of the Serbs who reside in the Federation of BiH and the Brčko District of BiH, who experienced statistically lowered ethnic saliency when study on the Bosniak ($p < 0.001$), Croat ($p < 0.10$), and Brčko District of BiH ($p < 0.05$) curricula. When the variable for familial socialization is introduced to the regression for Serbs, studying on the previously mentioned school curricula lose their statistical significance on lowering ethnic saliency among Serbs; however, attending a Catholic school becomes significant at the 0.10 level for increasing saliency. When the variable for familial socialization is introduced to the regression, attending a Catholic school becomes significant for increasing Bosniak ethnic saliency at the 0.10 level as well. When this variable is introduced for the Croats, it becomes statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) for increasing Croat ethnic saliency; previous regression models (Chapter 5) had found there to be no statistical effect. Among self-identifying Bosnians, attending a Catholic school still has no statistical significance; however, attending a school on the Serbian curriculum becomes statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) for lowering saliency; studying on the Croatian curriculum maintains its statistical significance ($p < 0.01$) for decreasing saliency.⁸⁵

Having their children attend a Catholic school is a conscientious choice made by the parents, regardless of their nationality. Due to the linkage of religion and nationality in the country, for non-Croat (Catholic) families, this is even more so. The Catholic schools are open to students of all nationalities (with the exception of Travnik), and have a reputation of providing a better education compared to other high schools. The increased saliency among Croat students is

⁸⁵ The variable for studying on the Brčko District of BiH curriculum is omitted for Bosnians due to the fact that I was unable to offer 'Bosnian' as a nationality option in the Brčko District of BiH.

not surprising due to the linkage of Croat-ness and Catholicism. For Bosniaks and Serbs, increased saliency may come from being around those from a different national group as well as learning about the Catholic faith. Studying Catholicism at a Catholic school is par for the course, however. Hypothesis 2a, which states that “Familial socialization will have a higher impact on ethnic saliency than school socialization” can be confirmed on the basis that it retains statistical significance ($p < 0.001$) across all four groups, while school curricula have varying levels (or lack) of significance among the four groups.

Next, I am going to explore the interesting finding that religious service attendance loses statistical significance on ethnic saliency among Serbs and Bosnians (Models 6c and 6d) when the familial socialization variable is introduced to the regression, whereas it maintains its significance ($p < 0.001$) among Bosniaks and Croats (Models 6a and 6b). The first – and logical – conclusion drawn from this comes from previous findings on weekly religious service attendance (see Table 3a); namely, that Serbs and Bosnians attend the least, compared to Bosniaks and Croats. Since Serbs and Bosnians have such low weekly attendance rates, when the familial socialization variable was introduced, it simply replaced religious service attendance as a factor – which could then be argued simply stood as a proxy for familial socialization, since whether or not (or how often) one attends religious services is controlled by the parents.

Another possibility is the coupling and de-coupling of religion and ethno-national identity. Among Serbs and Bosnians, it is de-coupled; among Croats, it is coupled. Indeed, my findings lend additional support to the results of other scholars who have found Catholicism and Croat-ness as being inextricably linked together (Skrbiš 2005; Iveković 2002; Tanner 2001, 32; Cohen 1997). Among Bosniaks, there is an increasing coupling of Islam and Bosniak national identity. The coupling / de-coupling theory draws support from the fact that ethnic saliency

levels are high with no statistical difference between the three constituent peoples. Although Serbs are experiencing a de-coupling between their religious faith and their ethno-national identity, religion is nonetheless connected to the Serbs through their autocephalous Orthodox Church. Islam is experiencing an increased role in Bosniak nationalism (International Crisis Group 2013).

Segregation in the Federation of BiH

The ethnically segregated cities/towns used to test Hypothesis 3 operate on the B-NPP, H-NPP, and Catholic curricula; they are located in Central Bosnia Canton, Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, and Zenica-Doboj Canton, in the following 10 cities/towns: Bugojno, Busovača, Čapljina, Gornji Vakuf-Uskoplje, Mostar, Novi Travnik, Stolac, Travnik, Vitez, and Žepče. The ethnically-divided cities/towns have an FES score of 3.9730 ($n=1,256$; $\alpha=0.8928$), and a saliency score of 3.4006 ($n=1,256$; $\alpha=0.8988$). The non-segregated city/towns used to test Hypothesis 3 are located in the same cantons, with schools on the B-NPP and H-NPP: Breza, Čitluk, Donji Vakuf, Jajce, Kakanj, Kreševo, Vareš, and Zenica. The non-segregated city/towns have an FES score of 3.9453 ($n=687$; $\alpha=0.9096$), and a saliency score of 3.3418 ($n=687$; $\alpha=0.9020$). Models 7a to 7e are designed to test Hypothesis 3; I use the mean R-FESM score (*Familial Socialization*) as my familial socialization variable. My independent variables are: *Familial Socialization*, whether or not the students go to school in an ethnically-divided city/town (*Divided*),⁸⁶ parental education (*Mom Education* and *Dad Education*), student gender (*Gender*), and amount of religious service attendance; for Model 7a, I include dummy variables representing the student national self-identifications (*nat_dummy_*). The dependent variable is

⁸⁶ *Divided*: 0=not divided; 1=divided.

ethnic saliency (*Saliency*), derived from MEIM-R. For Model 7a, the reference national self-identification is Croat. See Table 8 for the results of the regressions of Models 7b to 7e. My models are:

Model 7a: $Saliency = \text{Familial Socialization} + \text{Divided} + \text{Mom Education} + \text{Dad Education} + \text{Amount of Religious Service Attendance} + \text{Gender} + \text{Bosniak_dummy} + \text{Serb_dummy} + \text{Bosnian_dummy} + \text{Roma_dummy} + \text{Other_dummy} + \text{Bosniak/Bosnian_dummy} + \text{Mix1_dummy} + \text{Mix2_dummy}$

Model 7b (Bosniak): $Saliency = \text{Familial Socialization} + \text{Divided} + \text{Mom Education} + \text{Dad Education} + \text{Amount of Religious Service Attendance} + \text{Gender}$

Model 7c (Croat): $Saliency = \text{Familial Socialization} + \text{Divided} + \text{Mom Education} + \text{Dad Education} + \text{Amount of Religious Service Attendance} + \text{Gender}$

Model 7d (Serb): $Saliency = \text{Familial Socialization} + \text{Divided} + \text{Mom Education} + \text{Dad Education} + \text{Amount of Religious Service Attendance} + \text{Gender}$

Model 7e (Bosnian): $Saliency = \text{Familial Socialization} + \text{Divided} + \text{Mom Education} + \text{Dad Education} + \text{Amount of Religious Service Attendance} + \text{Gender}$

After running Model 7a, I found that *Familial Socialization* had a statistically significant effect on saliency ($p < 0.001$) on increasing ethnic saliency. Whether or not the school is located in an ethnically divided city/town (*Divided*) had no effect. Frequency of religious service attendance retains statistical significance ($p < 0.05$). When the variable *Familial Socialization* is removed from the regression, attending school in an ethnically divided town or not still has no statistical effect on ethnic saliency. When the ethnic division variable (*Divided*) is removed from the regression, however, *Familial Socialization* retains its statistical significance ($p < 0.001$). Models 7b to 7e explore specific effects on Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians. When these individual models are run, the familial socialization variable retains statistical significance ($p < 0.001$) across all groups (the Serb sample size within these three cantons is too small to make accurate comparisons; $n=13$). Being in a divided city or town has no statistical effect on saliency

across all three groups as well. For the first time, the amount of religious service attendance loses statistical significance across all groups as well. Hypothesis 3, which states that “Childhood experience of living in an ethnically segregated city/town has a bigger impact on children in terms of ethnic saliency than familial socialization” must be rejected. Models 6a to 6d cannot be used to test Hypothesis 2a in the ethnically divided cities/towns due to the fact that nationality and school curricula are too closely correlated.⁸⁷ Hypothesis 3 cannot be tested in Republika Srpska since ethnically divided schooling does not exist there; the same holds true for students in the Brčko District of BiH. See Table 8 for the results of the regressions from Models 7b to 7e, which are specifically focused on the following three cantons within the Federation of BiH: Central Bosnia Canton, Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, and Zenica-Doboj Canton.

⁸⁷ Within these three cantons (n=1,938), seven Bosniaks studied on the Croatian curriculum, 23 Croats on the Bosniak curriculum, and 12 Bosnians on the Croat curriculum. Serbs were split between the two curricula, with five on the Bosniak program and nine on the Croat program. All 99 students who went to the Catholic school in Žepče were Croat.

Table 8: Familial Socialization vs. Ethnically Divided Towns in Three Cantons
(Central Bosnia, Herzegovina-Neretva, and Zenica-Doboj)

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Familial Socialization	0.472*** (0.0245)	0.517*** (0.0278)	0.980*** (0.109)	0.559*** (0.0714)
Divided Towns	0.0366 (0.0317)	0.0564 (0.0409)	- 0.560 (0.294)	- 0.0135 (0.121)
Religious Service Attendance	0.00488 (0.0114)	- 0.0143 (0.0188)	- 0.0562 (0.174)	- 0.0524 (0.0371)
Male	0.00488 (0.0114)	0.121** (0.0380)	0.577* (0.231)	- 0.156 (0.129)
Mom Education	- 0.000404 (0.0155)	- 0.0117 (0.0180)	0.0645 (0.142)	- 0.0380 (0.0684)
Dad Education	0.00318 (0.0157)	- 0.000111 (0.0178)	0.0702 (0.100)	- 0.0433 (0.0711)
_cons	1.541*** (0.116)	1.335*** (0.145)	- 0.747 (0.725)	1.544*** (0.373)
R-square	0.312	0.303	0.954	0.418
N	852	846	13	131
(Standard errors in parentheses)				
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001				

General Conclusions on Familial Socialization

The role of families in the socialization of their children in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been put forth by Bringa (1995, 84), in which she states that the primary domain of ethno-religious identity formation is the household. Erikson (1963), Berghahn and Schissler (1987, 1), and Reidy et al. (2015, 20) also believe that the family acts as an important agent of socialization for young people. Umaña-Taylor et al. (2006, 407) find that familial ethnic socialization is strongly related to ethnic identity achievement and is critical for ethnic identity formation in adolescents. The previously presented findings in this chapter show that families do have a statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) effect on the socialization of their children, via increased ethnic saliency. Indeed, a pairwise correlation test shows that familial ethnic socialization and ethnic saliency are highly positively correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.5997, demonstrating a strong and positive relationship ($p < 0.001$). Living in an ethnically segregated city or town (childhood experience, as put forth by Ajduković and Biruški 2008) has no statistical significance, while familial ethnic socialization (*Familial Socialization*) is statistically significant at the 0.001 level within the three tested cantons in the Federation of BiH where official segregation exists; this shows that the role of families has a far stronger impact on socialization and increasing ethnic saliency than living in an ethnically divided city/town or attending an ethnically divided school.

In Chapter 5, it was found that the three constituent peoples attended weekly religious services at vastly different levels, yet there was no statistical difference between mean ethnic saliency scores of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. In this chapter, it was shown that frequency of religious service attendance lost its statistically significant effect on ethnic saliency when the familial socialization variable (*Familial Socialization*) was introduced to the regression analyses

for Serbs and Bosnians at the state level; when looking at the three segregated cantons within the Federation of BiH, it lost statistical significance across all four groups. As mentioned previously in this chapter, it seems that a coupling and de-coupling of ethno-national identity and religion are currently taking place in the country; among Bosniaks and Croats they are coupled, whereas among Serbs and Bosnians they are de-coupled. *Familial Socialization* is the one thing that does not change across all four groups. The powerful role of families may be seen through this unsolicited message from a female Bosniak student in Sarajevo, written to me in English: “I have many friends. But once I had a boyfriend, who wasn’t Muslim and my parents didn’t agree. We had to break up and now I am very sad.”

CHAPTER VII

OTHER-GROUP ORIENTATION AND THE CONTACT HYPOTHESIS

The basic premise of the contact hypothesis is that reconciliation between different groups can occur when they have contact with one another. Simple contact is not enough, however; it must also include four prerequisite features as well. Allport (1958, 454) hypothesized that to be maximally effective,

...contact and acquaintance programs should lead to a sense of equality in social status, should occur in ordinary purposeful pursuits, avoid artificially, and if possible enjoy the sanction of the community in which they occur. The deeper and more genuine the association, the greater the effect. While it may help somewhat to place members of different ethnic groups side by side on a job, the gain is greater if these members regard themselves as part of a *team*.

Janmaat (2012) tested the contact hypothesis using data from the April 1999 IEA Civic Education Study amongst 14 year-olds in England, Germany, and Sweden. Janmaat (2012) found that ethnically diverse classrooms increased tolerance in Germany and Sweden, but had the opposite effect in England. Bekhuis et al. (2013) explored the contact hypothesis among secondary school students in Nijmegen, the Netherlands (n=1,444), and found that quality of contact, rather than quantity, lowers xenophobic attitudes (Bekhuis et al. 2013, 238). In Northern Ireland, cross-community contact between Catholics and Protestants promotes positive out-group attitudes via an integrated educational system.

Research also shows that “...awareness of the presence of out-group members in an educational setting, rather than integrated education per se, appears to affect attitudes towards the out-group and the propensity towards forgiveness” (McGlynn et al. 2004, 157). This contact creates positive out-group perceptions, but it also has the effect of re-enforcing our own identity. Through these encounters with “otherness,” our own identity becomes “...relational so that contact with otherness is both positive and negative....” (Schöpflin 2003, 479-480). Oliver and Wong (2003, 573) provide an example of the negative effect of contact; the authors found that Asian-Americans who live in racially mixed neighborhoods of Los Angeles hold a negative opinion of out-group members, whereas Asian-Americans who reside in more homogeneous neighborhoods hold a less negative opinion of out-group members. In the context of the former SFR Yugoslavia, Kunovich and Hodson (2002, 204) found that ethnic diversity (at the county level) lowered ethnic prejudice levels in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia; unlike Allport (1958), however, the authors found that ethnic occupational segregation within these ethnically diverse counties also lowered ethnic prejudice levels.

The purpose of the Other-Group Orientation Scale (OGO Scale; Phinney 1992) is to measure the respondents’ willingness to interact and socialize with someone from a different ethno-national group than his or her own. The OGO Scale consists of six statements based on a four-point Likert Scale, in which respondents must indicate how much they agree or disagree with each statement, using the following options: (4) Strongly Agree, (3) Agree, (2) Disagree, or (1) Strongly Disagree. Items 1, 3, 5, and 6 measure active/positive orientation; items 2 and 4 measure passive/negative orientation. A high mean OGO score indicates a willingness to interact and socialize with those from a different ethno-national group.

The countrywide mean OGO Score is: 3.0290 (n=5,613; $\alpha=0.8183$), which shows that on average, students are willing to interact with those from a different ethno-national group than themselves.⁸⁸ This finding holds true when looking at the two entities individually, as well as in Herzegovina. Although the willingness is present, I also found that with the exception of students from the Brčko District of BiH, students on average do not socialize outside of their own respective ethno-national group. In addition to responding to the survey, I also received a mix of unsolicited written messages from various students on this topic, ranging from being outright against inter-ethnic friendships to open support of them; I would like to share three of them here. A female Bosniak from Breza (Zenica-Doboj Canton) wrote: “0 – *niti ih želim*” (‘0 – and I don’t want them, either’). A male Bosniak from the ethnically divided town of Busovača (Central Bosnia Canton) expressed a similar opinion, writing: “0 *hvala boga*” (‘0, thank God’). On the other end of the spectrum, a female Croat student from Mostar who attended the Croat mono-ethnic high school wrote in English: “I love all my friends. My friends are all the same.” Models 8a to 8e are designed to test Hypotheses 6a and 6b, which state:

H6a: The less often a student attends religious services, the more willing they will be to interact with someone from a different ethno-national group.

H6b: Students who attend schools in an urban area will be more willing to interact with someone from a different ethno-national group.

My dependent variable is OGO Score (*OGO Score*), derived from the OGO Scale (Phinney 1992). My independent variables are: frequency of religious service attendance, school location (*Urban*) student gender (*Gender*), and parental education (*Mom Education* and *Dad*

⁸⁸ When broken down between the four groups, slight mean score differences emerge, with Bosnians being the most willing and Croats the least willing. Bosniak: 3.0795; Croat: 2.8525; Serb: 3.0349; Bosnian: 3.2733.

Education). The reference national self-identification group for Model 8a is Croat. Results from testing hypotheses 6a and 6b, using Models 8b to 8e, are listed in Table 9. My models are:

Model 8a: OGO Score = Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Bosniak_dummy + Serb_dummy + Bosnian_dummy + Roma_dummy + Other_dummy + Bosniak/Bosnian_dummy + Mix1_dummy + Mix2_dummy

Model 8b (Bosniak): OGO Score = Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 8c (Croat): OGO Score = Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 8d (Serb): OGO Score = Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 8e (Bosnian): OGO Score = Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Upon running Model 8a, it was found that religious service attendance was statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) in determining willingness to interact across the ethno-national divide. Unlike in previous models exploring saliency, religious service attendance had a negative effect; that is, the less one attended services, the higher their OGO Score. It was also found that gender and attending school in an urban area are both statistically significant at the 0.001 level. Upon running Models 8b to 8e, it was found that gender is statistically significant at the 0.001 level for Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs; but only significant at the 0.10 level for self-identifying Bosnians. Attending school in an urban area is statistically significant at the 0.001 level among Bosniaks and Bosnians, statistically significant among Serbs at the 0.01 level, statistically significant among Croats at the 0.05 level.

The less one attended religious services across all four national groups (Models 8b to 8e) was statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) in increasing a willingness to interact across the ethno-national divide. Being female was statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) for Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs for having a higher OGO Score; among self-identifying Bosnians it was less so, being significant only at the 0.10 level. Attending school in an urban area was statistically significant in having a higher OGO Score across all four groups as well: among Bosniaks and Bosnians it was statistically significant at the 0.001 level, for Serbs at the 0.01 level, and for Croats at the 0.05 level. Females were statistically more likely ($p < 0.001$) than males to reach across the ethnic divide among Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs; for self-identifying Bosnians, it was much less so, only at the 0.10 level. See Table 9 for the results of Models 8b to 8e.

Table 9: Effects of Religious Service Attendance and Urbanism on Other-Group Orientation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Religious Service Attendance	- 0.0434*** (0.0107)	- 0.101*** (0.0168)	- 0.0746*** (0.0197)	- 0.0778*** (0.0226)
Urban	0.174*** (0.0284)	0.0957* (0.0467)	0.101** (0.0386)	0.388*** (0.0614)
Male	- 0.116*** (0.0291)	- 0.245*** (0.0366)	- 0.293*** (0.0393)	- 0.100 + (0.0573)
Mom Education	0.0142 (0.0134)	0.0159 (0.0176)	0.0293 (0.0204)	0.02900 (0.0274)
Dad Education	0.0169 (0.0135)	- 0.00288 (0.0169)	- 0.0381 + (0.0199)	- 0.00404 (0.0276)
_cons	3.067*** (0.0572)	3.326*** (0.101)	3.334*** (0.0860)	3.188*** (0.113)
R-square	0.053	0.048	0.066	0.185
N	2,038	1,579	1,207	438
(Standard errors in parentheses) +p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001				

Next, I attempted to test Hypotheses 7a and 7b, which explore the effects of attending a “non-appropriate” ethnic school on tolerance. Attending such a school forces the minority ethno-national group student to have contact and interact with others. Hypotheses 7a and 7b state:

H7a: Students attending school on a non-ethnic appropriate curriculum will be more willing to interact with someone from a different ethno-national group.

H7b: Students attending school in the Brčko District of BiH will be more willing to interact with someone from a different ethno-national group.

My dependent variable is the OGO Score; my independent variables are school curricula (NPP), parental education, student gender, amount of religious service attendance, and whether or not the school is in an urban or rural area (*Urban*). See Table 10 for the regression results of Models 9a to 9d:

Model 9a (Bosniak): OGO Score = Croat NPP + Serb NPP + Brčko District NPP + Catholic School NPP + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban+ Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 9b (Croat): OGO Score = Bosniak NPP + Serb NPP + Brčko District NPP + Catholic School NPP + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban+ Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 9c (Serb): OGO Score = Bosniak NPP + Croat NPP + Brčko District NPP + Catholic School NPP + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban+ Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 9d (Bosnian): OGO Score = Croat NPP + Serb NPP + Brčko District NPP + Catholic School NPP + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban+ Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Table 10: Attending a Non-appropriate Ethnic School and its Effects on Tolerance in Bosnia and Herzegovina

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Bosniak Curriculum		0.714*** (0.128)	0.235* (0.112)	
Croat Curriculum	0.423** (0.145)		0.402*** (0.116)	0.424** (0.150)
Serb Curriculum	0.447*** (0.0966)	0.579 (0.487)		0.237 (0.172)
Brčko District Curriculum	0.344*** (0.0627)	0.693*** (0.151)	0.185** (0.0616)	x (x)
Catholic School	0.639*** (0.154)	0.186** (0.0640)	0.384** (0.133)	0.167 (0.167)
Religious Service Attendance	- 0.0429*** (0.0105)	- 0.0841*** (0.0167)	- 0.0776*** (0.0196)	- 0.0800*** (0.0227)
Urban	0.135*** (0.0294)	0.00893 (0.0479)	0.0440 (0.0441)	0.421*** (0.0630)
Male	- 0.127*** (0.0287)	- 0.242*** (0.0361)	- 0.297*** (0.0390)	- 0.121* (0.0582)
Mom Education	0.0240 + (0.0133)	0.0276 (0.0175)	0.0269 (0.0204)	0.0255 (0.0273)
Dad Education	0.0266* (0.0133)	- 0.00391 (0.0166)	- 0.0355 + (0.0199)	- 0.00360 (0.0275)
_cons	2.986*** (0.0572)	3.190*** (0.102)	3.317*** (0.0857)	3.167*** (0.114)
R-square	0.086	0.081	0.089	0.205
N	2,038	1,579	1,207	438
(Standard errors in parentheses)				
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001				

Previously, it was found that nationality and ethno-national school curricula were too closely correlated to test possible effects on saliency (Chapter 5) – with the exception of the Serbs who reside in the Federation of BiH and the Brčko District of BiH – who experienced statistically lowered ethnic saliency levels when studying on the Bosniak ($p < 0.001$), Brčko District of BiH ($p < 0.05$), and Croat ($p < 0.10$) curricula. 91.56% of self-identifying Bosnians studied on the Bosniak curriculum. After running Model 9c, it was found that Serbs who attended schools that operated on the Croatian curriculum experienced a statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) increase in tolerance; attending a school that operated on the Bosniak curriculum had a similar effect, but at the 0.05 level. At least in the case of Serbs, Hypothesis 7a can be accepted.⁸⁹ Outside of the three ethno-national curricula, I found that studying on the unified Brčko District of BiH curriculum or going to a Catholic school had statistically significant, positive effects for Serbs ($p < 0.01$) on increasing tolerance. For Bosniaks ($p < 0.001$) and Croats ($p < 0.01$), attending a Catholic school had a statistically significant impact on increasing tolerance levels, but no effect on self-identifying Bosnians. Going to school in the Brčko District of BiH also statistically increased tolerance levels among Bosniaks and Croats, both at the 0.001 level. These finding regarding attending a Catholic school is interesting because it was previously found that attending a Catholic school had no statistical effect on saliency levels across the four groups (see Table 4, Chapter 5). The amount of religious service attendance maintains its statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), negative effect.

In Chapter 6, I found that familial ethnic socialization (*Familial Socialization*) had a statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), positive effect on increasing ethnic saliency levels (see Table

⁸⁹ In this analysis, the 39 Bosniaks who attended schools on the Serbian curriculum also experienced a statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) increase in tolerance. The 30 Croats who attended schools on the Bosniak curriculum experienced a similar effect ($p < 0.001$). In this sample, 17 Bosniaks went to schools on the Croat curriculum.

7), which allowed us to accept Hypothesis 2a. Here, I attempt to test Hypothesis 2b. In order to do so, I run four regression analyses (Models 10a to 10d) testing possible effects that families have on their children's willingness to interact and socialize with someone from a different ethno-national group. Hypothesis 2b states:

H2b: Students will be more willing to interact and socialize with someone from a different national group if their parents also socialize with out-group members.

Instead of using the R-FESM mean score as my independent variable for familial ethnic socialization, I use student responses from one specific item of this battery: item 5, which states "the people who my family hangs out with the most are people who are members of our national group." I chose to do this because this specific battery statement measures other-group contact via familial example (*Familial Example*); within the R-FESM, item 5 is one of six items used to tap Covert FES. My dependent variable remains the same: other-group orientation (*OGO Score*). See Table 11 for the regression results. My models are:

Model 10a (Bosniak): OGO Score = Familial Example + Urban + Croat NPP + Serb NPP + Brčko District NPP + Catholic School NPP + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 10b (Croat): OGO Score = Familial Example + Urban + Bosniak NPP + Serb NPP + Brčko District NPP + Catholic School NPP + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 10c (Serb): OGO Score = Familial Example + Urban + Bosniak NPP + Croat NPP + Brčko District NPP + Catholic School NPP + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 10d (Bosnian): OGO Score = Familial Example + Urban + Croat NPP + Serb NPP + Brčko District NPP + Catholic School NPP + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Table 11: Tolerance in Bosnia and Herzegovina – the Role of Families vs. Attending a Non-appropriate Ethnic School

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Familial Example	- 0.172*** (0.0124)	- 0.223*** (0.0156)	- 0.183*** (0.0156)	- 0.141*** (0.0235)
Bosniak Curriculum		0.475*** (0.122)	0.0343 (0.109)	
Croat Curriculum	0.266 + (0.139)		0.350** (0.110)	0.258 + (0.147)
Serb Curriculum	0.374*** (0.0924)	0.378 (0.459)		0.288 + (0.165)
Brčko District Curriculum	0.317*** (0.0601)	0.650*** (0.142)	0.127* (0.0586)	x (x)
Catholic School	0.435** (0.148)	0.0958 (0.0608)	0.293* (0.126)	- 0.0149 (0.163)
Urban	0.0913** (0.0284)	- 0.0833 + (0.0456)	0.0188 (0.0419)	0.352*** (0.0628)
Religious Service Attendance	- 0.0229* (0.0102)	- 0.0375* (0.0162)	- 0.0363 + (0.0189)	- 0.0445 + (0.0227)
Male	- 0.124*** (0.0275)	- 0.240*** (0.0342)	- 0.290*** (0.0371)	- 0.111* (0.0562)
Mom Education	0.0110 (0.0128)	0.0102 (0.0166)	0.0140 (0.0194)	0.0202 (0.0263)
Dad Education	0.0236 + (0.0128)	- 0.00588 (0.0157)	- 0.0358 + (0.0189)	- 0.0106 (0.0267)
_cons	3.628*** (0.0719)	3.979*** (0.111)	3.961*** (0.0988)	3.622*** (0.133)
R-square	0.165	0.187	0.182	0.267
N	2,028	1,568	1,200	434

(Standard errors in parentheses)
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

Upon running Models 10a to 10d, I find that other-group contact via familial example has a statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), negative effect towards OGO scores. That is, the more often families socialize with only members of their ethno-national group, the lower a students' OGO score will be. Conversely put, the more often the students' family socializes with members of other ethno-national groups, the higher a students' OGO score will be. The children see through the actions of their parents what is considered socially acceptable behavior within their families, thus leading to either a lower or higher willingness to interact with those outside of their ethno-national group. Hypothesis 2b can be accepted. When this specific family variable is added to the regression, the role of religious service attendance drops significantly in statistical significance across all four groups, but experiences the greatest drop among Serbs and Bosnians ($p < 0.10$). This is not a surprising result among these two groups, however, for Serbs and Bosnians attend weekly religious services the least compared to Croats and Bosniaks.

In the case of Serbs and Bosnians, when the family variable is introduced, it simply replaced religious service attendance as a factor – which could then be argued simply stood as a proxy for familial socialization, since whether or not (or how often) one attends religious services is controlled by the parents. It was previously found in Chapter 5 that Serbs who go to schools on the Bosniak curriculum experience a statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) decrease in saliency levels; however, attending such a school has no statistical effect on an increased or decreased willingness to interact with the majority group. Going to school in the Brčko District of BiH retains its statistical significance among Serbs, and becomes statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) among Croats and Bosniaks (for these two groups, the Brčko curriculum had no statistical effect on saliency levels; see: Table 4, Chapter 5).

Next, I run five regressions (Models 11a to 11e) to test Hypothesis 8a, which states:

H8a: Students who enjoy being around people from other national groups will have decreased levels of ethnic saliency.

For Allport (1958, 454), one of the four prerequisite features for the contact hypothesis to be maximally effective is a deep and genuine association between members of different groups.

Hypothesis 6a slightly touches on this, as it can lead (or has already led to) a deep friendship.

After running Models 11a to 11e, I then run Models 12a to 12e, which are designed to measure a genuine association between members of different ethno-national groups. This is done by using responses to the Quality of Other-Group Contact Measurement, adapted from Čehajić and Brown (2010). For Models 11a to 11e, my dependent variable is ethnic saliency (*Saliency*). The independent variable I am interested in measuring is item 6 of the OGO Scale, which states: “I enjoy being around people from other national groups” (*OGO_6*). The reference national self-identification for Model 11a is Croat. See Table 12 for the regression results. My models are:

Model 11a: $Saliency = OGO_6 + \text{Amount of Religious Service Attendance} +$
 $Urban + Gender + \text{Mom Education} + \text{Dad Education} +$
 $Bosniak_dummy + Serb_dummy + \text{Bosnian_dummy} +$
 $Roma_dummy + \text{Other_dummy} + \text{Bosniak/Bosnian_dummy} +$
 $Mix1_dummy + Mix2_dummy$

Model 11b: (Bosniak) $Saliency = OGO_6 + \text{Amount of Religious Service Attendance} +$
 $Urban + Gender + \text{Mom Education} + \text{Dad Education}$

Model 11c (Croat): $Saliency = OGO_6 + \text{Amount of Religious Service Attendance} +$
 $Urban + Gender + \text{Mom Education} + \text{Dad Education}$

Model 11d (Serb): $Saliency = OGO_6 + \text{Amount of Religious Service Attendance} +$
 $Urban + Gender + \text{Mom Education} + \text{Dad Education}$

Model 11e (Bosnian): $Saliency = OGO_6 + \text{Amount of Religious Service Attendance} +$
 $Urban + Gender + \text{Mom Education} + \text{Dad Education}$

After running Model 11a, I found that the variable *OGO_6* has a statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), negative effect on ethnic saliency. Attending school in an urban area has no statistical effect at the state level. Hypothesis 8a, which states that “Students who enjoy being around people from other national groups will have decreased levels of ethnic saliency,” can be accepted. A slightly different picture comes into being when Models 11b to 11e are run, however. The variable *OGO_6* has no statistical effect on Bosniak or Bosnian ethnic saliency, but there is a statistically significant, negative effect on saliency among Serbs ($p < 0.001$) and Croats ($p < 0.01$). Frequency of religious service attendance maintains its statistical significance ($p < 0.001$) across all four groups for increasing saliency levels.

Due to these results, I also ran a regression using item 3⁹⁰ (*OGO_3*) of the OGO Scale as my main independent variable (replacing item 6 / *OGO_6*) to test if simply being around individuals from a different ethno-national group has an effect on saliency, compared to actually enjoying their company. For Allport (1958), this simple contact is not enough. Whether or not a student spends time with people from a different ethno-national group (*OGO_3*) only has a statistically significant effect on Serbs ($p < 0.001$) in decreasing ethnic saliency levels. There are no statistically significant effects among Bosniaks, Croats, or Bosnians. Frequency of religious service attendance maintains its statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) effects across all four groups for increasing ethnic saliency levels. See Table 13 for the full regression results. In a December 2005 public opinion survey ($n=2,000$), respondents from Republika Srpska had fewer friends from a different ethnic group compared to those from the Federation of BiH. However, residents

⁹⁰ OGO Scale item 3: “I often spend time with people from other national groups.”

of Banja Luka (the capital of Republika Srpska) expressed a higher value than the national average in their preferences for friends from other ethnic groups (O'Loughlin 2010, 48).

Table 12: Effects of Student Enjoyment of Being around other National Groups on Ethnic Saliency in Bosnia and Herzegovina

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
OGO_6	- 0.0138 (0.0162)	- 0.0457** (0.0169)	- 0.102*** (0.0225)	- 0.0794 (0.0483)
Religious Service Attendance	0.105*** (0.0103)	0.150*** (0.0148)	0.156*** (0.0199)	0.119*** (0.0310)
Urban	- 0.0288 (0.0273)	- 0.0812* (0.0406)	0.0728 + (0.0388)	0.0364 (0.0871)
Male	- 0.0726** (0.0280)	0.0914** (0.0323)	- 0.0267 (0.0401)	- 0.244** (0.0780)
Mom Education	0.00185 (0.0129)	- 0.0164 (0.0153)	- 0.0361 + (0.0205)	- 0.0909* (0.0372)
Dad Education	0.00474 (0.0129)	- 0.000552 (0.0147)	0.00965 (0.0200)	0.0208 (0.0377)
_cons	3.171*** (0.0753)	2.975*** (0.105)	3.350*** (0.114)	3.339*** (0.220)
R-square	0.053	0.081	0.075	0.088
N	2,015	1,566	1,201	436
(Standard errors in parentheses)				
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001				

Table 13: Effects of Spending Time with People from Other National Groups on Ethnic Saliency in Bosnia and Herzegovina

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
OGO_3	- 0.00373 (0.0152)	- 0.00717 (0.0165)	- 0.0990*** (0.0211)	- 0.0144 (0.0477)
Religious Service Attendance	0.107*** (0.0102)	0.153*** (0.0148)	0.161*** (0.0198)	0.126*** (0.0311)
Urban	- 0.0294 (0.0276)	- 0.0839* (0.0408)	0.0825* (0.0390)	0.00613 (0.0893)
Male	- 0.0745** (0.0279)	0.101** (0.0319)	- 0.0202 (0.0399)	- 0.239** (0.0781)
Mom Education	0.00143 (0.0128)	- 0.0190 (0.0153)	- 0.0415* (0.0204)	- 0.0929* (0.0373)
Dad Education	0.00452 (0.0129)	0.00134 (0.0146)	0.00758 (0.0200)	0.0217 (0.0378)
_cons	3.135*** (0.0675)	2.851*** (0.102)	3.318*** (0.108)	3.120*** (0.205)
R-square	0.054	0.077	0.076	0.083
N	2,016	1,565	1,197	436
(Standard errors in parentheses)				
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001				

My final analysis is derived from responses to the Quality of Other-Group Contact Measurement, which consists of three statements based on a four-point Likert Scale. This measurement scale is adapted from Čehajić and Brown (2010), who derived it from Zagefka and Brown (2002). The countrywide mean score is 2.9210 (n=4,880 α =0.7842).⁹¹ The models listed below (Models 12a to 12e) are designed as a continuation for testing the contact hypothesis and familial influence via Hypothesis 8b; specifically, I am interested in which variables influence (or dissuade) contact.

H8b: Contact with other ethno-national groups via familial example will increase student willingness for out-group contact.

Models 12a to 12e use the mean response scores of items 2,⁹² 3,⁹³ and 4⁹⁴ of the Quality of Other-Group Contact Measurement (item 1 is qualitative and thus not used in this analysis). My dependent variable is mean quality contact scores (*Contact Score*). My independent variables are: familial example,⁹⁵ amount of religious service attendance, whether or not the school is in an urban or rural area (*Urban*), student gender (*Gender*), and parental education levels (*Mom Education* and *Dad Education*). The reference national self-identification group for Model 12a is Croat. See Table 14 for the regression results. My models are:

⁹¹ When broken down between the four groups, I found that Bosnians have the highest mean contact score and Croats have the lowest mean contact score. Bosniak: 2.9395; Croat: 2.7768; Serb: 2.9103; Bosnian: 3.1573.

⁹² Quality of Other-Group Contact Measurement, item 2: “I often spend time with my friends from other national groups.”

⁹³ Quality of Other-Group Contact Measurement, item 3: “I feel close to my friends from other national groups.”

⁹⁴ Quality of Other-Group Contact Measurement, item 4: “My friends who are members of other national groups are very similar to me.”

⁹⁵ Derived from item 5 of R-FESM (Umaña-Taylor et al. 2004), which states: “the people who my family hangs out with the most are people who are members of our national group.” This was used previously as one of the independent variables in Models 10a to 10d as well. Within the R-FESM, item 5 is one of six items used to tap Covert FES. The R-FESM uses a five-point Likert Scale.

Model 12a: Contact Score = Familial Example + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education + Bosniak_dummy + Serb_dummy + Bosnian_dummy + Roma_dummy + Other_dummy + Bosniak/Bosnian_dummy + Mix1_dummy + Mix2_dummy

Model 12b (Bosniak): Contact Score = Familial Example + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 12c (Croat): Contact Score = Familial Example + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 12d (Serb): Contact Score = Familial Example + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Model 12e (Bosnian): Contact Score = Familial Example + Amount of Religious Service Attendance + Urban + Gender + Mom Education + Dad Education

Familial Example, religious service attendance, an urban area, and being female are statistically significant predictors of strong inter-ethnic contact, all at the 0.001 level. Next, I present my findings relating to Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs, and Bosnians. *Familial Example* is statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) among all four groups; the more often families socialize outside of their national group, the higher their children's Contact Score will be; the more often families socialize within their national group, the lower their children's Contact Score will be. Hypothesis 8b can be accepted across all four groups. Frequency of religious service attendance is statistically significant at the 0.001 level among Bosniaks, Croats, and Bosnians; it is statistically significant for Serbs at the 0.01 level. The less often one attends church or mosque, the higher their Contact Score will be; meaning that quality of other-group contact increases. Attending school in an urban area is statistically significant for increasing quality contact at the 0.001 level for Bosniaks and Serbs; it is statistically significant at the 0.01 level among

Bosnians; and has no statistical effect among Croats. Gender has no statistical effect on Bosniaks or Bosnians, but it does for Croats and Serbs ($p < 0.001$). The gender significance comes in the form of meaning that female Croats and Serbs, on average, have higher meaningful contact with members of other national groups compared to their male counterparts. These results again underscore the powerful role of families in the socialization of their children (see: Chapter Six). See Table 14 for the regression results.

Table 14: Meaningful Contact in Bosnia and Herzegovina

	Bosniak	Croat	Serb	Bosnian
Familial Example	- 0.170*** (0.0143)	- 0.219*** (0.0208)	- 0.163*** (0.0180)	- 0.199*** (0.0241)
Religious Service Attendance	- 0.0311** (0.0119)	- 0.0708** (0.0216)	- 0.0259 (0.0220)	- 0.0821*** (0.0237)
Urban	0.118*** (0.0315)	0.0730 (0.0580)	0.154*** (0.0423)	0.185** (0.0652)
Male	- 0.0450 (0.0320)	- 0.168*** (0.0468)	- 0.151*** (0.0436)	0.0589 (0.0578)
Mom Education	0.00332 (0.0148)	- 0.0180 (0.0226)	- 0.000780 (0.0226)	0.0282 (0.0276)
Dad Education	- 0.000684 (0.0150)	- 0.00706 (0.0217)	- 0.0462* (0.0217)	0.00634 (0.0279)
_cons	3.586*** (0.0825)	4.068*** (0.146)	3.714*** (0.115)	3.706*** (0.138)
R-square	0.102	0.116	0.109	0.286
N	1,850	1,264	1,050	398
(Standard errors in parentheses)				
+p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001				

General Conclusions

On the issue of socializing and being friends with people from a different ethno-national group, a female Croat student from Posušje (West Herzegovina Canton) wrote on her survey, in English, the following unsolicited message to me:

Dear Matthew, I live in Posušje where 99.9% of people are Croats. Its 3 miles away from the Croatian border. How can I like to spend time with people from other national [groups]? There are no such people here. There is no *džamija* ['mosque'] in Posušje.⁹⁶

The situation is similar in Ljubuški (West Herzegovina Canton), where I received this message from a male Croat: “*Na području u kojem živim nema mnogo pripadnika drugih nacionalnih skupina, pa ih nisam imao priliku upoznati*” (‘In the area in which I live, there are not many people from other national groups, so I have not had the opportunity to meet them’). A female Bosniak from Busovača wrote that although she does not have cross-ethnic friendships, she is also not opposed to it, either: “*Nemam ih, ali ne bih se bunila da imam.*” These last two qualitative statements match my overall quantitative findings that although students on average do not socialize outside of their own respective ethno-national group, they are also not opposed to do doing so. Secondary schools are largely homogenous outside of Brčko, thus preventing high levels of contact in schools. Brčko is one of the only truly multi-ethnic cities left in the country, where all three of the constituent peoples live and go to school. The city of Tuzla comes in at a distant second. Sarajevo is no longer the multi-ethnic capital that many of its Bosniak residents claim it to be.

⁹⁶ This same student also noted why she ‘strongly disagreed’ with the statement “I often spend time with people from national groups other than my own,” writing: “*ne, jer ih nema oko mene* [‘no, because there are none of them around me’].” In response to participating in activities with people from a different national group (Item 5 of the OGO Scale), she wrote, in Croatian and English: “*Nemam takve aktivnosti u blizini.* There is no such activity in my town, because there’s no people from other nationality.”

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

In my fieldwork, I found that 38.43% of students self-identified as Bosniak,⁹⁷ 28.74% as Croat, 22.15% as Serb, 8.05% as Bosnian, 1.54% as Other, and 0.26% as Roma; forty-seven students (0.83%) identify with more than one ethno-national group (Table 6a). The institutionalization of the ethnic over the civic identity is the norm, with no changes in sight. Almond and Verba (1989, 372) claim that in order for a new country to establish a civic culture, it “...needs both the unifying symbols and system affect that the Mexican Revolution has provided, as well as the cognitive skills that exist in Germany. There must be a symbolic event, or symbolic, charismatic leader, or some other means of creating commitment and unity at the symbolic level.” Bosnia and Herzegovina currently lacks a cross-ethnic leader,⁹⁸ and its history is still very much political – viewed through an ethno-centric lens. Even the medieval Bosnian Kingdom cannot serve as a civic rallying point among the three groups. The golden lily (*fleur-de-lis*) was the symbol of the Kotromanić family and their kingdom, but it has since been

⁹⁷ 0.95% (n=54) of students chose Bosniak and Bosnian as their nationality, viewing them as being linked together.

⁹⁸ One possible exception to this is Željko Komšić, the former Croat member of the tripartate presidency, for whom many Bosniaks had voted for (Centralna izborna komisija Bosne i Hercegovine / Središnje izborno povjerenstvo Bosne i Hercegovine 2010, 1). This in turn, however, has led to many Croats in Herzegovina believing he was not a “true representative” of the Croat people – an argument put forth by the Croat nationalist parties. Due to the electoral system, candidates for the Bosniak and Croat seats only campaign in the Federation of BiH, and the Serb candidates only campaign in Republika Srpska (and citizens can only vote for the presidential candidates running within their entity).

adopted by Bosniaks as their ethnic symbol – thus removing its possible use as a civic symbol as well.

Schools display specific symbols of the majority group within classrooms: for Bosniaks it is the *fleur-de-lis* and state coat-of-arms; for Croats it is the Croatian chequy (*šahovnica*); in Serbian schools, portraits of St. Sava (as well as other Orthodox saints), the Serb cross, and the coat-of-arms of Republika Srpska are displayed. These symbols serve as a visible reminder of who the majority group is, and re-enforces an ethnic identity over a civic identity. Schools in the Brčko District of BiH, however, are not allowed to display such ethnic symbols because the District is not allowed to have a flag, coat-of-arms, or other symbols of state except for the flag and coat-of-arms of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Chapter I Article 3 of the Statute of the Brčko District of BiH). If schools are to integrate, or at the very least, make minority students feel more welcome, such ethnic-specific symbols must be removed from public schools. In Northern Ireland, integrated schools have struggled with issues of cultural symbols, such as flags and student clothing; for example, in physical education classes, students would wear soccer shirts of their respective sectarian teams. However, due to rising local tensions, these and other contentious cultural symbols have been banned in one such school (McGlynn 2004, 89). In order for this to happen in Bosnia and Herzegovina, individual schools would have to make such choices themselves, as there is currently no political will for such changes.

The international community, through the Office of the High Representative, could force change upon the people in a similar manner as was done in the Brčko District of BiH (Perry 2009). The Europeans, however, are currently in favor of the “local ownership” / hands-off approach. The post-war ethnic power-sharing arrangement also hinders the development of a Bosnian-Herzegovinian civic identity. The country has three presidents, one from each of the

three constituent peoples, and government institutions fall along ethnic distribution and ethnic rights. Ethnic politics is deeply entrenched in the country; in the October 2014 general elections, voters once again returned the ethno-nationalist parties to power (Centralna izborna komisija / Središnje izborno povjerenstvo Bosne i Hercegovine 2014, 1).

In Chapter 5, it was found that nationality and the ethno-national school curricula students study on are closely correlated, leading to issues of multicollinearity when attempting to measure effects of the three ethno-national curricula on ethnic saliency among students. The one exception to this are Serbs who study on the Bosniak curriculum in the Federation of BiH. The majority of the country has become highly ethnically homogenous, thus preventing everyday cross-ethnic contact. There are some exceptions to this, in such small places as Bosanski Petrovac (Una-Sana Canton) or Glamoč (Hercegbosanska Canton), where students are also not ethnically segregated in school, as well as the city of Tuzla. This general claim is supported by data from Chapter 7, in which I found that, on average, although students are willing to interact with those from a different ethno-national group than themselves, they also do not socialize outside of their own respective ethno-national group. The two exceptions to this are students from the Brčko District of BiH and the city of Tuzla, who actually do socialize outside of their national groups.

The city of Brčko is one of the only truly multi-ethnic cities left in the country, where all three of the constituent peoples live and go to school; the integration of schools was forced upon the people by the American administration of the Brčko District of BiH, however. The city of

Tuzla comes in at a distant second.⁹⁹ Sarajevo is no longer the multi-ethnic capital that many of its Bosniak residents claim it to be. With the exceptions of the cities of Brčko and Tuzla, does this mean that strong educational fences could make good neighbors, and that the security of each having one's "own" educational and community space is a positive attribute? If so, what does this mean for communities that do already have a certain amount of diversity that must be managed? Can a post-war country be successfully built upon the premise of "separate but equal," or should equality stem from efforts to integrate? Language is an important aspect of identity, and this will be a sticking point in any attempt to fully integrate schools and harmonize curricula. If we look at the state of divided and integrated schooling in Northern Ireland for possible guidance, the slow establishment of integrated schools in Northern Ireland has come from cross-community parental initiatives, rather than from the government (Smith 2001, 564). When such schools are established, the school charter (known locally as the Scheme of Management) institutionalizes and gives power to a Parent's Council that cannot be dismissed by school administration or some other individual (Smith 2001, 564). If schools are to be integrated in multi-ethnic areas of the country, the initiative will need to come from parents at the local level, as ethnic elites are currently not doing anything to lessen divisions in what are now three ethno-national societies.

In Chapter 6, it was shown that families have a statistically significant ($p < 0.001$) impact on increasing ethnic saliency via familial socialization, whereas divided schooling / ethnically-divided towns had no statistical effect (Table 8) in Central Bosnia Canton, Herzegovina-Neretva Canton, or Zenica-Doboj Canton. Familial socialization seems to be the reason why there is no

⁹⁹ The city of Tuzla is also unique because it did not fall victim to radical ethnic politics during the Bosnian War, unlike the rest of the country. In Tuzla, proto-civic associations successfully opposed ethno-nationalist politics and supported moderation and inclusiveness leading up to and during the war (Armakolas 2011, 256).

statistical difference between mean ethnic saliency scores among the three constituent peoples, yet very different levels of religious service attendance. Although regression analyses from Chapters 5 give frequency of religious service attendance statistical significance (Table 2a), Chapter 8 dismisses its effects at the state level among Serbs and Bosnians, as well as across all groups within the three divided cantons. Familial socialization is the one thing that does not change across all four groups, and it seems that a coupling and de-coupling of ethno-national identity and religion are currently taking place in the country; among Bosniaks and Croats they are coupled, whereas among Serbs and Bosnians they are de-coupled. Future research should focus more on familial socialization, and perhaps a qualitative approach towards why this coupling / de-coupling process is occurring. In what manner are imams linking Islam, Bosniakness, and the state together? Quantitative and qualitative research on Islam (and Serbian Orthodoxy) is needed to complement past research on Catholicism in the country.

In the case of divided schooling and the use of three separate curricula, it could be sustainable in a positive manner if reconciliation is included in the school learning environment. The impact of specifically unifying the ethnically-divided schools in Central Bosnia, Herzegovina-Neretva, and Zenica-Doboj cantons would be important at the symbolic level, however. As Table 8 shows, attending an ethnically divided school has no statistical effect on ethnic saliency, whereas familial socialization is statistically significant for increasing ethnic saliency levels.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, my research has found that the majority of students, on average, are willing to interact and be friends with those from a different ethno-national group (Chapter 7).

¹⁰⁰ Understanding what factors increase ethnic saliency is important for the reconciliation and democratization process within Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as other states affected by ethnic conflict. A pairwise correlation test between ethnic saliency and familial ethnic socialization within these three cantons has a correlation coefficient score of 0.5963 ($p < 0.001$).

Secondary schools, however, are largely homogenous, thus preventing high levels of contact in schools. Although schools are overwhelmingly homogenous, this willingness amongst students must be built into interpersonal trust and a civic identity in order for democratic consolidation to truly occur in the country. Willingness for interaction and friendship is the first step, however. Inglehart (1990, 22-25) also draws a relationship with the emergence of a “civic political culture” and interpersonal trust.

An example of this may be seen in the case of the *de facto* independent, but unrecognized (except by Turkey) Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), in which ethno-centric and ethno-nationalist history textbooks and lessons were changed to promote civic-ness along with co-existence and reconciliation (Vural and Özuyanık 2008). This change came about through the electoral victory of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and the This Country is Ours Platform (BMBP) coalition over the ethno-nationalist National Unity Party (UBP) and Democratic Party (DP) in 2003 (Vural and Özuyanık 2008, 134-135). The new TRNC government had the Ministry of National Education and Culture produce new textbooks that promoted a Cypriot (“territorial”) identity, which coincided with the CTP political goal of a re-unified, federal Cyprus (Vural and Özuyanık 2008); a similar undertaking in the Republic of Cyprus by the Greek-Cypriots has yet to occur, however (2008, 150). What does the TRNC example mean for Bosnia and Herzegovina? It shows that reconciliation and the promotion of a shared civic identity is possible in a post-conflict society when the proper political will is present. This political will, unfortunately, is not currently present in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as identity is currently seen a zero-sum game for ethnic elites. Gellner (1983, 34) argues that “...the monopoly of legitimate education is now more important, more central than is the monopoly of legitimate

violence” for the state. When there are three competing educations within the state, students do not become socialized into the same high culture and thus do not share a common identity.

An improved civics education and out-of-school cross-ethnic contact activities can help with this. One such initiative is Project Citizen (*Projekat građanin / Ja građanin*), sponsored by Civitas Bosnia and Herzegovina (Civitas BiH), a local NGO. In an empirical study of this program, Soule (2000, 19) found that students who participated in Project Citizen had greater political tolerance compared to those who did not participate in the program. However, for Smith (2003, 30), “...the most crucial question that citizenship education must address in a divided society is whether its citizens are committed to integrated development through shared institutions or more disposed towards a form of peaceful coexistence that involves separate development.” This is something that individuals at the local level, especially in ethnically mixed communities, must decide upon. Another possibility for promoting cross-ethnic contact could be done through the establishment of multi-ethnic youth sports teams as part of the reconciliation process. The establishment of such teams would encourage integrated development and help establish loyalty that is not based on ethnic affiliation.¹⁰¹ It would also fulfill a key tenet of the contact hypothesis: the individuals would view themselves as being a team (Allport 1958, 454).

Next, I would like to touch on the peace treaty and what it has achieved for the country. What has peace achieved in the country? Peace was brought about through the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords; although the peace treaty ended the war, it has also brought about a dysfunctional government based on ethnic politics. It also institutionalized ethnic segregation via the war-time schooling systems (Torsti 2009, 67). The purpose of the 1995 Dayton Peace

¹⁰¹ An example of loyalty based on ethnic affiliation may be seen in Mostar, which has two soccer teams: Velež Mostar (Bosniak) and Zrinjski Mostar (Croat).

Accords was to stop the war. It was, and has been, successful in this regard; however, it failed to address primary and secondary education issues – that is, the educational system played a secondary role in the peace treaty (Pingel 2009, 258). The educational system needs to play an important role in future peace treaties ending ethnic conflict in other parts of the world, so as to prevent ethnic segregation as well as to help with the peace and reconciliation process.

The peace process has socialized students into the ethnically-based political structures in the country. Ethnic identities have been institutionalized through schools and families, but also by outside forces, such as political institutions due to the ethnic power structure in the country. An example of socialization via political institutions is the registration of babies as being Bosniak, Croat, Serb, or Other. If registered as Other, one could not specify what that “other” was. The October 2014 Census also highlighted the institutionalization of ethnicity; Bosniak elites ran a campaign urging “their” people to declare as Bosniak, and not as Bosnian or Other. A citizen from Tuzla had this to say regarding the 2014 Census and an attempt by a census enumerator to push the institutionalized ethnic identity (Cvjetičanin et al. 2014, 21):

When he began asking questions he didn’t read all the offered answers but just the one he believed to be correct; for example, when he came to the ethnic/national declaration the enumerator just read ‘Bosniak’ and without waiting my answer he wrote in ‘Bosniak.’ When I stopped him and told him I don’t want to declare as Bosniak, he told me: ‘Well, I assumed judging by your name you would want to.’

Secessionist rhetoric from Republika Srpska (Inzko 2014, 1; Jukić August 2013, 1; Katana 2015, 1; Latal 2015, 1) as well as calls for a third, Croat entity that would be separate from the Federation of BiH, also serves to keep ethnicity at the front of discourse in the country.

The role of elite political discourse was stressed by the Director of U.S. National Intelligence, James R. Clapper, in his 2013 worldwide threat assessment report to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; the report stated that within the country, “...differences among Serb, Croat, and Bosniak

elites are intensifying, threatening BiH's state institutions...[and that] secessionist rhetoric from the leadership of the political entity Republika Srpska has further challenged Bosnia's internal cohesion” (Clapper 2013, 29-30). The divisive role of the media is a serious issue that the USAID’s “Strengthening Independent Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina Project” is working on, stating that BiH is facing “...an increase in nationalistic rhetoric in political discourse and the media, which greatly influences public sentiment and attitudes” (2013, 1). This segmented media market is conducive to the promotion and continuation of ethnic nationalism (Ballentine 1996). In the case of students, the media serves as an indirect (Jennings and Niemi 1974, 327) as well as explicit (Reidy et al. 2015, 17) socialization agent via the family.

Ultimately, it is the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina who must take the initiative for any change that they wish to see, as the current ethnic elites benefit from the status quo.¹⁰² The people continue to vote for the ethno-nationalist parties due to a lack of trust in their other citizens to also not vote for “their” respective ethno-national political party (Mujkić and Hulseay 2010). One example of a family challenging, and overcoming, the ethnically-based status quo occurred in February 2015. This family, from Sarajevo, won the right to register their newborn son’s nationality as “Bosnian” after a court battle, making him the first person to be officially registered with a civic nationality in the country (Jukić February 2015, 1). The family also plans on changing their previously registered ethnic nationalities to “Bosnian” as well (Jukić February 2015, 1). This small example also shows the powerful role of families in shaping the identity formation (socialization) of their children. With this example, as well as what the statistical

¹⁰² This situation is not unique to Bosnia and Herzegovina; a similar situation exists in Vukovar, Croatia (Kosić and Tauber 2010, 91) where ethnic elites benefit from the segregation of Croats and Croatian-Serbs. Clark (2013, 134) made a similar observation with Croatian and Croatian-Serb interviewees on the topic of reconciliation in Vukovar.

findings from previous chapters show, is that local families are the ones that will be the change-makers in a country that has become divided into three ethno-national societies.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- About, Frances E. "The Development of Ethnic Self-Identification and Attitudes." In Jean S. Phinney and Mary Jane Rotheram (eds.) *Children's Ethnic Socialization: Pluralism and Development*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1987 (32-55).
- Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine. November 5, 2013. "Preliminarni rezultati: Popisa stanovništva, domaćinstava i stanova u Bosni i Hercegovini 2013. [Preliminary Results: 2013 Census of Population, Households, and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina]." Agencija za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine. Saopštenje, broj 1. Sarajevo: 2013. godine. http://www.bhas.ba/obavjestenja/Preliminarni_rezultati_bos.pdf (accessed 06 November 2013).
- Ajduković, Dean and Biruški, Dinka Čorkalo. "Caught Between the Ethnic Sides: Children Growing up in a Divided Post-war Community." *International Journal of Behavioral Development* 32 (4): 337-347, 2008.
- Allport, Gordon W. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1958.
- Almond, Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, Inc., 1989.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. New York: Verso, 2006.
- Anderson, T.W. "Asymptotic Theory for Principal Component Analysis." *Annals of Mathematical Statistics* 34 (1): 122-148, March 1963.
- Anzulović, Branimir. *Heavenly Serbia: From Myth to Genocide*. New York: New York University Press, 1999.
- Armakolas, Ioannis. "The 'Paradox' of Tuzla City: Explaining Non-nationalist Local Politics during the Bosnian War." *Europe-Asia Studies* 63 (2): 229-261, March 2011.
- Bačević, Jana. *From Class to Identity: The Politics of Education Reform in Former Yugoslavia*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014.
- Bakke, Kristin M., Xun Cao, John O'Loughlin, and Michael D. Ward. "Social Distance in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the North Caucasus Region of Russia: Inter and Intra-ethnic Attitudes and Identities." *Nations and Nationalism* 15 (2): 227-253, 2009.
- Baranović, Branislava. "School Discourse Changes in Post-Communist Croatia – an Example of History and Literature Textbooks." Conference Paper. Presented at the International Sociological Association's 15th World Congress of Sociology. Brisbane, Australia. July 7-13, 2002.
- Baranović, Branislava. "History Textbooks in Post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Intercultural Education* 12 (1): 13-26, 2001.

- Bartulović, Alenka. "Nationalism in the Classroom: Narrative of the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-1995) in the History Textbooks of the Republic of Srpska." *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 6 (3): 51-72, December 2006.
- Behram, Mirsad. January 14, 2013. "Mostar: Osude uništenja spomenika borcima Armije RBiH. [Mostar: Officials Condemn Destruction of the Memorial to Soldiers of the Army of the Republic of BiH]." Radio Slobodna Evropa. <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/mostar-osude-unistenja-spomenika-borcima-armije-rbih/24823148.html> (accessed 14 January 2013).
- Bekhuis, Hidde, Stijn Ruiter, and Marcel Coenders. "Xenophobia among Youngsters: The Effect of Inter-Ethnic Contact." *European Sociological Review* 29 (2): 229-242, 2013.
- Berghahn, Volker R. and Schissler, Hanna. "Introduction: History Textbooks and Perceptions of the Past." In Volker R. Berghahn and Hanna Schissler (eds.) *Perceptions of History: International Textbook Research on Britain, Germany and the United States*. Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1987 (1-16).
- Bezhan, Frud. February 20, 2012. "New Afghan Textbooks Sidestep History." Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty. http://www.rferl.org/content/new_afghan_textbooks_sidestep_history/24490203.html (accessed 20 February 2012).
- Bieber, Florian. "Muslim Identity in the Balkans before the Establishment of Nation States." *Nationalities Papers* 28 (1): 13-28, 2000.
- Biruški, Dinka Čorkalo and Ajduković, Dean. "Separate Schools – A Divided Community: The Role of the School in Post-war Social Reconstruction." *Review of Psychology* 14 (2): 93-108, 2007.
- Boračić, Selma. January 19, 2010. "'Dvije škole pod jednim krovom' – problem bez kraja. ['Two Schools under One Roof' – a Problem with no End]." Radio Slobodna Evropa. http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/dvije_skole_isti_krov/1933384.html (accessed March 2012).
- Božić, Gordana. "Reeducating the Hearts of Bosnian Students: An Essay on Some Aspects of Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *East European Politics & Societies* 20 (2): 319-342, May 2006.
- Bringa, Tone. "Islam and the Quest for Identity in Post-Communist Bosnia-Herzegovina." In Maya Shatzmiller (ed.) *Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002 (24-34).
- Bringa, Tone. *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.

Bringa, Tone R. "National Categories, National Identification and Identity Formation in 'Multinational' Bosnia." *Anthropology of East Europe Review*: 80-89, 1993.

Centralna izborna komisija Bosne i Hercegovine / Središnje izborno povjerenstvo Bosne i Hercegovine. November 11, 2014. "Potvrđeni rezultati općih izbora 2014. godine. Zastupnički dom / Parlamentarne skupštine Bosne i Hercegovine. [Verified Results of the 2014 General Elections for the House of Representatives / Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina]." <http://www.izbori.ba/Potvrdjeni2014/Finalni/ParlamentBIH/Default.aspx> (accessed 30 January 2015).

Centralna izborna komisija Bosne i Hercegovine / Središnje izborno povjerenstvo Bosne i Hercegovine. November 11, 2010. "Potvrđeni rezultati općih izbora 2010. godine. Predsjedništvo BiH – Hrvatski član. [Verified Results of the 2010 General Elections for the Presidency of BiH – Croatian Member]." <http://www.izbori.ba/Finalni2010/Finalni/PredsjednistvoBiH/Default.aspx> (accessed 24 December 2014).

Chopivsky, Alexa. February 25, 2011. "Turning Ukraine into a 'Nation Without Identity.'" Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty. http://www.rferl.org/content/ukrainian_commentary/2320437.html (accessed 23 February 2014).

Clapper, James R. January 29, 2014. "Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community." Office of the Director of National Intelligence. <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/140129/clapper.pdf> (accessed 03 February 2014).

Clapper, James R. March 12, 2013. "Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community." Office of the Director of National Intelligence. <http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf> (accessed 13 March 2013).

Clark, Janine Natalya. "Reconciliation through Remembrance? War Memorials and the Victims of Vukovar." *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 7 (1): 116-135, March 2013.

Clark, Janine Natalya. "Education in Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Case for Root-and-Branch Reform." *Journal of Human Rights* 9 (3): 344-362, July 2010.

Clark, Janine Natalya. "Religion and Reconciliation in Bosnia & Herzegovina: Are Religious Actors Doing Enough?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 62 (4): 671-694, June 2010.

Cohen, Lenard J. "Prelates and Politicians in Bosnia: The Role of Religion in Nationalist Mobilisation." *Nationalities Papers* 25 (3): 481-499, 1997.

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. "The Referendum on Independence in Bosnia-Herzegovina: February 29 – March 1, 1992." http://www.csce.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=UserGroups.Home&ContentRecord_id=250&ContentType=G&ContentRecordType=G&UserGroup_id=5&Subaction=ByDate (accessed 03 April 2012).

- Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 1995. "Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina." Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/p_stream.php?kat=518 (accessed 21 February 2012).
- Coward, Martin. *Urbicide: The Politics of Urban Destruction*. London: Routledge, 2009.
- Cvjetičanin, Tijana, Roska Vrgova, Alisa Karović, Dalio Sijah, Darko Brkan, and Damir Damjanović. "Report on the Civic Monitoring of the Census in BiH 2013 - Popismonitor.ba" UG Zašto ne?. Sarajevo: March 2014. <http://zastone.ba/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/Report-on-the-Civic-Monitoring-of-the-Census-in-BiH-2013-%E2%80%93-Popismonitor.ba.pdf> (accessed 30 March 2014).
- Čehajić, Sabina and Brown, Rupert. "Silencing the Past: Effects of Intergroup Contact on Acknowledgement of In-Group Responsibility." *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 1 (2): 190-196, April 2010.
- Čehajić, Sabina, Rupert Brown, and Emanuele Castano. "Forgive and Forget? Antecedents and Consequences of Intergroup Forgiveness in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Political Psychology* 29 (3): 351-367, June 2008.
- Dahlman, Carl and Ó Tuathail, Gearóid. "Broken Bosnia: The Localized Geopolitics of Displacement and Return in Two Bosnian Places." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 95 (3): 644-662, September 2005.
- Dahlman, Carl and Ó Tuathail, Gearóid. "The Legacy of Ethnic Cleansing: The International Community and the Returns Process in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Political Geography* 24 (5): 569-599, June 2005.
- Dandy, Justine, Kevin Durkin, Peter McEvoy, Bonnie L. Barber, and Stephen Houghton. "Psychometric Properties of Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (MEIM) Scores with Australian Adolescents from Diverse Ethnocultural Groups." *Journal of Adolescence* 31 (3): 323-335, June 2008.
- Dayton Peace Accords. 1995. Electronic Archive of the U.S. State Department. <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html> (accessed 20 February 2012).
- Divjak, Jovan. "The First Phase, 1992-1993: Struggle for Survival and Genesis of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina." In Branka Magaš and Ivo Žanić (eds.) *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991-1995*. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001 (152-177).
- Dnevnik. September 3, 2012. "Hadžiomerović: Dvije škole pod jednim krovom treba još treba vremena. [Hadžiomerović: Two Schools Under One Roof Should Have More Time]." *Dnevnik*. <http://www.dnevnik.ba/novosti/bih/had%C5%BEiomerovi%C4%87-dvije-%C5%A1kole-pod-jednim-krovom-treba-jo%C5%A1-treba-vremena> (accessed 04 September 2012).

- Domović, Vlatka, Zlata Godler, and Vlatko Previšić. "Streamlining for Democracy: Intercultural Predispositions of the Croatian Secondary School Population." *Intercultural Education* 12 (3): 309-323, 2001.
- Donia, Robert J. "The Quest for Tolerance in Sarajevo's Textbooks." *Human Rights Review* 1 (2): 38-55, January-March, 2000.
- Donnelly, Caitlin. "Constructing the Ethos of Tolerance and Respect in an Integrated School: The Role of Teachers." *British Educational Research Journal* 30 (2): 263-278, April 2004.
- Dragun, Antonio. "Hrvati u Federaciji BiH: Povezanost suživota i opraštanja s individualnom religioznošću i društveno-političkim stavovima. [Croats in the Federation of BiH: The Relationship between Coexistence and Forgiveness with Individual Religiosity and Social-Political Attitudes]." *Revija za sociologiju* 37 (3-4): 165-180, prosinac 2006. godine.
- Džidić, Denis. November 4, 2014. "Bosnia Federation Rules Against Ethnically-Divided Schools." Balkan Insight. www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-federation-court-rules-against-school-discrimination (accessed 04 November 2014).
- Ehman, Lee H. "The American School in the Political Socialization Process." *Review of Educational Research* 50 (1): 99-119, Spring 1980.
- Ellison, Christopher G. and Powers, Daniel A. "The Contact Hypothesis and Racial Attitudes among Black Americans." *Social Science Quarterly* 75 (2): 385-400, June 1994.
- Erikson, Erik H. *Identity, Youth, and Crisis*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1968.
- Erikson, Erik H. *Childhood and Society*, 2nd edition. New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1963.
- European Commission. October 12, 2011. "Bosnia and Herzegovina 2011 Progress Report." European Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/reports_oct_2011_en.htm (accessed 12 October 2011).
- European Court of Human Rights. "Case of Zornić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Application no. 3681/06)." European Court of Human Rights. [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145566#{"itemid":\["001-145566"\]}](http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-145566#{) (accessed 15 July 2014).
- Ford, W. Scott. "Interracial Public Housing in a Border City: Another Look at the Contact Hypothesis." *American Journal of Sociology* 78 (6): 1426-1447, May 1973.
- Foster, Stuart J. and Crawford, Keith A. "The Critical Importance of History Textbook Research." In Stuart J. Foster and Keith A. Crawford (eds.) *What Shall We Tell the Children? International Perspectives on School History Textbooks*. Greenwich: Information Age Publishing Inc., 2006 (1-23).

- Freeman, Colin. August 1, 2010. "Lone Preacher: The Serb Mayor Who is Trying to Heal Bosnia's Scars of War." *The Telegraph*. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/bosnia/7920311/Lone-preacher-the-Serb-mayor-who-is-trying-to-heal-Bosnias-scars-of-war.html> (accessed 16 March 2012).
- Friedman, Francine. *Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Polity on the Brink*. New York: Routledge, 2004.
- Galbraith, Peter W. "Turning Points: Key Decisions in Making Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia." In Maya Shatzmiller (ed.) *Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002 (136-147).
- Gallatin, Judith. "Political Thinking in Adolescence." In Joseph Adelson (ed.) *Handbook of Adolescent Psychology*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980 (344-382).
- Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Greenburg, Robert D. *Language and Identity in the Balkans: Serbo-Croatian and its Disintegration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Greenburg, Edward S. "Consensus and Dissent: Trends in Political Socialization Research." In Edward S. Greenburg (ed.) *Political Socialization*. New York: Atherton, 1970 (1-18).
- Gurr, Ted Robert. *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993.
- Haggard, Stephan and Kaufman, Robert R. *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Hajdari, Una. October 27, 2014. "Kosovo Mountain Village Faces Educational Identity Crisis." *Balkan Insight*. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/kosovo-mountain-community-faces-educational-identity-crisis> (accessed 27 October 2014).
- Halimović, Dženana. February 6, 2010. "Vehabije u BiH: Od Bočinje do Maoče. [Wahhabis in BiH: From Bočinja to Maoča]." *Radio Slobodna Evropa*. <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/maoca-vehabije-selefije-akcija-svjetlost/1950070.html> (accessed 26 June 2014).
- Hanks, Michael and Eckland, Bruce K. "Adult Voluntary Associations and Adolescent Socialization." *The Sociological Quarterly* 19 (3): 481-490, 1978.
- Hashemi, Nader. "Peacekeeping with No Peace to Keep: The Failure of Canadian Foreign Policy in Bosnia." In Maya Shatzmiller (ed.) *Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002 (183-211).

- Hello, Evelyn, Peer Scheepers, Ad Vermulst, and Jan R.M. Gerris. "Association Between Educational Attainment and Ethnic Distance in Young Adults: Socialization by Schools or Parents?" *Acta Sociologica* 47 (3): 253-275, September 2004.
- Hewstone, Miles, Ed Cairns, Alberto Voci, Juergen Hamberger, and Ulrike Niens. "Intergroup Contact, Forgiveness, and Experience of 'The Troubles' in Northern Ireland." *Journal of Social Issues* 62 (1): 99-120, 2006.
- Heyneman, Stephen P. "Defining the Influence of Education on Social Cohesion." *International Journal of Educational Policy, Research, and Practice* 3 (4): 73-97, 2002-2003.
- Hjort, Hanna and Frisé, Ann. "Ethnic Identity and Reconciliation: Two Main Tasks for the Young in Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Adolescence* 41 (161): 141-163, Spring 2006.
- Hodson, Randy, Duško Sekulić, and Garth Massey. "National Tolerance in the Former Yugoslavia." *American Journal of Sociology* 99 (6): 1534-1558, May 1994.
- Hooghe, Marc, Cecil Meeusen, and Ellen Quintelier. "The Impact of Education and Intergroup Friendship on the Development of Ethnocentrism. A Latent Growth Curve Model Analysis of a Five-Year Panel Study among Belgian Late Adolescents." *European Sociological Review* 29 (6): 1109-1121, 2013.
- Hromadžić, Azra. "Discourses of Integration and Practices of Reunification at the Mostar Gymnasium, Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Comparative Education Review* 52 (4): 541-563, 2008.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Shuster, 1996.
- Hutton, Deborah S. and Mehlinger, Howard D. "International Textbook Revision: Examples from the United States." In Volker R. Berghahn and Hannah Schissler (eds.) *Perceptions of History: International Textbook Research on Britain, Germany and the United States*. Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1987 (141-156).
- Ingrao, Charles. "Weapons of Mass Instruction: Schoolbooks and Democratization in Multiethnic Central Europe." *Journal of Educational Media, Memory, and Society* 1 (1): 180-189, Spring 2009.
- International Crisis Group. February 26, 2013. "Bosnia's Dangerous Tango: Islam and Nationalism." International Crisis Group Policy Briefing No. 70: 1-24.
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/bosnia-herzegovina/b070-bosnias-dangerous-tango-islam-and-nationalism.aspx> (accessed 26 February 2013).

Inzko, Valentin. June 11, 2014. "46th Report of the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations." Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=48883#03down (accessed 12 June 2014).

Inzko, Valentin. November 8, 2013. "44th Report of the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations." Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=48284 (accessed 07 April 2014).

Inzko, Valentin. November 8, 2012. "42nd Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations." Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://www.ohr.int/other-doc/hr-reports/default.asp?content_id=47611#ftn_7b (accessed 23 December 2012).

Iveković, Ivan. "Nationalism and the Political Use and Abuse of Religion: The Politicalization of Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam in Yugoslav Successor States." *Social Compass* 49 (4): 523-536, 2002.

Jackman, Mary R. and Crane, Marie. "'Some of My Best Friends are Black...': Interracial Friendship and Whites' Racial Attitudes." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 50 (4): 459-486, 1986.

Jackson, J. Edward. *A User's Guide to Principal Components*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003.

Janmaat, Jan Germen. "The Effect of Classroom Diversity on Tolerance and Participation in England, Sweden and Germany." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 38 (1): 21-39, January 2012.

Jennings, M. Kent and Niemi, Richard G. "Political Learning in Perspective." In M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi (eds.) *The Political Character of Adolescence: The Influence of Families and Schools*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974 (319-335).

Juhász, Adrienn Lilla. "Emerging Social Realities in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Limits of Institutionalizing Ethnicity." *Regio: Minorities, Politics, Society* 1 (17): 175-192, 2007. (English edition of *Regio: Kisebbség, Politika, Társadalom*).

Jukić, Elvira M. February 16, 2015. "Bosnian Baby Beats Ethnically-Divided System." *Balkan Insight*. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-baby-beats-ethnically-divided-system> (accessed 16 February 2015).

Jukić, Elvira M. January 26, 2015. "Islamists Interrupt Prayers at Sarajevo Mosque." *Balkan Insight*. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/islamic-extremists-interrupt-prayer-at-a-sarajevo-mosque> (accessed 26 January 2015).

- Jukić, Elvira M. November 13, 2014. "Bosnia Police Round Up More Alleged Terrorists." *Balkan Insight*. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-police-arrests-11-alleged-terrorists> (accessed 13 November 2014).
- Jukić, Elvira M. September 3, 2014. "Bosnia Arrests 16 Suspected Jihad Recruiters." *Balkan Insight*. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnia-arrests-15-alleged-terrorists> (accessed 03 September 2014).
- Jukić, Elvira M. January 31, 2014. "Bosniak Parents Abandon Sarajevo Street Protest." *Balkan Insight*. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/school-row-protesters-leave-sarajevo> (accessed 31 January 2014).
- Jukić, Elvira M. September 17, 2013. "Bošnjaci bojkotiraju nastavu zbog 'diskriminacije' [Bosniaks Boycott School due to 'Discrimination']." *Balkanska tranziciona pravda [Balkan Transitional Justice] / Balkan Insight*. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/rs/article/bošnjaci-bojkotiraju-nastavu-zbog-diskriminacije> (accessed 17 September 2013).
- Jukić, Elvira M. August 20, 2013. "Bosnian Serb Struggle May last 'Generations.'" *Balkan Insight*. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/dodik-generations-will-fight-for-serb-independence> (accessed 20 August 2013).
- Kaletović, Bedrana. July 13, 2011. "Two Schools Under One Roof: Double Schools Represents Ethnic Segregation by Another Name in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Southeast European Times*. http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2011/07/13/feature-04 (accessed 22 April 2012).
- Kaplan, Robert D. *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History*. New York: Vintage Books, 2003.
- Karabegović, Dženana. October 25, 2012. "Federacija BiH: Sud podržao etničku segregaciju u školama. [Federation of BiH: Court Endorsed Ethnic Segregation in Schools]." *Radio Slobodna Evropa*. <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/federacija-bih-sud-podrzao-podjele-u-skolama/24751064.html> (accessed 02 November 2012).
- Karadaku, Linda. November 8, 2011. "History in Kosovo Schools Still Behind the Times." *Southeast European Times*. http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2011/08/11/feature-05 (accessed 23 April 2012).
- Katana, Erduan. April 27, 2015. "Ko o čemu – SNSD o samostalnosti RS." *Radio Slobodna Evropa*. <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/content/ko-o-cemu-snsd-o-samostalnosti-rs/26981294.html> (accessed 27 April 2015).
- Kolouh-Westin, Lidija. "Education and Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *International Journal of Educational Development* 24 (5): 495-509, September 2004.

- Koren, Snježana and Baranović, Branislava. "What Kind of History Education Do We Have after Eighteen Years of Democracy in Croatia? Transition, Intervention, and History Education Politics (1990-2008)." In Augusta Dimou (ed.) *Transition and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe*. Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2009 (91-140).
- Korostelina, Karina. "War of Textbooks: History Education in Russia and Ukraine." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43 (2): 129-137, June 2010.
- Kosić, Ankica and Tauber, Charles David. "Promoting Reconciliation through Youth: Cross-Community Initiatives in Vukovar, Croatia." *Peace and Conflict* 16: 81-95, 2010.
- Kostovicova, Denisa. "Republika Srpska and its Boundaries in Bosnian Serb Geographical Narratives in the Post-Dayton Period." *Space and Polity* 8 (3): 267-287, December 2004.
- Kukić, Slavo. "Položaj nacionalnih i vjerskih manjina u Bosni i Hercegovini. [Position of National and Religious Minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina]." *Politička misao* 38 (3): 122-137, srpnja 2001. godine [July 2001].
- Kunovich, Robert M. and Hodson, Randy. "Ethnic Diversity, Segregation, and Inequality: A Structural Model of Ethnic Prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia." *The Sociological Quarterly* 43 (2): 185-212, 2002.
- Kunovich, Robert M. and Hodson, Randy. "Conflict, Religious Identity, and Ethnic Intolerance in Croatia." *Social Forces* 78 (2): 643-668, December 1999.
- Lampe, John R. *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There was a Country*, 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Langton, Kenneth P. and Jennings, M. Kent. "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States." *The American Political Science Review* 62 (3): 852-867, September 1968.
- Latal, Srećko. April 27, 2015. "Bosnian Party Congresses Set Stage for New Conflicts." Balkan Insight. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-parties-congresses-set-stage-for-new-tensions> (accessed 27 April 2015).
- Lijphart, Arend. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
- Malcolm, Noel. *Bosnia: A Short History*. London: Pan Books, 2002.
- Marcia, James E. "Identity in Adolescence." In Joseph Adelson (ed.) *Handbook of Adolescent Psychology*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980 (159-187).

- Matejčić, Barbara. February 21, 2012. "Vukovar Still Imprisoned by its Bloody Past." *Balkan Insight*. <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/vukovar-still-imprisoned-by-its-bloody-past> (accessed 21 February 2012).
- McGlynn, Claire, Ulrike Niens, Ed Cairns, and Miles Hewstone. "Moving Out of Conflict: The Contribution of Integrated Schools in Northern Ireland to Identity, Attitudes, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation." *Journal of Peace Education* 1 (2): 147-163, September 2004.
- McGlynn, Claire. "Education for Peace in Integrated Schools: A Priority for Northern Ireland?" *Child Care in Practice* 10 (2): 85-94, April 2004.
- McGuire, William J. and McGuire, Claire V. "Significant Others in Self-space: Sex Differences and Developmental Trends in the Social Self." In J. Suls (ed.) *Psychological Perspectives of the Self*, vol. 1. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1982 (71-96).
- Mearsheimer, John J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001.
- Milanović, Marko. "Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina." *American Journal of International Law* 104: 1-12, 2010.
- Mitchell, Claire. "The Religious Content of Ethnic Identities." *Sociology* 40 (6): 1135-1152, December 2006.
- Morrison, Kenneth. *Wahhabism in the Balkans*. Shrivenham: Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, February 2008.
- Mujkić, Asim and Hulsey, John. "Explaining the Success of Nationalist Parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Politička misao: Croatian Political Science Review* 47 (2): 143-158, 2010.
- Murgescu, Mirela-Luminița. "Rewriting School Textbooks as a Tool of Understanding and Stability." *Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 2 (1): 90-104, January 2002.
- Newton, Kenneth. "May the Weak Force be with You: The Power of the Mass Media in Modern Politics." *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (2): 209-234, 2006.
- Niemi, Richard G. and Hepburn, Mary A. "The Rebirth of Political Socialization." *Perspectives on Political Science* 24 (1): 1-18, Winter 1995.
- Niemi, Richard G. and Junn, Jane. "Civics Courses and the Political Knowledge of High School Seniors." Conference Paper. Presented at the 89th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. Washington, D.C. 1993.
- Oder, Elizabeth. "The Social Cohesion Role of Educational Organizations: Primary and Secondary Schools." *Peabody Journal of Education* 80 (4): 78-88, 2005.

- Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. August 31, 2012. "Brčko Supervisor Roderick Moore Suspends Functions." Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina. http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/pressr/default.asp?content_id=47427 (accessed 31 August 2012).
- Oliver, J. Eric and Wong, Janelle. "Intergroup Prejudice in Multiethnic Settings." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (4): 567-582, October 2003.
- O'Loughlin, John. "Inter-ethnic Friendships in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Ethnicities* 10 (1): 26-54, 2010.
- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Curricular Reform." OSCE Mission to BiH. <http://www.oscebih.org/Default.aspx?id=31&lang=EN> (accessed 22 April 2012).
- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2005. "Compendium of Selected Reports on Education in BiH, 2004-2005." OSCE Mission to BiH. <http://www.oscebih.org/documents/1482-eng.pdf> (accessed 24 April 2012).
- Ó Tuathail, Gearóid and Dahlman, Carl. "The 'West Bank of the Drina:' Land Allocation and Ethnic Engineering in Republika Srpska." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 31 (3): 304-322, September 2006.
- Pašalić-Kreso, Adila. "The War and Post-War Impact on the Educational System of Bosnia and Herzegovina." *International Review of Education* 54 (3-4): 353-374, 2008.
- Pavić, Snježana. August 28, 2010. "Zdravko Krsmanović: Muslimani mu vjeruju, a Dodik ga ne može vidjeti. [Zdravko Krsmanović: Muslims Believe Him, and Dodik Cannot See It]." *Jutarnji list*. <http://www.jutarnji.hr/zdravko-krsmanovic---muslimani-mu-vjeruju--a-dodik-ga-ne-moze-vidjeti/881259/> (accessed 16 March 2012).
- Perry, Valery. "At Cross Purposes? Democratization and Peace Implementation Strategies in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Frozen Conflict." *Human Rights Review* 10 (1): 35-54, March 2009.
- Perry, Valery. "Reading, Writing and Reconciliation: Educational Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina." European Centre for Minority Issues, Working Paper #18: 1-106, September 2003.
- Pingel, Falk. "From Ownership to Intervention – or Vice Versa? Textbook Revision in Bosnia and Herzegovina." In Augusta Dimou (ed.) *Transition and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe*. Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2009 (251-305).
- Phinney, Jean S. "Understanding Ethnic Diversity: The Role of Ethnic Identity." *American Behavioral Scientist* 40 (2): 143-152, November / December 1996.

- Phinney, Jean S. "A Three-Stage Model of Ethnic Identity Development." In M. Bernal and G. Knight (eds.) *Ethnic Identity: Formation and Transmission among Hispanic and Other Minorities*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993 (61-79).
- Phinney, Jean S. "The Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure: A New Scale for Use with Adolescents and Young Adults from Diverse Groups." *Journal of Adolescent Research* 7 (2): 156-176, April 1992.
- Phinney, Jean S. "Ethnic Identity in Adolescents and Adults: Review of Research." *Psychological Bulletin* 108 (3): 499-514, 1990.
- Phinney, Jean S. and Rotheram, Mary Jane. "Children's Ethnic Socialization: Themes and Implications." In Jean S. Phinney and Mary Jane Rotheram (eds.) *Children's Ethnic Socialization: Pluralism and Development*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1987 (274-292).
- Phuong, Catherine. "'Freely to Return:' Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Journal of Refugee Studies* 13 (2): 165-183, 2000.
- PopisMonitor. March 25, 2014. "U Dobretićima popisano triput više ljudi od stvarnog broja stanovništva. [In Dobretići, the Census Listed Three Times as many People than the Actual Population]." PopisMonitor. <http://popismonitor.ba/u-dobreticima-popisano-triput-vise-ljudi-od-stvarnog-broja-stanovnistva/> (accessed 29 March 2014).
- Radio Slobodna Evropa. November 2013. "Mapa: Etnička struktura BiH 1991. godine. [Map: Ethnic Structure of BiH in 1991]." Radio Slobodna Evropa. <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/section/bosnian-census/3428.html> (accessed 06 November 2013).
- Radio Slobodna Evropa. April 29, 2012. "Sud u Mostaru naložio uspostavu jedinstvenih škola. [Court in Mostar Orders the Establishment of Unified Schools]." Radio Slobodna Evropa. <http://www.slobodnaevropa.org/archive/news/20120429/500/500.html?id=24564132> (accessed 29 April 2012).
- Ramadanović, Jusuf. February 9, 2010. "BiH Court Orders Detention of Arrested Wahhabi Islamic Group Members." Southeast European Times. http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2010/02/09/feature-03 (accessed 26 June 2014).
- Ramet, Sabrina P. *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milošević*, 4th edition. Boulder: Westview Press, 2002.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. and Adamović, Ljubiša S. *Beyond Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics, and Culture in a Shattered Community*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.

Reidy, Catherine M., Laura K. Taylor, Christine K. Merrilees, Dean Ajduković, Dinka Čorkalo-Biruški, and E. Mark Cummings. "The Political Socialization of Youth in a post-conflict Community." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 45: 11-23, March 2015.

Rieffer, Barbara-Ann J. "Religion and Nationalism: Understanding the Consequences of a Complex Relationship." *Ethnicities* 3 (2): 215-242, June 2003.

Roberts, Robert E., Jean S. Phinney, Louise C. Masse, Y. Richard Chen, Catherine R. Roberts, and Andrea Romero. "The Structure of Ethnic Identity in Young Adolescents from Diverse Ethnocultural Groups." *Journal of Early Adolescence* 19 (3): 301-322, August 1999.

Rotheram, Mary Jane and Phinney, Jean S. "Introduction: Definitions and Perspectives in the Study of Children's Ethnic Socialization." In Jean S. Phinney and Mary Jane Rotheram (eds.) *Children's Ethnic Socialization: Pluralism and Development*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1987 (10-28).

Sanić-Hadžihasanović, Gordana. October 1, 2013. "Historic Census Pushes Bosnians to Decide Who They Are." Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty. <http://www.rferl.org/content/bosnia-census/25123381.html> (accessed 01 October 2013).

Schöpflin, George. "Identities, Politics and post-Communism in Central Europe." *Nations and Nationalism* 9 (4): 477-490, 2003.

Sekulić, Duško, Garth Massey, and Randy Hodson. "Ethnic Intolerance and Ethnic Conflict in the dissolution of Yugoslavia." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 29: 797-827, 2006.

Sekulić, Duško and Šporer, Željka. "Religioznost kao prediktor vrijednosnih orijentacija. [Religiosity as a Predictor of Value Orientations]." *Revija za sociologiju* 37 (1-2): 1-19, lipanj 2006. godine.

Sells, Michael A. "Crosses of Blood: Sacred Space, Religion and Violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Sociology of Religion* 64 (3): 309-331, Autumn 2003.

Sells, Michael A. "The Construction of Islam in Serbian Religious Mythology and Its Consequences." In Maya Shatzmiller (ed.) *Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002 (56-85).

Sells, Michael A. *The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia*. Berkely: University of California Press, 1996.

Shrader, Charles R. *The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military History, 1992-1994*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, June 2003.

- Sindelar, Daisy. February 23, 2014. "As Heads Role in Kiev, Few Tears Shed for Divisive Education Minister." Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty. <http://www.rferl.org/content/as-heads-roll-in-kyiv-few-tears-shed-for-divisive-education-minister/25274495.html> (accessed 23 February 2014).
- Sivac-Bryant, Sebina. "The Omarska Memorial Project as an Example of How Transitional Justice Interventions Can Produce Hidden Harms." *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 9 (1): 170-180, 2015.
- Sivac-Bryant, Sebina. "Kozarac School: A Window on Transitional Justice for Returnees." *The International Journal of Transitional Justice* 2 (1): 106-115, 2008.
- Skrbiš, Zlatko. "The Apparitions of the Virgin Mary of Međugorje: The Convergence of Croatian Nationalism and Her Apparitions." *Nations and Nationalism* 11 (3): 443-461, 2005.
- Smith, Alan. "Citizenship Education in Northern Ireland: Beyond National Identity?" *Cambridge Journal of Education* 33 (1): 15-31, 2003.
- Smith, Alan. "Religious Segregation and the Emergence of Integrated Schools in Northern Ireland." *Oxford Review of Education* 27 (4): 559-575, 2001.
- Snyder, Jack and Ballentine, Karen. "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas." *International Security* 21 (2): 5-40, Fall 1996.
- Soule, Suzanne. 2000. "Beyond Communism and War: The Effect of Civic Education on the Democratic Attitudes and Behavior of Bosnian and Herzegovinian Youth." Center for Civic Education. <http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED447046.pdf> (accessed 26 January 2015).
- Srednja mješovita škola Žepče. "Povijest škole. [History of the School]." Srednja mješovita škola Žepče. <http://www.smszepce.info/index.php/info/povijest> (accessed 02 October 2012).
- Stabback, Philip. "Common Curriculum, Core Curriculum or Common Curriculum Standards – Finding a Solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina." *Prospects: Quarterly Review of Comparative Education* 37: 449-467, 2007.
- Statut Brčko Distrikta Bosne i Hercegovine. 2010. "Statut Brčko Distrikta Bosne i Hercegovine. [Statute of the Brčko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina]." Vlada Brčko Distrikta BiH. <http://www.bdcentral.net/index.php/ba/vani-akti/statut-brko-distrikta-bih> (accessed 30 March 2012).
- Stojanović, Dubravka. "Value Changes in the Interpretations of History in Serbia." In Ola Lishaug, Sabrina P. Ramet, and Dragana Dulić (eds.) *Civic and Uncivic Values: Serbia in the post-Milošević Era*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2011 (221-240).

- Stojanović, Dubravka. "Slow Burning: History Textbook in Serbia, 1993-2008." In Augusta Dimou (ed.) *Transition and the Politics of History Education in Southeast Europe*. Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2009 (141-158).
- Swimelar, Safia. "Education in Post-war Bosnia: The Nexus of Societal Security, Identity and Nationalism." *Ethnopolitics* 11 (2): 1-22, 2012.
- Tajfel, Henri. *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Tanner, Marcus. *Croatia: A Nation Forged in War*, 2nd edition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001.
- Thompson, Mark. *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*. Avon: The Bath Press, May 1994.
- Torsti, Pilvi. "Segregated Education and Texts: A Challenge to Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina." *International Journal on World Peace* 26 (2): 65-82, June 2009.
- Torsti, Pilvi. "How to Deal with a Difficult Past? History Textbooks Supporting Enemy Images in Post-War Bosnia and Hercegovina." *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 39 (1): 77-96, 2007.
- Torsti, Pilvi. "History Culture and Banal Nationalism in post-War Bosnia." *Southeast European Politics* 5 (2-3): 142-157, December 2004.
- Umaña-Taylor, Adriana J., Ruchi Bhanot, and Nana Shin. "Ethnic Identity Formation During Adolescence: The Critical Role of Families." *Journal of Family Issues* 27 (3): 390-414, March 2006.
- Umaña-Taylor, Adriana J., Ani Yazedjian, and Mayra Bámaca-Gómez. "Developing the Ethnic Identity Scale Using Eriksonian and Social Identity Perspectives." *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research* 4 (1): 9-38, 2004.
- Umaña-Taylor, Adriana J. "Ethnic Identity Development among Mexican-origin Latino Adolescents Living in the U.S." Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Columbia: University of Missouri – Columbia, 2001.
- United States Agency for International Development. "Overview: Bosnia and Herzegovina." USAID. http://www.usaid.gov/locations/Europe_eurasia/countries/ba/index.html (accessed 29 December 2011).
- United States Agency for International Development. November 6, 2013. "Fact Sheet: Strengthening Independent Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina." United States Agency for International Development. <http://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-strengthening-independent-media-bosnia-and-herzegovina> (accessed 10 November 2013).

Ustavni sud Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine. February 19, 1998. "Broj U-11/97. [Ruling Number U-11/97]." Ustavni sud Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine. http://www.ustavnisudfbih.ba/bs/open_page_nw.php?1=bs&pid=158 (accessed 21 February 2012).

Ustav Bosansko-podrinjskog kantona Goražde. June 1998. "Ustav Bosansko-podrinjskog kantona Goražde. [Constitution of Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Goražde]." Vlada Bosansko-podrinjskog kantona Goražde. http://www.bpkg.gov.ba/media/images/2011/07/ustav_bpk_gorazde.pdf (accessed 21 February 2012).

Ustav Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine. 1994. "Ustav Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine. [Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina]." Ustavni sud Federacije Bosne i Hercegovine. <http://www.ustavnisudfbih.ba/bs/dokumenti/ustav.pdf> (accessed 21 February 2012).

Ustav Hercegbosanske županije. 1996. "Ustav Hercegbosanske županije. [Constitution of Hercegbosanska Canton]." Skupština Hercegbosanske županije. http://www.vladahbz.com/nm/1996/NN_03_1996.pdf (accessed 21 February 2012).

Ustav Hercegovačko-neretvanske županije-kantona. December 1996. "Ustav Hercegovačko-neretvanske županije-kantona. [Constitution of Herzegovina-Neretva Canton]." Vlada Hercegovačko-neretvanske županije / Hercegovačko-neretvanskog kantona. <http://www.vlada-hnz-k.ba/hr/ustav/ustav-hn%C5%BE> (accessed 21 February 2012).

Ustav Kantona Sarajevo. 1996. "Ustav Kantona Sarajevo. [Constitution of Canton Sarajevo]." Vlada kantona Sarajevo. <http://www.ks.gov.ba/node/2330> (accessed 21 February 2012).

Ustav Republike Srpske. 1992. "Ustav Republike Srpske. [Constitution of Republika Srpska]." Ustavni sud Republike Srpske. http://www.ustavnisud.Org/upload/4_8_2009_48_ustav_srpski.pdf (accessed 21 February 2012).

Ustav Srednjobosanskog kantona. December 2005. "Ustav Srednjobosanskog kantona. [Constitution of Central Bosnia Canton]." Vlada kantona Središnja Bosna / Srednjobosanskog kantona. http://www.sbk-ksb.gov.ba/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=18&Itemid=33 (accessed 21 February 2012).

Ustav Tuzlanskog kantona. 2005. "Ustav Tuzlanskog kantona. [Constitution of Tuzla Canton]." Skupština Tuzlanskog kantona. <http://skupstinatk.kim.ba/b/s/ustav.htm> (accessed 21 February 2012).

Ustav Unsko-sanskog kantona. December 2003. "Ustav Unsko-sanskog kantona. [Constitution of Una-Sana Canton]." <http://vladausk.ba/dokumenti/ustav.pdf> (accessed 21 February 2012).

Ustav Zeničko-dobojskog kantona. September 1995. "Ustav Zeničko-dobojskog kantona. [Constitution of Zenica-Doboj Canton]." Službene stranice Skupštine i Vlade. <http://www.zdk.ba/prikazi/43-ustav/158-ustav-zeni%C4%8Dko-dobojskog-kantona> (accessed 21 February 2012).

Ustav Županije Posavske. April 10, 1996. "Ustav Županije Posavske. [Constitution of Posavina Canton]." Vlada Županije Posavske. http://www.zupanijaposavska.ba/nova2/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=97&Itemid=154 (accessed 21 February 2012).

Ustav Županije Zapadnohercegovačke. 1996. "Ustav Županije Zapadnohercegovačke. [Constitution of West Herzegovina Canton]." Skupština Županije Zapadnohercegovačke. http://www.skupstina-zzh.ba/opsirnije.asp?id_kategorija=1&id=10 (accessed 21 February 2012).

Voicu, Mălina. "Effect of Nationalism on Religiosity in 30 European Countries." *European Sociological Review* 28 (3): 333-343, June 2012.

Voltmer, Katrin. "The Mass Media and the Dynamics of Political Communication in Processes of Democratization." In Katrin Voltmer (ed.) *Mass Media and Political Communication in New Democracies*. New York: Routledge, 2006 (1-20).

Vural, Yücel and Özuyanık, Evrim. "Redefining Identity in the Turkish-Cypriot School History Textbooks: A Step Towards a United Federal Cyprus." *South European Society & Politics* 13 (2): 133-154, June 2008.

Washington Agreement. 1994. Peace Agreements Digital Collection of the United States Institute of Peace. http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/washagree_03011994.pdf (accessed 03 March 2012).

Worrell, Frank C., Liza M. Conyers, Elias Mpofu, and Beverly J. Vandiver. "Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure Scores in a Sample of Adolescents from Zimbabwe." *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research* 6 (1): 35-59, 2006.

Youniss, James, Jeffery A. McLellan, and Miranda Yates. "What We Know about Engendering Civic Identity." *The American Behavioral Scientist* 40 (5): 620-631, March/April 1997.

Zakošek, Nenad. "The Heavy Burden of History: Political Uses of the Past in the Yugoslav Successor States." *Politička misao: Croatian Political Science Review* 44 (5): 29-43, June 2008.

Zaller, John. "The Myth of Massive Media Impact Revived: New Support for a Discredited Idea." In Diana G. Mutz, Paul M. Sniderman, and Richard A. Brody (eds.) *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996 (17-78).

Zagefka, Hanna and Brown, Rupert. "The Relationship between Acculturation Strategies, Relative Fit, and Intergroup Relations: Immigrant-majority Relations in Germany." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 32: 171-188, 2002.

Zavod za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine. *Popis 1991. godine SR Bosne i Hercegovine*. [1991 *Census of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina*]. Zavod za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine - Bilten broj 234. Sarajevo: 1991. godine.

LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: SURVEY IN ENGLISH

I. People relate to their own national group in different ways, and the following statements describe how you may experience your own nationality. Use the numbers below to indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement.

(1) Strongly disagree (2) Disagree (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree

Statement	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. I have spent time trying to find out more about my national group, such as its history, traditions, and customs.	1	2	3	4
2. I am active in organizations or social groups that include mostly members of my own national group.	1	2	3	4
3. I have a clear sense of my national background and what it means for me.	1	2	3	4
4. I think a lot about how my life will be affected by my national group membership.	1	2	3	4
5. I am happy that I am a member of the group I belong to.	1	2	3	4
6. I have a strong sense of belonging to my own national group.	1	2	3	4
7. I understand pretty well what my national group membership means to me.	1	2	3	4
8. In order to learn more about my nation, I have often talked to other people about my national group.	1	2	3	4
9. I have a lot of pride in my national group.	1	2	3	4
10. I participate in cultural practices of my own group, such as special food, music, or customs.	1	2	3	4
11. I feel a strong attachment towards my own national group.	1	2	3	4
12. I feel good about my national group and cultural background.	1	2	3	4

13. My nationality is:

1. Bosniak
2. Croat
3. Serb
4. Bosnian
5. Roma
6. Other (write in): _____.

14. My father's nationality is:

1. Bosniak
2. Croat
3. Serb
4. Bosnian
5. Roma
6. Other (write in): _____.

15. My mother's nationality is:

1. Bosniak
2. Croat
3. Serb
4. Bosnian
5. Roma
6. Other (write in): _____.

II. The following statements describe different situations in which you may have the opportunity to socialize with people from other nationalities. Use the numbers below to indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement.

(1) Strongly Disagree (2) Disagree (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree

Statement	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. I like meeting and getting to know people from other national groups.	1	2	3	4
2. I sometimes feel it would be better if the different national groups did not try to mix together.	1	2	3	4
3. I often spend time with people from other national groups.	1	2	3	4
4. I do not try to become friends with people from other national groups.	1	2	3	4
5. I am involved in activities with people from other national groups.	1	2	3	4
6. I enjoy being around people from other national groups.	1	2	3	4

III. The following statements deal with your family. Use the numbers below to indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement.

(1) Strongly Disagree (2) Disagree (3) Neither Agree nor Disagree (4) Agree (5) Strongly Agree

Statement	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. My family teaches me about my national / cultural background.	1	2	3	4	5
2. My family encourages me to respect the cultural values and beliefs of our national / cultural group.	1	2	3	4	5
3. My family participates in activities that are specific to my national group.	1	2	3	4	5
4. Our home is decorated with things that reflect our national / cultural background.	1	2	3	4	5
5. The people who my family hangs out with the most are people who are members of our national group.	1	2	3	4	5
6. My family teaches me about the values and beliefs of our national/cultural background.	1	2	3	4	5
7. My family talks about how important it is to know about my national / cultural background.	1	2	3	4	5
8. My family celebrates holidays that are specific to our national / cultural group.	1	2	3	4	5
9. My family teaches me about the history of our national / cultural group.	1	2	3	4	5
10. My family listens to music sung or played by artists from our national group.	1	2	3	4	5
11. My family attends things such as concerts, plays, festivals, or other events that represent our national / cultural background.	1	2	3	4	5
12. My family feels a strong attachment to our national / cultural group.	1	2	3	4	5

IV. The following statements deal with friendships. For question one, please provide a number of your choice. For questions two, three, and four, please use the numbers below to indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement.

1. How many friends do you have among members from other national groups who live in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

_____.

(1) Strongly Disagree (2) Disagree (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree

Statement	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
2. I often spend time with my friends from other national groups.	1	2	3	4
3. I feel close to my friends from other national groups.	1	2	3	4
4. My friends who are members of other national groups are very similar to me.	1	2	3	4

V. Other Questions

1. Sex:
 1. Male
 2. Female
2. What is the highest education of your mother?
 1. Did not finish elementary school
 2. Elementary school
 3. Completed secondary technical school (three or four year)
 4. High school diploma
 5. University degree
 6. Post-graduate degree (Masters, Ph.D., etc.)
 7. I don't know
3. What is the highest level of education of your father?
 1. Did not finish elementary school
 2. Elementary school
 3. Completed secondary technical school (three or four year)
 4. High school diploma
 5. University degree
 6. Post-graduate degree (Masters, Ph.D., etc.)
 7. I don't know
4. Upon graduation, do you plan on attending university?
 1. Yes
 2. No
5. How often would you say you go to church / mosque?
 1. Every week
 2. Every other week
 3. Once or twice a month
 4. A few times a year
 5. Never
6. Do you consider religion to be an important part of your life, or not?
 1. Yes
 2. No
7. Do you believe in God, or not?
 1. Yes
 2. No
8. How proud are you to be a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
 1. Not at all proud
 2. Not very proud
 3. Quite proud
 4. Very proud

VITA

EDUCATION

- The Florida State University, August 2009.
 - o M.S., International Affairs.
 - o Global Pathways Certificate: Area and Regional Studies.
- The Florida State University, August 2007.
 - o B.S., Political Science.
 - o Minors in: Aerospace Studies, History, and International Affairs.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE SKILLS AND TRAINING

- Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian.
 - o Arizona State University, Critical Languages Institute; Summer 2012 and Summer 2011.

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

- Graduate Instructor at the University of Mississippi, 2014 – 2015.
 - o “Introduction to Comparative Politics.”
- Teaching Assistant at the University of Mississippi, 2013 – 2014.

FELLOWSHIPS AND GRANTS

- National Security Education Program, David L. Boren Fellowship; June 2012 – July 2013.
 - o One-year dissertation field research in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
 - o Intermediate Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian intensive language training at the Critical Languages Institute, Arizona State University (Summer 2012).
- U.S. Department of State Title VIII Fellowship, Summer 2012 and Summer 2011.
 - o Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian intensive language training.
 - o Awarded by the Critical Languages Institute, Arizona State University.
- U.S. Department of State Title VIII Advanced Language Fellowship, Summer 2012.
 - o American Councils for International Education, Southeast European Language Training Program (intermediate Bosnian in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina); declined.

- International Distinguished Engagement Award – Imre Sándor Memorial Scholarship.
 - o The Critical Languages Institute, Arizona State University (Summer 2011).
- University of Mississippi Department of Political Science and Graduate School conference travel grants.
 - o January 2015, June 2013, October 2011, April 2011, and June 2010.
- Sherwood and Janet Roberts Blue Memorial Scholarship, 2010 – 2012.